representative government-第41章

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sion　turn　on　sentimentalities　about　skulking　or　cowardice。　Secrecy　is　justifiable　in　many　cases；　imperative　in　some；　and　it　is　not　cowardice　to　seek　protection　against　evils　which　are　honestly　avoidable。　Nor　can　it　be　reasonably　maintained　that　no　cases　are　conceivable　in　which　secret　voting　is　preferable　to　public。　But　I　must　contend　that　these　cases；　in　affairs　of　a　political　character；　are　the　exception；　not　the　rule。　　　The　present　is　one　of　the　many　instances　in　which；　as　I　have　already　had　occasion　to　remark；　the　spirit　of　an　institution；　the　impression　it　makes　on　the　mind　of　the　citizen；　is　one　of　the　most　important　parts　of　its　operation。　The　spirit　of　vote　by　ballot…　the　interpretation　likely　to　be　put　on　it　in　the　mind　of　an　elector…　is　that　the　suffrage　is　given　to　him　for　himself；　for　his　particular　use　and　benefit；　and　not　as　a　trust　for　the　public。　For　if　it　is　indeed　a　trust；　if　the　public　are　entitled　to　his　vote；　are　not　they　entitled　to　know　his　vote？　This　false　and　pernicious　impression　may　well　be　made　on　the　generality；　since　it　has　been　made　on　most　of　those　who　of　late　years　have　been　conspicuous　advocates　of　the　ballot。　The　doctrine　was　not　so　understood　by　its　earlier　promoters；　but　the　effect　of　a　doctrine　on　the　mind　is　best　shown；　not　in　those　who　form　it；　but　in　those　who　are　formed　by　it。　Mr。　Bright　and　his　school　of　democrats　think　themselves　greatly　concerned　in　maintaining　that　the　franchise　is　what　they　term　a　right；　not　a　trust。　Now　this　one　idea；　taking　root　in　the　general　mind；　does　a　moral　mischief　outweighing　all　the　good　that　the　ballot　could　do；　at　the　highest　possible　estimate　of　it。　In　whatever　way　we　define　or　understand　the　idea　of　a　right；　no　person　can　have　a　right　（except　in　the　purely　legal　sense）　to　power　over　others：　every　such　power；　which　he　is　allowed　to　possess；　is　morally；　in　the　fullest　force　of　the　term；　a　trust。　But　the　exercise　of　any　political　function；　either　as　an　elector　or　as　a　representative；　is　power　over　others。　　　Those　who　say　that　the　suffrage　is　not　a　trust　but　a　right　will　scarcely　accept　the　conclusions　to　which　their　doctrine　leads。　If　it　is　a　right；　if　it　belongs　to　the　voter　for　his　own　sake；　on　what　ground　can　we　blame　him　for　selling　it；　or　using　it　to　recommend　himself　to　any　one　whom　it　is　his　interest　to　please？　A　person　is　not　expected　to　consult　exclusively　the　public　benefit　in　the　use　he　makes　of　his　house；　or　his　three　per　cent　stock；　or　anything　else　to　which　he　really　has　a　right。　The　suffrage　is　indeed　due　to　him；　among　other　reasons；　as　a　means　to　his　own　protection；　but　only　against　treatment　from　which　he　is　equally　bound；　so　far　as　depends　on　his　vote；　to　protect　every　one　of　his　fellow…citizens。　His　vote　is　not　a　thing　in　which　he　has　an　option；　it　has　no　more　to　do　with　his　personal　wishes　than　the　verdict　of　a　juryman。　It　is　strictly　a　matter　of　duty；　he　is　bound　to　give　it　according　to　his　best　and　most　conscientious　opinion　of　the　public　good。　Whoever　has　any　other　idea　of　it　is　unfit　to　have　the　suffrage；　its　effect　on　him　is　to　pervert；　not　to　elevate　his　mind。　Instead　of　opening　his　heart　to　an　exalted　patriotism　and　the　obligation　of　public　duty；　it　awakens　and　nourishes　in　him　the　disposition　to　use　a　public　function　for　his　own　interest；　pleasure；　or　caprice；　the　same　feelings　and　purposes；　on　a　humbler　scale；　which　actuate　a　despot　and　oppressor。　Now　an　ordinary　citizen　in　any　public　position；　or　on　whom　there　devolves　any　social　function；　is　certain　to　think　and　feel；　respecting　the　obligations　it　imposes　on　him；　exactly　what　society　appears　to　think　and　feel　in　conferring　it。　What　seems　to　be　expected　from　him　by　society　forms　a　standard　which　he　may　fall　below；　but　which　he　will　seldom　rise　above。　And　the　interpretation　which　he　is　almost　sure　to　put　upon　secret　voting　is　that　he　is　not　bound　to　give　his　vote　with　any　reference　to　those　who　are　not　allowed　to　know　how　he　gives　it；　but　may　bestow　it　simply　as　he　feels　inclined。　　　This　is　the　decisive　reason　why　the　argument　does　not　hold；　from　the　use　of　the　ballot　in　clubs　and　private　societies；　to　its　adoption　in　parliamentary　elections。　