representative government-第46章
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ative； on leaving his constituents； enters at once into a courtly or aristocratic atmosphere； whose influences all tend to deflect his course into a different direction from the popular one； to tone down any democratic feelings which he may have brought with him； and make him forget the wishes and grow cool to the interests of those who chose him… the obligation of a frequent return to them for a renewal of his commission is indispensable to keeping his temper and character up to the right mark。 Even three years； in such circumstances； are almost too long a period； and any longer term is absolutely inadmissible。 Where； on the contrary； democracy is the ascendant power； and still tends to increase； requiring rather to be moderated in its exercise than encouraged to any abnormal activity； where unbounded publicity； and an ever…present newspaper press； give the representative assurance that his every act will be immediately known； discussed； and judged by his constituents； and that he is always either gaining or losing ground in the estimation； while by the same means the influence of their sentiments； and all other democratic influences； are kept constantly alive and active in his own mind…less than five years would hardly be a sufficient period to prevent timid subserviency。 The change which has taken place in English politics as to all these features explains why annual Parliaments； which forty years ago stood prominently in front of the creed of the more advanced reformers； are so little cared for and so seldom heard of at present。 It deserves consideration that； whether the term is short or long； during the last year of it the members are in position in which they would always be if Parliaments were annual： so that if the term were very brief； there would virtually be annual Parliaments during a great proportion of all time。 As things now are； the period of seven years； though of unnecessary length； is hardly worth altering for any benefit likely to be produced； especially since the possibility； always impending； of an earlier dissolution keeps the motives for standing well with constituents always before the member's eyes。 Whatever may be the term most eligible for the duration of the mandate； it might seem natural that the individual member should vacate his seat at the expiration of that term from the day of his election； and that there should be no general renewal of the whole House。 A great deal might be said for this system if there were any practical object in recommending it。 But it is condemned by much stronger reasons than can be alleged in its support。 One is； that there would be no means of promptly getting rid of a majority which had pursued a course offensive to the nation。 The certainty of a general election after a limited； which would often be a nearly expired； period； and the possibility of it at any time when the minister either desires it for his own sake； or thinks that it would make him popular with the country； tend to prevent that wide divergence between the feelings of the assembly and those of the constituency； which might subsist indefinitely if the majority of the House had always several years of their term still to run… if it received new infusions drop by drop； which would be more likely to assume than to modify the qualities of the mass they were joined to。 It is as essential that the general sense of the House should accord in the main with that of the nation as is that distinguished individuals should be forfeiting their seats； to give free utterance to the most unpopular sentiments。 There is another reason； of much weight； against the gradual and partial renewal of a representative assembly。 It is useful that there should be a periodical general muster of opposing forces； to gauge the state of the national mind； and ascertain； beyond dispute； the relative strength of different parties and opinions。 This is not done conclusively by any partial renewal； even where； as in some of the French constitutions； a large fraction； a fifth or a third； go out at once。 The reasons for allowing to the executive the power of dissolution will be considered in a subsequent chapter； relating to the constitution and functions of the Executive in a representative government。 Chapter 12 Ought Pledges to be Required from Members of Parliament？
SHOULD A member of the legislature be bound by the instructions of his constituents？ Should he be the organ of their sentiments； or of his own？ their ambassador to a congress； or their professional agent； empowered not only to act for them； but to judge for them what ought to be done？ These two theories of the duty of a legislator in a representative government have each its supporters； and each is the recognised doctrine of some representative governments。 In the Dutch United Provinces； the members of the States General were mere delegates； and to such a length was the doctrine carried； that when any important question arose which had not been provided for in their instructions； they had to refer back to their constituents； exactly as an ambassador does to the government from which he is accredited。 In this and most other countries which possess representative constitutions； law and custom warrant a member of Parliament in voting according to his opinion of right； however different from that of his constituents： but there is a floating notion of the opposite kind； which has considerable practical operation on many minds； even of members of Parliament； and often makes them； independently of desire for popularity； or concern for their re…election； feel bound in conscience to let their conduct； on questions on which their constituents have a decided opinion； be the expression of that opinion rather than of their own。 Abstractedly from positive law； and from the historical traditions of any particular people； which of these notions of the duty of a representative is the true one？ Unlike the questions which we have hitherto treated； this is not a question of constitutional legislation； but of what may more properly be called constitutional morality… the ethics of representative government。 It does not so much concern institutions； as the temper of mind which the electors ought to bring to the discharge of their functions； the ideas which should prevail as to the moral duties of an elector。 For let the system of representation be what it may； it will be converted into one of mere delegation if the electors so choose。 As long as they are free not to vote； and free to vote as they like； they cannot be prevented from making their vote depend on any condition they think fit to annex to it。 By refusing to elect any one who will not pledge himself to all their opinions； and even； if they please； to consult with them before voting on any important subject not foreseen； they can reduce their representative to their mere mouthpiece； or compel him in honour； when no longer willing to act in that capacity； to resign his seat。 And since they have the power of doing this； the theory of the Constitution ought to suppose that they will wish to do it； since the very principle of constitutional government requires it to be assumed that political power will be abused to promote the particular purposes of the holder； not because it always is so； but because such is the natural tendency of things； to guard against which is the especial use of free institutions。 However wrong； therefore； or however foolish； we may think it in the electors to convert their representative into a delegate； that stretch of the electoral privilege being a natural and not improbable one； the same precautions ought to be taken as if it were certain。 We may hope that the electors will not act on this notion of the use of the suffrage； but a representative government needs to be so framed that； even if they do； they shall not be able to effect what ought not to be in the power of any body of persons… class legislation for their own benefit。 When it is said that the question is only one of political morality； this does not extenuate its importance。 Questions of constitutional morality are of no less practical moment than those relating to the constitution itself。 The very existence of som
