representative government-第5章

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rring　the　decision　of　their　disputes　and　the　redress　of　their　injuries　to　the　public　authorities。　But　in　this　larger　use　of　the　term；　as　well　as　in　the　former　narrow　one；　Order　expresses　rather　one　of　the　conditions　of　government；　than　either　its　purpose　or　the　criterion　of　its　excellence。　For　the　habit　may　be　well　established　of　submitting　to　the　government；　and　referring　all　disputed　matters　to　its　authority；　and　yet　the　manner　in　which　the　government　deals　with　those　disputed　matters；　and　with　the　other　things　about　which　it　concerns　itself；　may　differ　by　the　whole　interval　which　divides　the　best　from　the　worst　possible。　　　If　we　intend　to　comprise　in　the　idea　of　Order　all　that　society　requires　from　its　government　which　is　not　included　in　the　idea　of　Progress；　we　must　define　Order　as　the　preservation　of　all　kinds　and　amounts　of　good　which　already　exist；　and　Progress　as　consisting　in　the　increase　of　them。　This　distinction　does　comprehend　in　one　or　the　other　section　everything　which　a　government　can　be　required　to　promote。　But；　thus　understood；　it　affords　no　basis　for　a　philosophy　of　government。　We　cannot　say　that；　in　constituting　a　polity；　certain　provisions　ought　to　be　made　for　Order　and　certain　others　for　Progress；　since　the　conditions　of　Order；　in　the　sense　now　indicated；　and　those　of　Progress；　are　not　opposite；　but　the　same。　The　agencies　which　tend　to　preserve　the　social　good　which　already　exists　are　the　very　same　which　promote　the　increase　of　it；　and　vice　versa：　the　sole　difference　being；　that　a　greater　degree　of　those　agencies　is　required　for　the　latter　purpose　than　for　the　former。　　　What；　for　example；　are　the　qualities　in　the　citizens　individually　which　conduce　most　to　keep　up　the　amount　of　good　conduct；　of　good　management；　of　success　and　prosperity；　which　already　exist　in　society？　Everybody　will　agree　that　those　qualities　are　industry；　integrity；　justice；　and　prudence。　But　are　not　these；　of　all　qualities；　the　most　conducive　to　improvement？　and　is　not　any　growth　of　these　virtues　in　the　community　in　itself　the　greatest　of　improvements？　If　so；　whatever　qualities　in　the　government　are　promotive　of　industry；　integrity；　justice；　and　prudence；　conduce　alike　to　permanence　and　to　progression；　only　there　is　needed　more　of　those　qualities　to　make　the　society　decidedly　progressive　than　merely　to　keep　it　permanent。　　　What；　again；　are　the　particular　attributes　in　human　beings　which　seem　to　have　a　more　especial　reference　to　Progress；　and　do　not　so　directly　suggest　the　ideas　of　Order　and　Preservation？　They　are　chiefly　the　qualities　of　mental　activity；　enterprise；　and　courage。　But　are　not　all　these　qualities　fully　as　much　required　for　preserving　the　good　we　have；　as　for　adding　to　it？　If　there　is　anything　certain　in　human　affairs；　it　is　that　valuable　acquisitions　are　only　to　be　retained　by　the　continuation　of　the　same　energies　which　gained　them。　Things　left　to　take　care　of　themselves　inevitably　decay。　Those　whom　success　induces　to　relax　their　habits　of　care　and　thoughtfulness；　and　their　willingness　to　encounter　disagreeables；　seldom　long　retain　their　good　fortune　at　its　height。　The　mental　attribute　which　seems　exclusively　dedicated　to　Progress；　and　is　the　culmination　of　the　tendencies　to　it；　is　Originality；　or　Invention。　Yet　this　is　no　less　necessary　for　Permanence；　since；　in　the　inevitable　changes　of　human　affairs；　new　inconveniences　and　dangers　continually　grow　up；　which　must　be　encountered　by　new　resources　and　contrivances；　in　order　to　keep　things　going　on　even　only　as　well　as　they　did　before。　Whatever　qualities；　therefore；　in　a　government；　tend　to　encourage　activity；　energy；　courage；　originality；　are　requisites　of　Permanence　as　well　as　of　Progress；　only　a　somewhat　less　degree　of　them　will　on　the　average　suffice　for　the　former　purpose　than　for　the　latter。　　　To　pass　now　from　the　mental　to　the　outward　and　objective　requisites　of　society；　it　is　impossible　to　point　out　any　contrivance　in　politics；　or　arrangement　of　social　affairs；　which　conduces　to　Order　only；　or　to　Progress　only；　whatever　tends　to　either　promotes　both。　