lect12-第1章

按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！







Lecture　XII





Sovereignty





　　　　The　historical　theories　commonly　received　among　English


lawyers　have　done　so　much　harm　not　only　to　the　study　of　law　but


to　the　study　of　history；　that　an　account　of　the　origin　and　growth


of　our　legal　system；　founded　on　the　examination　of　new　materials


and　the　re…examination　of　old　ones；　is　perhaps　the　most　urgently


needed　of　all　additions　to　English　knowledge。　But　next　to　a　new


history　of　law；　what　we　most　require　is　a　new　philosophy　of　law。


If　our　country　ever　gives　birth　to　such　a　philosophy；　we　shall


probably　owe　it　to　two　advantages。　The　first　of　them　is　our


possession　of　a　legal　system　which　for　many　purposes　may　be


considered　indigenous。　Our　national　pride；　which　has　sometimes


retarded　or　limited　our　advance　in　juridical　enquiry；　has　kept


our　law　singularly　pure　from　mixture　with　the　stream　of　legal


rules　flowing　from　the　great　fountain　of　the　Roman　Corpus　Juris；


and　thus；　when　we　place　it　in　juxtaposition　with　any　other


European　legal　system；　the　results　of　the　comparison　are　far　more


fruitful　of　instruction　than　those　obtained　by　contrasting　the


various　Continental　bodies　of　law　with　one　another。　The　second


advantage　I　believe　to　consist　in　the　growing　familiarity　of


Englishmen　with　the　investigations　of　the　so…called　Analytical


Jurists；　of　whom　the　most　considerable　are　Jeremy　Bentham　and


John　Austin。　Of　this　advantage　we　have　a　monopoly。　Bentham　seems


to　be　exclusively　known　in　France　and　Germany　as　the　author　of　an


unpopular　system　of　morals。　Austin　is　apparently　not　known　at


all。　Yet　to　Bentham；　and　even　in　a　higher　degree　to　Austin；　the


world　is　indebted　for　the　only　existing　attempt　to　construct　a


system　of　jurisprudence　by　strict　scientific　process　and　to　found


it；　not　on　*　priori　assumption；　but　on　the　observation；


comparison；　and　analysis　of　the　various　legal　conceptions。　There


is　not　the　smallest　necessity　for　accepting　all　the　conclusions


of　these　great　writers　with　implicit　deference；　but　there　is　the


strongest　necessity　for　knowing　what　those　conclusions　are。　They


are　indispensable；　if　for　no　other　object；　for　the　purpose　of


clearing　the　head。


　　　　An　important　distinction　between　Bentham　and　Austin　is　not　as


often　recognised　as　it　ought　to　be。　Bentham　in　the　main　is　a


writer　on　legislation。　Austin　in　the　main　is　a　writer　on


jurisprudence；　Bentham　is　chiefly　concerned　with　law　as　it　might


be　and　ought　to　be。　Austin　is　chiefly　concerned　with　law　as　it


is。　Each　trespasses　occasionally　on　the　domain　of　the　other。


Unless　Bentham　had　written　the　treatise　called　the　'Fragment　on


Government；'　Austin's　'Province　of　Jurisprudence　Determined；'


