representative government-第43章
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in political speculations。 The notion is itself unfounded； that publicity； and the sense of being answerable to the public； are of no use unless the public are qualified to form a sound judgment。 It is a very superficial view of the utility of public opinion to suppose that it does good only when it succeeds in enforcing a servile conformity to itself。 To be under the eyes of others… to have to defend oneself to others… is never more important than to those who act in opposition to the opinion of others； for it obliges them to have sure ground of their own。 Nothing has so steadying an influence as working against pressure。 Unless when under the temporary sway of passionate excitement； no one will do that which he expects to be greatly blamed for； unless from a preconceived and fixed purpose of his own； which is always evidence of a thoughtful and deliberate character； and； except in radically bad men； generally proceeds from sincere and strong personal convictions。 Even the bare fact of having to give an account of their conduct is a powerful inducement to adhere to conduct of which at least some decent account can be given。 If any one thinks that the mere obligation of preserving decency is not a very considerable check on the abuse of power； he has never had his attention called to the conduct of those who do not feel under the necessity of observing that restraint。 Publicity is inappreciable； even when it does no more than prevent that which can by no possibility be plausibly defended… than compel deliberation； and force every one to determine； before he acts； what he shall say if called to account for his actions。 〃But； if not now （it may be said）； at least hereafter； when all are fit to have votes； and when all men and women are admitted to vote in virtue of their fitness； then there can no longer be danger of class legislation； then the electors； being the nation； can have no interest apart from the general interest： even if individuals still vote according to private or class inducements； the majority will have no such inducement； and as there will then be no non…electors to whom they ought to be responsible； the effect of the ballot； excluding none but the sinister influences； will be wholly beneficial。 〃Even in this I do not agree。 I cannot think that even if the people were fit for； and had obtained； universal suffrage； the ballot would be desirable。 First； because it could not； in such circumstances be supposed to be needful。 Let us only conceive the state of things which the hypothesis implies； a people universally educated； and every grown…up human being possessed of a vote。 If； even when only a small proportion are electors； and the majority of the population almost uneducated； public opinion is already； as every one now sees that it is； the ruling power in the last resort； it is a chimera to suppose that over a community who all read； and who all have votes； any power could be exercised by landlords and rich people against their own inclination which it would be at all difficult for them to throw off。 But though the protection of secrecy would then be needless； the control of publicity would be as needful as ever。 The universal observation of mankind has been very fallacious if the mere fact of being one of the community； and not being in a position of pronounced contrariety of interest to the public at large； is enough to ensure the performance of a public duty； without either the stimulus or the restraint derived from the opinion of our fellow creatures。 A man's own particular share of the public interest； even though he may have no private interest drawing him in the opposite direction； is not； as a general rule； found sufficient to make him do his duty to the public without other external inducements。 Neither can it be admitted that even if all had votes they would give their votes as honestly in secret as in public。 〃The proposition that the electors when they compose the whole of the community cannot have an interest in voting against the interest of the community will be found on examination to have more sound than meaning in it。 Though the community as a whole can have （as the terms imply） no other interest than its collective interest； any or every individual in it may。 A man's interest consists of whatever he takes an interest in。 Everybody has as many different interests as he has feelings； likings or dislikings； either of a selfish or of a better kind。 It cannot be said that any of these； taken by itself； constitutes 'his interest'； he is a good man or a bad according as he prefers one class of his interests or another。 A man who is a tyrant at home will be apt to sympathise with tyranny （when not exercised over himself）： he will be almost certain not to sympathise with resistance to tyranny。 An envious man will vote against Aristides because he is called the just。 A selfish man will prefer even a trifling individual benefit to his share of the advantage which his country would derive from a good law； because interests peculiar to himself are those which the habits of his mind both dispose him to dwell on； and make him best able to estimate。 A great number of the electors will have two sets of preferences… those on private and those on public grounds。 The last are the only ones which the elector would like to avow。 The best side of their character is that which people are anxious to show； even to those who are no better than themselves。 People will give dishonest or mean votes from lucre； from malice； from pique； from personal rivalry； even from the interests or prejudices of class or sect； more readily in secret than in public。 And cases exist… they may come to be more frequent… in which almost the only restraint upon a majority of knaves consists in their involuntary respect for the opinion of an honest minority。 In such a case as that of the repudiating States of North America； is there not some check to the unprincipled voter in the shame of looking an honest man in the face？ Since all this good would be sacrificed by the ballot； even in the circumstances most favourable to it； a much stronger case is requisite than can now be made out for its necessity （and the case is continually becoming still weaker） to make its adoption desirable。〃*
* Thoughts on Parliamentary Reform； 2nd ed。 pp 32…36。
On the other debateable points connected with the mode of voting it is not necessary to expend so many words。 The system of personal representation； as organised by Mr。 Hare； renders necessary the employment of voting papers。 But it appears to me indispensable that the signature of the elector should be affixed to the paper at a public polling place； or if there be no such place conveniently accessible； at some office open to all the world； and in the presence of a responsible public officer。 The proposal which has been thrown out of allowing the voting papers to be filled up at the voter's own residence； and sent by the post； or called for by a public officer； I should regard as fatal。 The act would be done in the absence of the salutary and the presence of all the pernicious influences。 The briber might； in the shelter of privacy； behold with his own eyes his bargain fulfilled； and the intimidator could see the extorted obedience rendered irrevocably on the spot； while the beneficent counter…influence of the presence of those who knew the voter's real sentiments； and the inspiring effect of the sympathy of those of his own party or opinion； would be shut out。*
* 〃This expedient has been recommended； both on the score of saving expense； and on that of obtaining the votes of many electors who otherwise would not vote； and who are regarded by the advocates of the plan as a particularly desirable class of voters。 The scheme has been carried into practice in the election of poor…law guardians； and its success in that instance is appealed to in favour of adopting it in the more important case of voting for a member of the Legislature。 But the two cases appear to me to differ in the point on which the benefits of the expedient depend。 In a local election for a special kind of administrative business； which consists mainly in the dispensation of a public fund； it is an object to prevent the choice from
