representative government-第48章

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f　superior　wisdom；　are　likely　to　recognise　it；　where　it　exists；　by　other　signs　than　thinking　exactly　as　they　do；　and　even　in　spite　of　considerable　differences　of　opinion：　and　when　they　have　recognised　it　they　will　be　far　too　desirous　to　secure　it；　at　any　admissible　cost；　to　be　prone　to　impose　their　own　opinion　as　a　law　upon　persons　whom　they　look　up　to　as　wiser　than　themselves。　On　the　other　hand；　there　is　a　character　of　mind　which　does　not　look　up　to　any　one；　which　thinks　no　other　person's　opinion　much　better　than　its　own；　or　nearly　so　good　as　that　of　a　hundred　or　a　thousand　persons　like　itself。　Where　this　is　the　turn　of　mind　of　the　electors；　they　will　elect　no　one　who　is　not　or　at　least　who　does　not　profess　to　be；　the　image　of　their　own　sentiments；　and　will　continue　him　no　longer　than　while　he　reflects　those　sentiments　in　his　conduct：　and　all　aspirants　to　political　honours　will　endeavour；　as　Plato　says　in　the　〃Gorgias；〃　to　fashion　themselves　after　the　model　of　the　Demos；　and　make　themselves　as　like　to　it　as　possible。　It　cannot　be　denied　that　a　complete　democracy　has　a　strong　tendency　to　cast　the　sentiments　of　the　electors　in　this　mould。　Democracy　is　not　favourable　to　the　reverential　spirit。　That　it　destroys　reverence　for　mere　social　position　must　be　counted　among　the　good；　not　the　bad　part　of　its　influences；　though　by　doing　this　it　closes　the　principal　school　of　reverence　（as　to　merely　human　relations）　which　exists　in　society。　But　also　democracy；　in　its　very　essence；　insists　so　much　more　forcibly　on　the　things　in　which　all　are　entitled　to　be　considered　equally；　than　on　those　in　which　one　person　is　entitled　to　more　consideration　than　another；　that　respect　for　even　personal　superiority　is　likely　to　be　below　the　mark。　It　is　for　this；　among　other　reasons；　I　hold　it　of　so　much　importance　that　the　institutions　of　the　country　should　stamp　the　opinions　of　persons　of　a　more　educated　class　as　entitled　to　greater　weight　than　those　of　the　less　educated：　and　I　should　still　contend　for　assigning　plurality　of　votes　to　authenticated　superiority　of　education；　were　it　only　to　give　the　tone　to　public　feeling；　irrespective　of　any　direct　political　consequences。　　　When　there　does　exist　in　the　electoral　body　an　adequate　sense　of　the　extraordinary　difference　in　value　between　one　person　and　another；　they　will　not　lack　signs　by　which　to　distinguish　the　persons　whose　worth　for　their　purposes　is　the　greatest。　Actual　public　services　will　naturally　be　the　foremost　indication：　to　have　filled　posts　of　magnitude；　and　done　important　things　in　them；　of　which　the　wisdom　has　been　justified　by　the　results；　to　have　been　the　author　of　measures　which　appear　from　their　effects　to　have　been　wisely　planned；　to　have　made　predictions　which　have　been　of　verified　by　the　event；　seldom　or　never　falsified　by　it；　to　have　given　advice；　which　when　taken　has　been　followed　by　good　consequences；　when　neglected；　by　bad。　There　is　doubtless　a　large　portion　of　uncertainty　in　these　signs　of　wisdom；　but　we　are　seeking　for　such　as　can　be　applied　by　persons　of　ordinary　discernment。　They　will　do　well　not　to　rely　much　on　any　one　indication；　unless　corroborated　by　the　rest；　and；　in　their　estimation　of　the　success　or　merit　of　any　practical　effort；　to　lay　great　stress　on　the　general　opinion　of　disinterested　persons　conversant　with　the　subject　matter。　The　tests　which　I　have　spoken　of　are　only　applicable　to　tried　men；　among　whom　must　be　reckoned　those　who；　though　untried　practically；　have　been　tried　speculatively；　who；　in　public　speech　or　in　print；　have　discussed　public　affairs　in　a　manner　which　proves　that　they　have　given　serious　study　to　them。　Such　persons　may；　in　the　mere　character　of　political　thinkers；　have　exhibited　a　considerable　amount　of　the　same　titles　to　confidence　as　those　who　have　been　proved　in　the　position　of　practical　statesmen。　When　it　is　necessary　to　choose　persons　wholly　untried；　the　best　criteria　are；　reputation　for　ability　among　those　who　personally　know　them；　and　the　confidence　placed　and　recommendations　given　by　persons　already　looked　up　to。　