representative government-第47章
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f no less practical moment than those relating to the constitution itself。 The very existence of some governments； and all that renders others endurable； rests on the practical observance of doctrines of constitutional morality； traditional notions in the minds of the several constituted authorities； which modify the use that might otherwise be made of their powers。 In unbalanced governments… pure monarchy； pure aristocracy； pure democracy… such maxims are the only barrier which restrains the government from the utmost excesses in the direction of its characteristic tendency。 In imperfectly balanced governments； where some attempt is made to set constitutional limits to the impulses of the strongest power； but where that power is strong enough to overstep them with at least temporary impunity； it is only by doctrines of constitutional morality； recognised and sustained by opinion； that any regard at all is preserved for the checks and limitations of the constitution。 In well…balanced governments； in which the supreme power is divided； and each sharer is protected against the usurpations of the others in the only manner possible… namely； by being armed for defence with weapons as strong as the others can wield for attack… the government can only be carried on by forbearance on all sides to exercise those extreme powers； unless provoked by conduct equally extreme on the part of some other sharer of power： and in this case we may truly say that only by the regard paid to maxims of constitutional morality is the constitution kept in existence。 The question of pledges is not one of those which vitally concern the existence of representative governments； but it is very material to their beneficial operation。 The laws cannot prescribe to the electors the principles by which they shall direct their choice； but it makes a great practical difference by what principles they think they ought to direct it。 And the whole of that great question is involved in the inquiry whether they should make it a condition that the representative shall adhere to certain opinions laid down for him by his constituents。 No reader of this treatise can doubt what conclusion； as to this matter； results from the general principles which it professes。 We have from the first affirmed； and unveryingly kept in view； the co…equal importance of two great requisites of government： responsibility to those for whose benefit political power ought to be； and always professes to be； employed； and jointly therewith to obtain； in the greatest measure possible； for the function of government the benefits of superior intellect； trained by long meditation and practical discipline to that special task。 If this second purpose is worth attaining； it is worth the necessary price。 Superior powers of mind and profound study are of no use if they do not sometimes lead a person to different conclusions from those which are formed by ordinary powers of mind without study： and if it be an object to possess representatives in any intellectual respect superior to average electors； it must be counted upon that the representative will sometimes differ in opinion from the majority of his constituents； and that when he does； his opinion will be the oftenest right of the two。 It follows that the electors will not do wisely if they insist on absolute conformity to their opinions as the condition of his retaining his seat。 The principle is； thus far； obvious； but there are real difficulties in its application： and we will begin by stating them in their greatest force。 If it is important that the electors should choose a representative more highly instructed than themselves； it is no less necessary that this wiser man should be responsible to them； in other words； they are the judges of the manner in which he fulfils his trust： and how are they to judge； except by the standard of their own opinions？ How are they even to select him in the first instance but by the same standard？ It will not do to choose by mere brilliancy… by superiority of showy talent。 The tests by which an ordinary man can judge beforehand of mere ability are very imperfect： such as they are； they have almost exclusive reference to the arts of expression； and little or none to the worth of what is expressed。 The latter cannot be inferred from the former； and if the electors are to put their own opinions in abeyance； what criterion remains to them of the ability to govern well？ Neither； if they could ascertain； even infallibly； the ablest man； ought they to allow him altogether to judge for them； without any reference to their own opinions。 The ablest candidate may be a Tory and the electors Liberals； or a Liberal and they may be Tories。 The political questions of the day may be Church questions； and he may be a High Churchman or a Rationalist； while they may be Dissenters or Evangelicals； and vice versa。 His abilities； in these cases； might only enable him to go greater lengths； and act with greater effect； in what they may conscientiously believe to be a wrong course； and they may be bound； by their sincere convictions； to think it more important that their representative should be kept； on these points； to what they deem the dictate of duty； than that they should be represented by a person of more than average abilities。 They may also have to consider； not solely how they can be most ably represented； but how their particular moral position and mental point of view shall be represented at all。 The influence of every mode of thinking which is shared by numbers ought to be felt in the legislature： and the constitution being supposed to have made due provision that other and conflicting modes of thinking shall be represented likewise； to secure the proper representation for their own mode may be the most important matter which the electors on the particular occasion have to attend to。 In some cases； too； it may be necessary that the representative should have his hands tied； to keep him true to their interest； or rather to the public interest as they conceive it。 This would not be needful under a political system which assured them an indefinite choice of honest and unprejudiced candidates； but under the existing system； in which the electors are almost always obliged； by the expenses of election and the general circumstances of society； to select their representative from persons of a station in life widely different from theirs； and having a different class…interest； who will affirm that they ought to abandon themselves to his discretion？ Can we blame an elector of the poorer classes； who has only the choice among two or three rich men； for requiring from the one he votes for a pledge to those measures which he considers as a test of emancipation from the class…interests of the rich？ It moreover always happens to some members of the electoral body to be obliged to accept the representative selected by a majority of their own side。 But though a candidate of their own choosing would have no chance； their votes may be necessary to the success of the one chosen for them； and their only means of exerting their share of influence on his subsequent conduct； may be to make their support of him dependent on his pledging himself to certain conditions。 These considerations and counter…considerations are so intimately interwoven with one another； it is so important that the electors should choose as their representatives wiser men than themselves； and should consent to be governed according to that superior wisdom； while it is impossible that conformity to their own opinions； when they have opinions； should not enter largely into； their judgment as to who possesses the wisdom； and how far its presumed possessor has verified the presumption by his conduct； that it seems quite impracticable to lay down for the elector any positive rule of duty： and the result will depend； less on any exact prescription； or authoritative doctrine of political morality； than on the general tone of mind of the electoral body； in respect to the important requisite of deference to mental superiority。 Individuals； and peoples； who are acutely sensible of the value of superior wisdom； are likely to recognise it； where it exists； by other signs than thinking exactly
