representative government-第57章
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s always been more liberty； but worse organisation； while in other countries there is better organisation； but less liberty。 It is necessary； then； that in addition to the national representation there should be municipal and provincial representations： and the two questions which remain to be resolved are； how the local representative bodies should be constituted； and what should be the extent of their functions。
* On Liberty； concluding chapter； and； at greater length； in the final chapter of Principles of Political Economy。
In considering these questions two points require an equal degree of our attention： how the local business itself can be best done； and how its transaction can be made most instrumental to the nourishment of public spirit and the development of intelligence。 In an earlier part of this inquiry I have dwelt in strong language… hardly any language is strong enough to express the strength of my conviction… on the importance of that portion of the operation of free institutions which may be called the public education of the citizens。 Now； of this operation the local administrative institutions are the chief instrument。 Except by the part they may take as jurymen in the administration of justice； the mass of the population have very little opportunity of sharing personally in the conduct of the general affairs of the community。 Reading newspapers； and perhaps writing to them； public meetings； and solicitations of different sorts addressed to the political authorities； are the extent of the participation of private citizens in general politics during the interval between one parliamentary election and another。 Though it is impossible to exaggerate the importance of these various liberties； both as securities for freedom and as means of general cultivation； the practice which they give is more in thinking than in action； and in thinking without the responsibilities of action； which with most people amounts to little more than passively receiving the thoughts of some one else。 But in the case of local bodies； besides the function of electing； many citizens in turn have the chance of being elected； and many； either by selection or by rotation； fill one or other of the numerous local executive offices。 In these positions they have to act for public interests； as well as to think and to speak； and the thinking cannot all be done by proxy。 It may be added； that these local functions； not being in general sought by the higher ranks； carry down the important political education which they are the means of conferring to a much lower grade in society。 The mental discipline being thus a more important feature in local concerns than in the general affairs of the State； while there are not such vital interests dependent on the quality of the administration； a greater weight may be given to the former consideration； and the latter admits much more frequently of being postponed to it than in matters of general legislation and the conduct of imperial affairs。 The proper constitution of local representative bodies does not present much difficulty。 The principles which apply to it do not differ in any respect from those applicable to the national representation。 The same obligation exists； as in the case of the more important function； for making the bodies elective； and the same reasons operate as in that case； but with still greater force； for giving them a widely democratic basis： the dangers being less； and the advantages； in point of popular education and cultivation； in some respects even greater。 As the principal duty of the local bodies consists of the imposition and expenditure of local taxation； the electoral franchise should vest in all who contribute to the local rates； to the exclusion of all who do not。 I assume that there is no indirect taxation； no octroi duties； or that if there are； they are supplementary only； those on whom their burden falls being also rated to a direct assessment。 The representation of minorities should be provided for in the same manner as in the national Parliament； and there are the same strong reasons for plurality of votes。 Only； there is not so decisive an objection； in the inferior as in the higher body； to making the plural voting depend （as in some of the local elections of our own country） on a mere money qualification： for the honest and frugal dispensation of money forms so much larger a part of the business of the local than of the national body； that there is more justice as well as policy in allowing a greater proportional influence to those who have a larger money interest at stake。 In the most recently established of our local representative institutions； the Boards of Guardians； the justices of peace of the district sit ex officio along with the elected members； in number limited by law to a third of the whole。 In the peculiar constitution of English society I have no doubt of the beneficial effect of this provision。 It secures the presence； in these bodies； of a more educated class than it would perhaps be practicable to attract thither on any other terms； and while the limitation in number of the ex officio members precludes them from acquiring predominance by mere numerical strength； they； as a virtual representation of another class； having sometimes a different interest from the rest； are a check upon the class interests of the farmers or petty shopkeepers who form the bulk of the elected Guardians。 A similar commendation cannot be given to the constitution of the only provincial boards we possess； the Quarter Sessions； consisting of the justices of peace alone； on whom； over and above their judicial duties； some of the most important parts of the administrative business of the country depend for their performance。 The mode of formation of these bodies is most anomalous； they being neither elected； nor； in any proper sense of the term； nominated； but holding their important functions； like the feudal lords to whom they succeeded； virtually by right of their acres： the appointment vested in the Crown （or； speaking practically； in one of themselves； the Lord Lieutenant） being made use of only as a means of excluding any one who it is thought would do discredit to the body； or； now and then； one who is on the wrong side in politics。 The institution is the most aristocratic in principle which now remains in England； far more so than the House of Lords； for it grants public money and disposes of important public interests； not in conjunction with a popular assembly； but alone。 It is clung to with proportionate tenacity by our aristocratic classes； but is obviously at variance with all the principles which are the foundation of representative government。 In a County Board there is not the same justification as in Boards of Guardians； for even an admixture of ex officio with elected members： since the business of a county being on a sufficiently large scale to be an object of interest and attraction to country gentlemen； they would have no more difficulty in getting themselves elected to the Board than they have in being returned to Parliament as county members。 In regard to the proper circumscription of the constituencies which elect the local representative bodies； the principle which； when applied as an exclusive and unbending rule to parliamentary representation； is inappropriate； namely community of local interests； is here the only just and applicable one。 The very object of having a local representation is in order that those who have any interest in common； which they do not share with the general body of their countrymen； may manage that joint interest by themselves： and the purpose is contradicted if the distribution of the local representation follows any other rule than the grouping of those joint interests。 There are local interests peculiar to every town； whether great or small； and common to all its inhabitants： every town； therefore； without distinction of size； ought to have its municipal council。 It is equally obvious that every town ought to have but one。 The different quarters of the same town have seldom or never any material diversities of local interest； they all require to have the same things done； the same expenses incurred； and； except as to