By　tests　like　these；　constituencies　who　sufficiently　value　mental　ability；　and　eagerly　seek　for　it；　will　generally　succeed　in　obtaining　men　beyond　mediocrity；　and　often　men　whom　they　can　trust　to　carry　on　public　affairs　according　to　their　unfettered　judgment；　to　whom　it　would　be　an　affront　to　require　that　they　should　give　up　that　judgment　at　the　behest　of　their　inferiors　in　knowledge。　　　If　such　persons；　honestly　sought；　are　not　to　be　found；　then　indeed　the　electors　are　justified　in　taking　other　precautions；　for　they　cannot　be　expected　to　postpone　their　particular　opinions；　unless　in　order　that　they　may　be　served　by　a　person　of　superior　knowledge　to　their　own。　They　would　do　well；　indeed；　even　then；　to　remember；　that　when　once　chosen；　the　representative；　if　he　devotes　himself　to　his　duty；　has　greater　opportunities　of　correcting　an　original　false　judgment　than　fall　to　the　lot　of　most　of　his　constituents；　a　consideration　which　generally　ought　to　prevent　them　（unless　compelled　by　necessity　to　choose　some　one　whose　impartiality　they　do　not　fully　trust）　from　exacting　a　pledge　not　to　change　his　opinion；　or；　if　he　does；　to　resign　his　seat。　But　when　an　unknown　person；　not　certified　in　unmistakable　terms　by　some　high　authority；　is　elected　for　the　first　time；　the　elector　cannot　be　expected　not　to　make　conformity　to　his　own　sentiments　the　primary　requisite。　It　is　enough　if　he　does　not　regard　a　subsequent　change　of　those　sentiments；　honestly　avowed；　with　its　grounds　undisguisedly　stated；　as　a　peremptory　reason　for　withdrawing　his　confidence。　　　Even　supposing　the　most　tried　ability　and　acknowledged　eminence　of　character　in　the　representative；　the　private　opinions　of　the　electors　are　not　to　be　placed　entirely　in　abeyance。　Deference　to　mental　superiority　is　not　to　go　the　length　of　self…annihilation…　abnegation　of　any　personal　opinion。　But　when　the　difference　does　not　relate　to　the　fundamentals　of　politics；　however　decided　the　elector　may　be　in　his　own　sentiments；　he　ought　to　consider　that　when　an　able　man　differs　from　him　there　is　at　least　a　considerable　chance　of　his　being　in　the　wrong；　and　that　even　if　otherwise；　it　is　worth　while　to　give　up　his　opinion　in　things　not　absolutely　essential；　for　the　sake　of　the　inestimable　advantage　of　having　an　able　man　to　act　for　him　in　the　many　matters　in　which　he　himself　is　not　qualified　to　form　a　judgment。　In　such　cases　he　often　endeavours　to　reconcile　both　wishes；　by　inducing　the　able　man　to　sacrifice　his　own　opinion　on　the　points　of　difference：　but；　for　the　able　man　to　lend　himself　to　this　compromise；　is　treason　against　his　especial　office；　abdication　of　the　peculiar　duties　of　mental　superiority；　of　which　it　is　one　of　the　most　sacred　not　to　desert　the　cause　which　has　the　clamour　against　it；　nor　to　deprive　of　his　services　those　of　his　opinions　which　need　them　the　most。　A　man　of　conscience　and　known　ability　should　insist　on　full　freedom　to　act　as　he　in　his　own　judgment　deems　best；　and　should　not　consent　to　serve　on　any　other　terms。　But　the　electors　are　entitled　to　know　how　he　means　to　act；　what　opinions；　on　all　things　which　concern　his　public　duty；　he　intends　should　guide　his　conduct。　If　some　of　these　are　unacceptable　to　them；　it　is　for　him　to　satisfy　them　that　he　nevertheless　deserves　to　be　their　representative；　and　if　they　are　wise；　they　will　overlook；　in　favour　of　his　general　value；　many　and　great　differences　between　his　opinions　and　their　own。　　　　There　are　some　differences；　however；　which　they　cannot　be　expected　to　overlook。　Whoever　feels　the　amount　of　interest　in　the　government　of　his　country　which　befits　a　freeman；　has　some　convictions　on　national　affairs　which　are　like　his　life…blood；　which　the　strength　of　his　belief　in　their　truth；　together　with　the　importance　he　attaches　to　them；　forbid　him　to　make　a　subject　of　compromise；　or　postpone　to　the　judgment　of　any　person；　however　greatly　his　superior。　Such　convictions；　when　they　exist　in　a　people；　or　in　any　appreciable　portion　of　one；　are　entitled　to　influence　in　virtue　of　their　mere　existence；　and　not　solely　in　that　of　the　probability　of　their　being　grounded　in　truth。　A　people　cannot　be　well　governed　in　opposition　to　their　primary　notions　of　right；　even　though　these　may