representative government-第68章
按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！
nment。 It is a very shallow view of the springs of political action in a community which thinks such things unimportant because the number of those in a position actually to profit by the concession might not be very considerable。 That limited number would be composed precisely of those who have most moral power over the rest： and men are not so destitute of the sense of collective degradation as not to feel the withholding of an advantage from even one person； because of a circumstance which they all have in common with him； an affront to all。 If we prevent the leading men of a community from standing forth to the world as its chiefs and representatives in the general councils of mankind； we owe it both to their legitimate ambition； and to the just pride of the community； to give them in return an equal chance of occupying the same prominent position in a nation of greater power and importance。 Thus far of the dependencies whose population is in a sufficiently advanced state to be fitted for representative government。 But there are others which have not attained that state； and which； if held at all； must be governed by the dominant country； or by persons delegated for that purpose by it。 This mode of government is as legitimate as any other if it is the one which in the existing state of civilisation of the subject people most facilitates their transition to a higher stage of improvement。 There are； as we have already seen； conditions of society in which a vigorous despotism is in itself the best mode of government for training the people in what is specifically wanting to render them capable of a higher civilisation。 There are others； in which the mere fact of despotism has indeed no beneficial effect； the lessons which it teaches having already been only too completely learnt； but in which； there being no spring of spontaneous improvement in the people themselves； their almost only hope of making any steps in advance depends on the chances of a good despot。 Under a native despotism； a good despot is a rare and transitory accident： but when the dominion they are under is that of a more civilised people； that people ought to be able to supply it constantly。 The ruling country ought to be able to do for its subjects all that could be done by a succession of absolute monarchs； guaranteed by irresistible force against the precariousness of tenure attendant on barbarous despotisms； and qualified by their genius to anticipate all that experience has taught to the more advanced nation。 Such is the ideal rule of a free people over a barbarous or semi…barbarous one。 We need not expect to see that ideal realised； but unless some approach to it is； the rulers are guilty of a dereliction of the highest moral trust which can devolve upon a nation： and if they do not even 'him at it； they are selfish usurpers； on a par in criminality with any of those whose ambition and rapacity have sported from age to age with the destiny of masses of mankind。 As it is already a common； and is rapidly tending to become the universal； condition of the more backward populations； to be either held in direct subjection by the more advanced； or to be under their complete political ascendancy； there are in this age of the world few more important problems than how to organise this rule； so as to make it a good instead of an evil to the subject people； providing them with the best attainable present government； and with the conditions most favourable to future permanent improvement。 But the mode of fitting the government for this purpose is by no means so well understood as the conditions of good government in a people capable of governing themselves。 We may even say that it is not understood at all。 The thing appears perfectly easy to superficial observers。 If India （for example） is not fit to govern itself； all that seems to them required is that there should be a minister to govern it： and that this minister； like all other British ministers； should be responsible to the British Parliament。 Unfortunately this； though the simplest mode of attempting to govern a dependency； is about the worst； and betrays in its advocates a total want of comprehension of the conditions of good government。 To govern a country under responsibility to the people of that country； and to govern one country under responsibility to the people of another； are two very different things。 What makes the excellence of the first is that freedom is preferable to despotism： but the last is despotism。 The only choice the case admits is a choice of despotisms： and it is not certain that the despotism of twenty millions is necessarily better than that of a few； or of one。 But it is quite certain that the despotism of those who neither hear； nor see； nor know anything about their subjects； has many chances of being worse than that of those who do。 It is not usually thought that the immediate agents of authority govern better because they govern in the name of an absent master； and of one who has a thousand more pressing interests to attend to。 The master may hold them to a strict responsibility； enforced by heavy penalties； but it is very questionable if those penalties will often fall in the right place。 It is always under great difficulties； and very imperfectly； that a country can be governed by foreigners； even when there is no extreme disparity； in habits and ideas； between the rulers and the ruled。 Foreigners do not feel with the people。 They cannot judge； by the light in which a thing appears to their own minds； or the manner in which it affects their feelings； how it will affect the feelings or appear to the minds of the subject population。 What a native of the country； of average practical ability； knows as it were by instinct； they have to learn slowly； and after all imperfectly； by study and experience。 The laws； the customs； the social relations； for which they have to legislate； instead of being familiar to them from childhood； are all strange to them。 For most of their detailed knowledge they must depend on the information of natives； and it is difficult for them to know whom to trust。 They are feared； suspected； probably disliked by the population； seldom sought by them except for interested purposes； and they are prone to think that the servilely submissive are the trustworthy。 Their danger is of despising the natives； that of the natives is of disbelieving that anything the strangers do can be intended for their good。 These are but a part of the difficulties that any rulers have to struggle with who honestly attempt to govern well a country in which they are foreigners。 To overcome these difficulties in any degree will always be a work of much labour； requiring a very superior degree of capacity in the chief administrators； and a high average among the subordinates： and the best organisation of such a government is that which will best ensure the labour； develop the capacity； and place the highest specimens of it in the situations of greatest trust。 Responsibility to an authority which bas gone through none of the labour； acquired none of the capacity； and for the most part is not even aware that either； in any peculiar degree； is required； cannot be regarded as a very effectual expedient for accomplishing these ends。 The government of a people by itself has a meaning and a reality； but such a thing as government of one people by another does not and cannot exist。 One people may keep another as a warren or preserve for its own use； a place to make money in； a human cattle farm to be worked for the profit of its own inhabitants。 But if the good of the governed is the proper business of a government； it is utterly impossible that a people should directly attend to it。 The utmost they can do is to give some of their best men a commission to look after it； to whom the opinion of their own country can neither be much of a guide in the performance of their duty； nor a competent judge of the mode in which it has been performed。 Let any one consider how the English themselves would be governed if they knew and cared no more about their own affairs than they know and care about the affairs of the Hindoos。 Even this comparison gives no adequate idea of the state of the case： for a peo
