representative government-第40章
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person most unwilling to accept it。 The electors are to make choice of one of those who have offered themselves as candidates： and those who choose the electors already know who these are。 If there is any political activity in the country； all electors； who care to vote at all； have made up their minds which of these candidates they would like to have； and will make that the sole consideration in giving their vote。 The partisans of each candidate will have their list of electors ready； all pledged to vote for that individual； and the only question practically asked of the primary elector will be which of these lists he will support。 The case in which election by two stages answers well in practice is when the electors are not chosen solely as electors； but have other important functions to discharge； which precludes their being selected solely as delegates to give a particular vote。 This combination of circumstances exemplifies itself in another American institution； the Senate of the United States。 That assembly； the Upper House； as it were； of Congress； is considered to represent not the people directly； but the States as such； and to be the guardian of that portion of their sovereign rights which they have not alienated。 As the internal sovereignty of each State is； by the nature of an equal federation； equally sacred whatever be the size or importance of the State； each returns to the Senate the same number of members （two）； whether it be little Delaware or the 〃Empire State〃 of New York。 These members are not chosen by the population； but by the State Legislatures； themselves elected by the people of each State； but as the whole ordinary business of a legislative assembly； internal legislation and the control of the executive； devolves upon these bodies； they are elected with a view to those objects more than to the other； and in naming two persons to represent the State in the Federal Senate they for the most part exercise their own judgment； with only that general reference to public opinion necessary in all acts of the government of a democracy。 The elections； thus made； have proved eminently successful； and are conspicuously the best of all the elections in the United States； the Senate invariably consisting of the most distinguished men among those who have made themselves sufficiently known in public life。 After such an example； it cannot be said that indirect popular election is never advantageous。 Under certain conditions it is the very best system that can be adopted。 But those conditions are hardly to be obtained in practice； except in a federal government like that of the United States； where the election can be entrusted to local bodies whose other functions extend to the most important concerns of the nation。 The only bodies in any analogous position which exist； or are likely to exist； in this country are the municipalities； or any other boards which have been or may be created for similar local purposes。 Few persons； however； would think it any improvement in our parliamentary constitution if the members for the City of London were chosen by the Aldermen and Common Council； and those for the borough of Marylebone avowedly； as they already are virtually； by the vestries of the component parishes。 Even if those bodies； considered merely as local boards； were far less objectionable than they are； the qualities that would fit them for the limited and peculiar duties of municipal or parochial aedileship are no guarantee of any special fitness to judge of the comparative qualifications of candidates for a seat in Parliament。 They probably would not fulfil this duty any better than it is fulfilled by the inhabitants voting directly； while； on the other hand； if fitness for electing members of Parliament had to be taken into consideration in selecting persons for the office of vestrymen or town councillors； many of those who are fittest for that more limited duty would inevitably be excluded from it； if only by the necessity there would be of choosing persons whose sentiments in general politics agreed with those of the voters who elected them。 The mere indirect political influence of town…councils has already led to a considerable perversion of municipal elections from their intended purpose； by making them a matter of party politics。 If it were part of the duty of a man's book…keeper or steward to choose his physician； he would not be likely to have a better medical attendant than if he chose one for himself； while he would be restricted in his choice of a steward or book…keeper to such as might without too great danger to his health be entrusted with the other office。 It appears； therefore； that every benefit of indirect election which is attainable at all is attainable under direct； that such of the benefits expected from it； as would not be obtained under direct election； will just as much fail to be obtained under indirect； while the latter has considerable disadvantages peculiar to itself。 The mere fact that it is an additional and superfluous wheel in the machinery is no trifling objection。 Its decided inferiority as a means of cultivating public spirit and political intelligence has already been dwelt upon： and if it had any effective operation at all… that is； if the primary electors did to any extent leave to their nominees the selection of their parliamentary representative… the voter would be prevented from identifying himself with his member of Parliament； and the member would feel a much less active sense of responsibility to his constituents。 In addition to all this； the comparatively small number of persons in whose hands； at last； the election of a member of Parliament would reside； could not but afford great additional facilities to intrigue； and to every form of corruption compatible with the station in life of the electors。 The constituencies would universally be reduced； in point of conveniences for bribery； to the condition of the small boroughs at present。 It would be sufficient to gain over a small number of persons to be certain of being returned。 If it be said that the electors would be responsible to those who elected them； the answer is obvious； that； holding no permanent office； or position in the public eye； they would risk nothing by a corrupt vote except what they would care little for； not to be appointed electors again： and the main reliance must still be on the penalties for bribery； the insufficiency of which reliance； in small constituencies； experience has made notorious to all the world。 The evil would be exactly proportional to the amount of discretion left to the chosen electors。 The only case in which they would probably be afraid to employ their vote for the promotion of their personal interest would be when they were elected under an express pledge； as mere delegates； to carry； as it were； the votes of their constituents to the hustings。 The moment the double stage of election began to have any effect； it would begin to have a bad effect。 And this we shall find true of the principle of indirect election however applied； except in circumstances similar to those of the election of Senators in the United States。 The best which could be said for this political contrivance that in some states of opinion it might be a more practicable expedient than that of plural voting for giving to every member of the community a vote of some sort； without rendering the mere numerical majority predominant in Parliament： as； for instance； if the present constituency of this country were increased by the addition of a numerous and select portion of the labouring classes； elected by the remainder。 Circumstances might render such a scheme a convenient mode of temporary compromise； but it does not carry out any principle sufficiently thoroughly to be likely to recommend itself to any class of thinkers as a permanent arrangement。 Chapter 10 Of the Mode of Voting。
THE QUESTION of greatest moment in regard to modes of voting is that of secrecy or publicity； and to this we will at once address ourselves。 It would be a great mistake to make the discussion turn on sentimentalities about skulking or cowardice。 Secrecy is justifiable in many cases； imp