which　sets　forth　the　basis　of　his　system；　would　never　probably


have　been　composed。　On　the　other　hand；　Austin；　in　his　singular


discussion　of　the　theory　of　utility　as　an　index　to　the　Law　of


God；　has　entered　on　an　investigation　of　the　class　followed　by


Bentham。　Still　the　description　which　I　have　given　of　their


objects　is　sufficiently　correct　as　a　general　description；　and


those　objects　are　widely　different。　Bentham　aims　at　the


improvement　of　the　law　to　be　effected　by　the　application　of　the


principles　now　indissolubly　associated　with　his　name。　Almost　all


of　his　more　important　suggestions　have　been　adopted　by　the


English　Legislature；　but　the　process　of　engrafting　on　the　law


what　to　each　successive　generation　seem　to　be　improvements　is　in


itself　of　indefinite　duration；　and　may　go　on；　and　possibly　will


go　on；　as　long　as　the　human　race　lasts。　Austin's　undertaking　is


more　modest。　It　would　be　completed；　if　a　Code　were　produced


perfectly　logical　in　order　of　arrangement　and　perfectly　lucid　in


statement　of　rule　Jurisprudence；　the　science　of　positive　law；　is


sometimes　spoken　of　nowadays　as　if　it　would　bring　the　substance


of　the　law　into　a　state　of　indefinite　perfection。　It　would


doubtless；　if　it　were　carried　far；　lead　indirectly　to　great　legal


reforms　by　dispelling　obscurities　and　dissipating　delusions；　but


the　investigation　of　the　principles　on　which　the　direct


improvement　of　substantive　legal　rules　should　be　conducted


belongs　nevertheless　not　to　the　theorist　on　jurisprudence　but　to


the　theorist　on　legislation。


　　　　The　portion　of　Austin's　Lectures　which　sets　forth　the　basis


of　his　system；　and　which　was　published　several　years　ago　as　the


'Province　of　Jurisprudence　Determined；'　has　long　been　one　of　the


higher　classbooks　in　this　University；　and；　taken　together　with


the　other　lectures　more　recently　given　to　the　world　（though


unhappily　in　a　fragmentary　shape）；　it　must　always；　or　for　a　long


time　to　come；　be　the　mainstay　of　the　studies　prosecuted　in　this


Department。　Making　the　utmost　acknowledgment　of　the　value　of　the


book；　I　find　it　impossible　not　to　recognise　the　magnitude　of　the


difficulties　which　it　occasions　to　the　beginner。　Those　which　have


their　origin　in　peculiarities　of　style　and　which　seem　to　be


attributable　to　the　perpetual　commerce　of　thought　in　which　the


writer　lived　with　his　precursors；　Bentham　and　Hobbes；　I　find　to


be　practically　less　grave　than　difficulties　of　another　sort　which


arise　from　the　repulsion　created　in　the　mind　by　the　shape　in


which　the　conceptions　of　law；　right；　and　duty　are　presented　to　it


by　Austin's　analysis。　Of　course；　so　far　as　this　distaste　is


caused　by　unpalatable　truth；　any　tenderness　shown　to　it　would　be


wasted；　but　even　thus　it　is　a　misfortune；　and；　if　it　be　in　any


degree　provoked　by　avoidable　causes；　such　as　methods　of　statement


or　arrangement；　no　pains　bestowed　on　the　attempt　to　remove　it　to


this　extent　would　be　thrown　away。　A　very　frequent　effect　of


forcing　on　students　of　active　mind　and　industrious　habits　a


system　or　subject　which　for　some　reason　or　other　is　repugnant　to


them　is　to　make　them　regard　it　as　so　much　dogma；　as　something


resting　on　the　personal　authority　of　the　writer　with　whose　name


it　happens　to　be　associated。　Now　nothing　could　be　more


unfortunate　for　the　philosophy　of　law　than　that　the　system　of　the


'Province　of　Jurisprudence　Determined'　should　come　to　be　regarded


simply　as　Austin's　system　　as　standing　by　the　side。　of


Blackstone's　or　Hegel's　or　any　other　system　　as　interchangeable


with　it　or　equivalent　to　it。　For；　when　certain　assumptions　or


postulates　have　been　made；　I　am　fully　convinced　that　the　great


majority　of　Austin's　positions　follow　as　of　course　and　by


ordinary　logical　process。　These　assumptions　do　not　appear　to　me


to　be　stated　and　described　by　Austin　with　sufficient　fulness　


possibly　because；　though　he　is　a　comparatively　modern　writer；　a


part　of　the　enquiries　necessary　for　such　statement　had　in　his　day


been　barely　commenced　　but；　whatever　the　cause；　the　result　is


that　he　seems　to　me　open　to　the　same　charge　as　some　of　the


greatest　writers　on　Political　Economy　who　have　omitted　to　set


forth　at　the　outset　with　adequate　distinctness　the　limited


objects　of　their　science；　and　who　have　thus　attracted　to　it　a


mass　of　prejudice　of　which　it　may　never　possibly　get　rid。　The


present　Lecture　is　an　attempt　to　show　what　a　certain　number　of


these　assumptions　or　postulates　are；　in　that　which　follows　it；　I


endeavour　to　show　how　these　assumptions　are　affected　by　some


conclusions　which　we　have　arrived　at　in　former　Lectures　during


our　investigation　of　the　early　history　of　society。　（Supra；


Lectures　I　to　XI）　I　think　it　best　for　my　purpose　to　begin　with


calling　attention　to　the　definition　of　Sovereignty。　Beyond　all


doubt　this　is　the　logical　order　of　the　discussion　undertaken　by


Austin；　and　I　find　it　difficult　to　understand；　except　on　one


hypothesis；　why；　deserting　the　arrangement　of　Hobbes；　he　began


the　discussion　of　this　part　of　his　subject　by　the　analysis　of


Law；　Right　and　Duty；　and　ended　it　with　an　account　o