A　member　of　a　club　is　really；　what　the　elector　falsely　believes　himself　to　be；　under　no　obligation　to　consider　the　wishes　or　interests　of　any　one　else。　He　declares　nothing　by　his　vote　but　that　he　is　or　is　not　willing　to　associate；　in　a　manner　more　or　less　close；　with　a　particular　person。　This　is　a　matter　on　which；　by　universal　admission；　his　own　pleasure　or　inclination　is　entitled　to　decide：　and　that　he　should　be　able　so　to　decide　it　without　risking　a　quarrel　is　best　for　everybody；　the　rejected　person　included。　An　additional　reason　rendering　the　ballot　unobjectionable　in　these　cases　is　that　it　does　not　necessarily　or　naturally　lead　to　lying。　The　persons　concerned　are　of　the　same　class　or　rank；　and　it　would　be　considered　improper　in　one　of　them　to　press　another　with　questions　as　to　how　he　had　voted。　It　is　far　otherwise　in　parliamentary　elections；　and　is　likely　to　remain　so；　as　long　as　the　social　relations　exist　which　produce　the　demand　for　the　ballot；　as　long　as　one　person　is　sufficiently　the　superior　of　another　to　think　himself　entitled　to　dictate　his　vote。　And　while　this　is　the　case；　silence　or　an　evasive　answer　is　certain　to　be　construed　as　proof　that　the　vote　given　has　not　been　that　which　was　desired。　　　In　any　political　election；　even　by　universal　suffrage　（and　still　more　obviously　in　the　case　of　a　restricted　suffrage）；　the　voter　is　under　an　absolute　moral　obligation　to　consider　the　interest　of　the　public；　not　his　private　advantage；　and　give　his　vote；　to　the　best　of　his　judgment；　exactly　as　he　would　be　bound　to　do　if　he　were　the　sole　voter；　and　the　election　depended　upon　him　alone。　This　being　admitted；　it　is　at　least　a　prima　facie　consequence　that　the　duty　of　voting；　like　any　other　public　duty；　should　be　performed　under　the　eye　and　criticism　of　the　public；　every　one　of　whom　has　not　only　an　interest　in　its　performance；　but　a　good　title　to　consider　himself　wronged　if　it　is　performed　otherwise　than　honestly　and　carefully。　Undoubtedly　neither　this　nor　any　other　maxim　of　political　morality　is　absolutely　inviolable；　it　may　be　overruled　by　still　more　cogent　considerations。　But　its　weight　is　such　that　the　cases　which　admit　of　a　departure　from　it　must　be　of　a　strikingly　exceptional　character。　　　It　may；　unquestionably；　be　the　fact　that　if　we　attempt；　by　publicity；　to　make　the　voter　responsible　to　the　public　for　his　vote；　he　will　practically　be　made　responsible　for　it　to　some　powerful　individual；　whose　interest　is　more　opposed　to　the　general　interest　of　the　community　than　that　of　the　voter　himself　would　be　if；　by　the　shield　of　secrecy；　he　were　released　from　responsibility　altogether。　When　this　is　the　condition；　in　a　high　degree；　of　a　large　proportion　of　the　voters；　the　ballot　may　be　the　smaller　evil。　When　the　voters　are　slaves；　anything　may　be　tolerated　which　enables　them　to　throw　off　the　yoke。　The　strongest　case　for　the　ballot　is　when　the　mischievous　power　of　the　Few　over　the　Many　is　increasing。　In　the　decline　of　the　Roman　republic　the　reasons　for　the　ballot　were　irresistible。　The　oligarchy　was　yearly　becoming　richer　and　more　tyrannical；　the　people　poorer　and　more　dependent；　and　it　was　necessary　to　erect　stronger　and　stronger　barriers　against　such　abuse　of　the　franchise　as　rendered　it　but　an　instrument　the　more　in　the　hands　of　unprincipled　persons　of　consequence。　As　little　can　it　be　doubted　that　the　ballot；　so　far　as　it　existed；　had　a　beneficial　operation　in　the　Athenian　constitution。　Even　in　the　least　unstable　of　the　Grecian　commonwealths　freedom　might　be　for　the　time　destroyed　by　a　single　unfairly　obtained　popular　vote；　and　though　the　Athenian　voter　was　not　sufficiently　dependent　to　be　habitually　coerced；　he　might　have　been　bribed；　or　intimidated　by　the　lawless　outrages　of　some　knot　of　individuals；　such　as　were　not　uncommon　even　at　Athens　among　the　youth　of　rank　and　fortune。　The　ballot　was　in　these　cases　a　valuable　instrument　of　order；　and　conduced　to　the　Eunomia　by　which　Athens　was　distinguished　among　the　ancient　commonwealths。　　　But　in　the　more　advanced　states　of　modern　Europe；　and　especially　in　this　country；　the　power　of　coercing　voters　has　decli