Take；　for　instance；　the　common　institution　of　a　police。　Order　is　the　object　which　seems　most　immediately　interested　in　the　efficiency　of　this　part　of　the　social　organisation。　Yet　if　it　is　effectual　to　promote　Order；　that　is；　if　it　represses　crime；　and　enables　every　one　to　feel　his　person　and　property　secure；　can　any　state　of　things　be　more　conducive　to　Progress？　The　greater　security　of　property　is　one　of　the　main　conditions　and　causes　of　greater　production；　which　is　Progress　in　its　most　familiar　and　vulgarest　aspect。　The　better　repression　of　crime　represses　the　dispositions　which　tend　to　crime；　and　this　is　Progress　in　a　somewhat　higher　sense。　The　release　of　the　individual　from　the　cares　and　anxieties　of　a　state　of　imperfect　protection；　sets　his　faculties　free　to　be　employed　in　any　new　effort　for　improving　his　own　state　and　that　of　others：　while　the　same　cause；　by　attaching　him　to　social　existence；　and　making　him　no　longer　see　present　or　prospective　enemies　in　his　fellow　creatures；　fosters　all　those　feelings　of　kindness　and　fellowship　towards　others；　and　interest　in　the　general　well…being　of　the　community；　which　are　such　important　parts　of　social　improvement。　　　Take；　again；　such　a　familiar　case　as　that　of　a　good　system　of　taxation　and　finance。　This　would　generally　be　classed　as　belonging　to　the　province　of　Order。　Yet　what　can　be　more　conducive　to　Progress？　A　financial　system　which　promotes　the　one；　conduces；　by　the　very　same　excellences；　to　the　other。　Economy；　for　example；　equally　preserves　the　existing　stock　of　national　wealth；　and　favours　the　creation　of　more。　A　just　distribution　of　burthens；　by　holding　up　to　every　citizen　an　example　of　morality　and　good　conscience　applied　to　difficult　adjustments；　and　an　evidence　of　the　value　which　the　highest　authorities　attach　to　them；　tends　in　an　eminent　degree　to　educate　the　moral　sentiments　of　the　community；　both　in　respect　of　strength　and　of　discrimination。　Such　a　mode　of　levying　the　taxes　as　does　not　impede　the　industry；　or　unnecessarily　interfere　with　the　liberty；　of　the　citizen；　promotes；　not　the　preservation　only；　but　the　increase　of　the　national　wealth；　and　encourages　a　more　active　use　of　the　individual　faculties。　And　vice　versa；　all　errors　in　finance　and　taxation　which　obstruct　the　improvement　of　the　people　in　wealth　and　morals　tend　also；　if　of　sufficiently　serious　amount；　positively　to　impoverish　and　demoralise　them。　It　holds；　in　short；　universally；　that　when　Order　and　Permanence　are　taken　in　their　widest　sense；　for　the　stability　of　existing　advantages；　the　requisites　of　Progress　are　but　the　requisites　of　Order　in　a　greater　degree；　those　of　Permanence　merely　those　of　Progress　in　a　somewhat　smaller　measure。　　　In　support　of　the　position　that　Order　is　intrinsically　different　from　Progress；　and　that　preservation　of　existing　and　acquisition　of　additional　good　are　sufficiently　distinct　to　afford　the　basis　of　a　fundamental　classification；　we　shall　perhaps　be　reminded　that　Progress　may　be　at　the　expense　of　Order；　that　while　we　are　acquiring；　or　striving　to　acquire；　good　of　one　kind；　we　may　be　losing　ground　in　respect　to　others：　thus　there　may　be　progress　in　wealth；　while　there　is　deterioration　in　virtue。　Granting　this；　what　it　proves　is　not　that　Progress　is　generically　a　different　thing　from　Permanence；　but　that　wealth　is　a　different　thing　from　virtue。　Progress　is　permanence　and　something　more；　and　it　is　no　answer　to　this　to　say　that　Progress　in　one　thing　does　not　imply　Permanence　in　everything。　No　more　does　Progress　in　one　thing　imply　Progress　in　everything。　Progress　of　any　kind　includes　Permanence　in　that　same　kind；　whenever　Permanence　is　sacrificed　to　some　particular　kind　of　Progress；　other　Progress　is　still　more　sacrificed　to　it；　and　if　it　be　not　worth　the　sacrifice；　not　the　interest　of　Permanence　alone　has　been　disregarded；　but　the　general　interest　of　Progress　has　been　mistaken。　　　If　these　improperly　contrasted　ideas　are　to　be　used　at　all　in　the　attempt　to　give　a　first　commencement　of　scientific　precision　to　the　notion　of　good　government；　it　would　be　more　philosophically　correct　to　leave　out　of　the　definition　the　word　Order；　and　to　say　that　the　best　government　is　that　which　is　most　c