representative government-第60章
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do not act at the centre； but in the locality： and however inferior the local public may be to the central； it is the local public alone which has any opportunity of watching them； and it is the local opinion alone which either acts directly upon their own conduct； or calls the attention of the government to the points in which they may require correction。 It is but in extreme cases that the general opinion of the country is brought to bear at all upon details of local administration； and still more rarely has it the means of deciding upon them with any just appreciation of the case。 Now； the local opinion necessarily acts far more forcibly upon purely local administrators。 They； in the natural course of things； are permanent residents； not expecting to be withdrawn from the place when they cease to exercise authority in it； and their authority itself depends； by supposition； on the will of the local public。 I need not dwell on the deficiencies of the central authority in detailed knowledge of local persons and things； and the too great engrossment of its time and thoughts by other concerns； to admit of its acquiring the quantity and quality of local knowledge necessary even for deciding on complaints； and enforcing responsibility from so great a number of local agents。 In the details of management； therefore； the local bodies will generally have the advantage； but in comprehension of the principles even of purely local management； the superiority of the central government； when rightly constituted； ought to be prodigious： not only by reason of the probably great personal superiority of the individuals composing it； and the multitude of thinkers and writers who are at all times engaged in pressing useful ideas upon their notice； but also because the knowledge and experience of any local authority is but local knowledge and experience； confined to their own part of the country and its modes of management； whereas the central government has the means of knowing all that is to be learnt from the united experience of the whole kingdom； with the addition of easy access to that of foreign countries。 The practical conclusion from these premises is not difficult to draw。 The authority which is most conversant with principles should be supreme over principles； while that which is most competent in details should have the details left to it。 The principal business of the central authority should be to give instruction； of the local authority to apply it。 Power may be localised； but knowledge； to be most useful； must be centralised； there must be somewhere a focus at which all its scattered rays are collected； that the broken and coloured lights which exist elsewhere may find there what is necessary to complete and purify them。 To every branch of local administration which affects the general interest there should be a corresponding central organ； either a minister； or some specially appointed functionary under him； even if that functionary does no more than collect information from all quarters； and bring the experience acquired in one locality to the knowledge of another where it is wanted。 But there is also something more than this for the central authority to do。 It ought to keep open a perpetual communication with the localities： informing itself by their experience； and them by its own； giving advice freely when asked； volunteering it when seen to be required； compelling publicity and recordation of proceedings； and enforcing obedience to every general law which the legislature has laid down on the subject of local management。 That some such laws ought to be laid down few are likely to deny。 The localities may be allowed to mismanage their own interests； but not to prejudice those of others； nor violate those principles of justice between one person and another of which it is the duty of the State to maintain the rigid observance。 If the local majority attempts to oppress the minority； or one class another； the State is bound to interpose。 For example； all local rates ought to be voted exclusively by the local representative body； but that body； though elected solely by rate…payers； may raise its revenues by imposts of such a kind； or assess them in such a manner； as to throw an unjust share of the burden on the poor； the rich； or some particular class of the population： it is the duty； therefore； of the legislature； while leaving the mere amount of the local taxes to the discretion of the local body； to lay down authoritatively the modes of taxation； and rules of assessment； which alone the localities shall be permitted to use。 Again； in the administration of public charity the industry and morality of the whole labouring population depend； to a most serious extent； upon adherence to certain fixed principles in awarding relief。 Though it belongs essentially to the local functionaries to determine who； according to those principles； is entitled to be relieved； the national Parliament is the proper authority to prescribe the principles themselves； and it would neglect a most important part of its duty if it did not； in a matter of such grave national concern； lay down imperative rules； and make effectual provision that those rules should not be departed from。 What power of actual interference with the local administrators it may be necessary to retain； for the due enforcement of the laws； is a question of detail into which it would be useless to enter。 The laws themselves will naturally define the penalties； and fix the mode of their enforcement。 It may be requisite； to meet extreme cases； that the power of the central authority should extend to dissolving the local representative council； or dismissing the local executive： but not to making new appointments； or suspending the local institutions。 Where Parliament has not interfered； neither ought any branch of the executive to interfere with authority； but as an adviser and critic； an enforcer of the laws； and a denouncer to Parliament or the local constituencies of conduct which it deems condemnable； the functions of the executive are of the greatest possible value。 Some may think that however much the central authority surpasses the local in knowledge of the principles of administration； the great object which has been so much insisted on； the social and political education of the citizens； requires that they should be left to manage these matters by their own； however imperfect； lights。 To this it might be answered； that the education of the citizens is not the only thing to be considered； government and administration do not exist for that alone； great as its importance is。 But the objection shows a very imperfect understanding of the function of popular institutions as a means of political instruction。 It is but a poor education that associates ignorance with ignorance； and leaves them； if they care for knowledge； to grope their way to it without help； and to do without it if they do not。 What is wanted is； the means of making ignorance aware of itself； and able to profit by knowledge； accustoming minds which know only routine to act upon； and feel the value of principles： teaching them to compare different modes of action； and learn； by the use of their reason； to distinguish the best。 When we desire to have a good school； we do not eliminate the teacher。 The old remark； 〃as the schoolmaster is； so will be the school；〃 is as true of the indirect schooling of grown people by public business as of the schooling of youth in academies and colleges。 A government which attempts to do everything is aptly compared by M。 Charles de Remusat to a schoolmaster who does all the pupils' tasks for them； he may be very popular with the pupils； but he will teach them little。 A government； on the other hand； which neither does anything itself that can possibly be done by any one else； nor shows any one else how to do anything； is like a school in which there is no schoolmaster； but only pupil teachers who have never themselves been taught。 Chapter 16 Of Nationality； as connected with Representative Government。
A PORTION of mankind may be said to constitute a Nationality if they are united among themselves by common sympathies which do not exist between them
