representative government-第32章
按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！
trust attaching to all novelties which have not been sufficiently canvassed to make generally manifest all the pros and cons of the question。 The only serious obstacle is the unfamiliarity： this indeed is a formidable one； for the imagination much more easily reconciles itself to a great alteration in substance； than to a very small one in names and forms。 But unfamiliarity is a disadvantage which； when there is any real value in an idea； it only requires time to remove。 And in these days of discussion； and generally awakened interest in improvement； what formerly was the work of centuries； often requires only years。
Since the first publication of this Treatise； several adverse criticisms have been made on Mr。 Hare's plan； which indicate at least a careful examination of it； and a more intelligent consideration than had previously been given to its pretensions。 This is the natural progress of the discussion of great improvements。 They are at first met by a blind prejudice； and by arguments to which only blind prejudice could attach any value。 As the prejudice weakens； the arguments it employs for some time increase in strength； since； the plan being better understood； its inevitable inconveniences； and the circumstances which militate against its at once producing all the benefits it is intrinsically capable of； come to light along with its merits。 But of all the objections； having any semblance of reason； which have come under my notice； there is not one which had not been foreseen； considered； and canvassed by the supporters of the plan； and found either unreal or easily surmountable。 The most serious； in appearance； of the objections may be the most briefly answered； the assumed impossibility of guarding against fraud； or suspicion of fraud； in the operations of the Central Office。 Publicity； and complete liberty of inspecting the voting papers after the election； were the securities provided； but these； it is maintained； would be unavailing； because； to check the returns； a voter would have to go over all the work that had been done by the staff of clerks。 This would be a very weighty objection； if there were any necessity that the returns should be verified individually by every voter。 All that a simple voter could be expected to do in the way of verification would be to check the use made of his own voting paper； for which purpose every paper would be returned； after a proper interval； to the place from whence it came。 But what he could not do would be done for him by the unsuccessful candidates and their agents。 Those among the defeated who thought that they ought to have been returned would； singly or a number together； employ an agency for verifying the process of the election； and if they detected material error； the documents would be referred to a Committee of the House of Commons； by whom the entire electoral operations of the nation would be examined and verified； at a tenth part the expense of time and money necessary for the scrutiny of a single return before an Election Committee under the system now in force。 Assuming the plan to be workable； two modes have been alleged in which its benefits might be frustrated； and injurious consequences produced in lieu of them。 First； it is said that undue power would be given to knots or cliques； sectarian combinations； associations for special objects； such as the Maine Law League； the Ballot or Liberation Society； or bodies united by class interests or community of religious persuasion。 It is in the second place objected that the system would admit of being worked for party purposes。 A central organ of each political party would send its list of 658 candidates all through the country； to be voted for by the whole of its supporters in every constituency。 Their votes would far outnumber those which could ever be obtained by any independent candidate。 The 〃ticket〃 system； it is contended； would； as it does in America； operate solely in favour of the great organised parties； whose tickets would be accepted blindly； and voted for in their integrity； and would hardly ever be outvoted； except occasionally； by the sectarian groups； or knots of men bound together by a common crotchet who have been already spoken of。 The answer to this appears to be conclusive。 No one pretends that under Mr。 Hare's or any other plan organisation would cease to be an advantage。 Scattered elements are always at a disadvantage compared with organised bodies。 As Mr。 Hare's plan cannot alter the nature of things； we must expect that all parties or sections； great or small； which possess organisation； would avail themselves of it to the utmost to strengthen their influence。 But under the existing system those influences are everything。 The scattered elements are absolutely nothing。 The voters who are neither bound to the great political nor to any of the little sectarian divisions have no means of making their votes available。 Mr。 Hare's plan gives them the means。 They might be more； or less； dexterous in using it。 They might obtain their share of influence； or much less than their share。 But whatever they did acquire would be clear gain。 And when it is assumed that every petty interest； or combination for a petty object； would give itself an organisation； why should we suppose that the great interest of national intellect and character would alone remain unorganised？ If there would be Temperance tickets； and Ragged School tickets； and the like； would not one public…spirited person in a constituency be sufficient to put forth a 〃personal merit〃 ticket； and circulate it through a whole neighbourhood？ And might not a few such persons； meeting in London； select from the list of candidates the most distinguished names； without regard to technical divisions of opinion； and publish them at a trifling expense through all the constituencies？ It must be remembered that the influence of the two great parties； under the present mode of election； is unlimited： in Mr。 Hare's scheme it would be great； but confined within bounds。 Neither they； nor any of the smaller knots； would be able to elect more members than in proportion to the relative number of their adherents。 The ticket system in America operates under conditions the reverse of this。 In America electors vote for the party ticket； because the election goes by a mere majority； and a vote for any one who is certain not to obtain the majority is thrown away。 But； on Mr。 Hare's system； a vote given to a person of known worth has almost as much chance of obtaining its object as one given to a party candidate。 It might be hoped； therefore； that every Liberal or Conservative； who was anything besides a Liberal or a Conservative… who had any preferences of his own in addition to those of his party… would scratch through the names of the more obscure and insignificant party candidates； and inscribe in their stead some of the men who are an honour to the nation。 And the probability of this fact would operate as a strong inducement with those who drew up the party lists not to confine themselves to pledged party men； but to include along with these； in their respective tickets； such of the national notabilities as were more in sympathy with their side than with the opposite。 The real difficulty； for it is not to be dissembled that there is a difficulty； is that the independent voters； those who are desirous of voting for unpatronised persons of merit； would be apt to put down the names of a few such persons； and to fill up the remainder of their list with mere party candidates； thus helping to swell the numbers against those by whom they would prefer to be represented。 There would be an easy remedy for this； should it be necessary to resort to it； namely； to impose a limit to the number of secondary or contingent votes。 No voter is likely to have an independent preference； grounded on knowledge； for 658； or even for 100 candidates。 There would be little objection to his being limited to twenty； fifty； or whatever might be the number in the selection of whom there was some probability that his own choice would be exercised…that he would vote as an individual； and not as one of the mere rank and file of a party。 But even without this restriction； the evil would be l
