representative government-第39章
按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！
d； as in a good state of things it would； on personal conditions。 Where it depends； as in this and most other countries； on conditions of property； the contradiction is even more flagrant。 There something more than ordinarily irrational in the fact that when a woman can give all the guarantees required from a male elector； independent circumstances； the position of a householder and head of a family； payment of taxes； or whatever may be the conditions imposed； the very principle and system of a representation based on property is set aside； and an exceptionally personal disqualification is created for the mere purpose of excluding her。 When it is added that in the country where this is done a woman now reigns； and that the most glorious ruler whom that country ever had was a woman； the picture of unreason； and scarcely disguised injustice； is complete。 Let us hope that as the work proceeds of pulling down； one after another； the remains of the mouldering fabric of monopoly and tyranny； this one will not be the last to disappear； that the opinion of Bentham； of Mr。 Samuel Bailey； of Mr。 Hare； and many other of the most powerful political thinkers of this age and country （not to speak of others）； will make its way to all minds not rendered obdurate by selfishness or inveterate prejudice； and that； before the lapse another generation； the accident of sex； no more than the accident of skin； will be deemed a sufficient justification for depriving its possessor of the equal protection and just privileges of a citizen。 Chapter 9 Should there be Two Stages of Election？
IN SOME representative constitutions the plan has been adopted of choosing the members of the representative body by a double process； the primary electors only choosing other electors； and these electing the member of parliament。 This contrivance was probably intended as a slight impediment to the full sweep of popular feeling； giving the suffrage； and with it the complete ultimate power； to the Many； but compelling them to exercise it through the agency of a comparatively few； who； it was supposed； would be less moved than the Demos by the gusts of popular passion； and as the electors； being already a select body； might be expected to exceed in intellect and character the common level of their constituents； the choice made by them was thought likely to be more careful and enlightened； and would in any case be made under a greater feeling of responsibility； than election by the masses themselves。 This plan of filtering； as it were； the popular suffrage through an intermediate body admits of a very plausible defence； since it may be said； with great appearance of reason； that less intellect and instruction are required for judging who among our neighbours can be most safely trusted to choose a member of parliament； than who is himself fittest to be one。 In the first place； however； if the dangers incident to popular power may be thought to be in some degree lessened by this indirect arrangement； so also are its benefits； and the latter effect is much more certain than the former。 To enable the system to work as desired； it must be carried into effect in the spirit in which it is planned； the electors must use the suffrage in the manner supposed by the theory； that is； each of them must not ask himself who the member of parliament should be； but only whom he would best like to choose one for him。 It is evident that the advantages which indirect is supposed to have over direct election require this disposition of mind in the voter； and will only be realised by his taking the doctrine au serieux； that his sole business is to choose the choosers； not the member himself。 The supposition must be； that he will not occupy his thoughts with political opinions and measures； or political men； but will be guided by his personal respect for some private individual； to whom he will give a general power of attorney to act for him。 Now if the primary electors adopt this view of their position； one of the principal uses of giving them a vote at all is defeated： the political function to which they are called fails of developing public spirit and political intelligence； of making public affairs an object of interest to their feelings and of exercise to their faculties。 The supposition； moreover； involves inconsistent conditions； for if the voter feels no interest in the final result； how or why can he be expected to feel any in the process which leads to it？ To wish to have a particular individual for his representative in parliament is possible to a person of a very moderate degree of virtue and intelligence； and to wish to choose an elector who will elect that individual is a natural consequence： but for a person does not care who is elected； or feels bound to put that consideration in abeyance； to take any interest whatever in merely naming the worthiest person to elect another according to his own judgment； implies a zeal for what is right in the abstract； an habitual principle of duty for the sake of duty； which is possible only to persons of a rather high grade of cultivation； who； by the very possession of it； show that they may be； and deserve to be； trusted with political power in a more direct shape。 Of all public functions which it is possible to confer on the poorer members of the community this surely is the least calculated to kindle their feelings； and holds out least natural inducement to care for it； other than a virtuous determination to discharge conscientiously whatever duty one has to perform： and if the mass of electors cared enough about political affairs to set any value on so limited a participation in them； they would not be likely to be satisfied without one much more extensive。 In the next place； admitting that a person who； from his narrow range of cultivation； cannot judge well of the qualifications of a candidate for parliament may be a sufficient judge of the honesty and general capacity of somebody whom he may depute to choose a member of Parliament for him； I may remark； that if the voter acquiesces in this estimate of his capabilities； and really wishes to have the choice made for him by a person in whom he places reliance； there is no need of any constitutional provision for the purpose； he has only to ask this confidential person privately what candidate he had better vote for。 In that case the two modes of election coincide in their result； and every advantage of indirect election is obtained under direct。 The systems only diverge in their operation； if we suppose that the voter would prefer to use his own judgment in the choice of a representative； and only lets another choose for him because the law does not allow him a more direct mode of action。 But if this be his state of mind； if his will does not go along with the limitation which the law imposes； and he desires to make a direct choice； he can do so notwithstanding the law。 He has only to choose as elector a known partisan of the candidate he prefers； or some one who will pledge himself to vote for that candidate。 And this is so much the natural working of election by two stages that； except in a condition of complete political indifference； it can scarcely be expected to act otherwise。 It is in this way that the election of the President of the United States practically takes place。 Nominally； the election is indirect： the population at large does not vote for the President； it votes for electors who choose the President。 But the electors are always chosen under an express engagement to vote for a particular candidate： nor does a citizen ever vote for an elector because of any preference for the man； he votes for the Lincoln ticket； or the Breckenridge ticket。 It must be remembered that the electors are not chosen in order that they may search the country and find the fittest person in it to be President； or to be a member of Parliament。 There would be something to be said for the practice if this were so： but it is not so； nor ever will be until mankind in general are of opinion； with Plato； that the proper person to be entrusted with power is the person most unwilling to accept it。 The electors are to make choice of one of those who have offere
