representative government-第11章
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the power of taxation； and the supreme legislative as well as executive authority。 Were he to act thus； and so far abdicate as a despot； he would do away with a considerable part of the evils characteristic of despotism。 Political activity and capacity for public affairs would no longer be prevented from growing up in the body of the nation； and a public opinion would form itself not the mere echo of the government。 But such improvement would be the beginning of new difficulties。 This public opinion； independent of the monarch's dictation； must be either with him or against him； if not the one； it will be the other。 All governments must displease many persons； and these having now regular organs； and being able to express their sentiments； opinions adverse to the measures of government would often be expressed。 What is the monarch to do when these unfavourable opinions happen to be in the majority？ Is he to alter his course？ Is he to defer to the nation？ If so； he is no longer a despot； but a constitutional king； an organ or first minister of the people； distinguished only by being irremovable。 If not； he must either put down opposition by his despotic power； or there will arise a permanent antagonism between the people and one man； which can have but one possible ending。 Not even a religious principle of passive obedience and 〃right divine〃 would long ward off the natural consequences of such a position。 The monarch would have to succumb； and conform to the conditions of constitutional royalty； or give place to some one who would。 The despotism； being thus chiefly nominal； would possess few of the advantages supposed to belong to absolute monarchy； while it would realise in a very imperfect degree those of a free government； since however great an amount of liberty the citizens might practically enjoy； they could never forget that they held it on sufferance； and by a concession which under the existing constitution of the state might at any moment be resumed； that they were legally slaves； though of a prudent； or indulgent； master。 It is not much to be wondered at if impatient or disappointed reformers； groaning under the impediments opposed to the most salutary public improvements by the ignorance； the indifference； the intractableness； the perverse obstinacy of a people； and the corrupt combinations of selfish private interests armed with the powerful weapons afforded by free institutions； should at times sigh for a strong hand to bear down all these obstacles； and compel a recalcitrant people to be better governed。 But （setting aside the fact； that for one despot who now and then reforms an abuse； there are ninety…nine who do nothing but create them） those who look in any such direction for the realisation of their hopes leave out of the idea of good government its principal element； the improvement of the people themselves。 One of the benefits of freedom is that under it the ruler cannot pass by the people's minds； and amend their affairs for them without amending them。 If it were possible for the people to be well governed in spite of themselves； their good government would last no longer than the freedom of a people usually lasts who have been liberated by foreign arms without their own co…operation。 It is true； a despot may educate the people； and to do so really； would be the best apology for his despotism。 But any education which aims at making human beings other than machines； in the long run makes them claim to have the control of their own actions。 The leaders of French philosophy in the eighteenth century had been educated by the Jesuits。 Even Jesuit education； it seems； was sufficiently real to call forth the appetite for freedom。 Whatever invigorates the faculties； in however small a measure； creates an increased desire for their more unimpeded exercise； and a popular education is a failure； if it educates the people for any state but that which it will certainly induce them to desire； and most probably to demand。 I am far from condemning； in cases of extreme exigency； the assumption of absolute power in the form of a temporary dictatorship。 Free nations have； in times of old； conferred such power by their own choice； as a necessary medicine for diseases of the body politic which could not be got rid of by less violent means。 But its acceptance； even for a time strictly limited； can only be excused； if； like Solon or Pittacus； the dictator employs the whole power he assumes in removing the obstacles which debar the nation from the enjoyment of freedom。 A good despotism is an altogether false ideal； which practically （except as a means to some temporary purpose） becomes the most senseless and dangerous of chimeras。 Evil for evil； a good despotism； in a country at all advanced in civilisation； is more noxious than a bad one； for it is far more relaxing and enervating to the thoughts； feelings； and energies of the people。 The despotism of Augustus prepared the Romans for Tiberius。 If the whole tone of their character had not first been prostrated by nearly two generations of that mild slavery； they would probably have had spirit enough left to rebel against the more odious one。
There is no difficulty in showing that the ideally best form of government is that in which the sovereignty； or supreme controlling power in the last resort； is vested in the entire aggregate of the community； every citizen not only having a voice in the exercise of that ultimate sovereignty； but being； at least occasionally； called on to take an actual part in the government； by the personal discharge of some public function； local or general。 To test this proposition； it has to be examined in reference to the two branches into which； as pointed out in the last chapter； the inquiry into the goodness of a government conveniently divides itself； namely； how far it promotes the good management of the affairs of society by means of the existing faculties； moral； intellectual； and active； of its various members； and what is its effect in improving or deteriorating those faculties。 The ideally best form of government； it is scarcely necessary to say； does not mean one which is practicable or eligible in all states of civilisation； but the one which； in the circumstances in which it is practicable and eligible； is attended with the greatest amount of beneficial consequences； immediate and prospective。 A completely popular government is the only polity which can make out any claim to this character。 It is pre…eminent in both the departments between which the excellence of a political constitution is divided。 It is both more favourable to present good government； and promotes a better and higher form of national character； than any other polity whatsoever。 Its superiority in reference to present well…being rests upon two principles； of as universal truth and applicability as any general propositions which can be laid down respecting human affairs。 The first is； that the rights and interests of every or any person are only secure from being disregarded when the person interested is himself able； and habitually disposed； to stand up for them。 The second is； that the general prosperity attains a greater height； and is more widely diffused； in proportion to the amount and variety of the personal energies enlisted in promoting it。 Putting these two propositions into a shape more special to their present application； human beings are only secure from evil at the hands of others in proportion as they have the power of being； and are； self…protecting； and they only achieve a high degree of success in their struggle with Nature in proportion as they are self…dependent； relying on what they themselves can do； either separately or in concert； rather than on what others do for them。 The former proposition… that each is the only safe guardian of his own rights and interests… is one of those elementary maxims of prudence； which every person； capable of conducting his own affairs； implicitly acts upon； wherever he himself is interested。 Many； indeed； have a great dislike to it as a political doctrine； and are fond of holding it up to obloquy； as a doctrine of universal selfishness。 To which we may answer； that whenever it ceases to be true that mankind
