an enquiry concerning human understanding-第7章

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as　absurd　and　monstrous。　Neither　B/OCCACE；　L/A　F/ONTAINE；
nor　any　author　of　that　kind；　though　pleasantry　be　their
chief　object；　have　ever　indulged　them。

　　　　　To　return　to　the　comparison　of　history　and　epic　poetry；
we　may　conclude　from　the　foregoing　reasonings　that　as　a
certain　unity　is　requisite　in　all　productions；　it　cannot　be
wanting　to　history　more　than　to　any　other；　that　in　history
the　connection　among　the　several　events　which　unites　them
into　one　body　is　the　relation　of　cause　and　effect；　the　same
which　takes　place　in　epic　poetry；　and　that；　in　the　latter
composition；　this　connection　is　only　required　to　be　closer
and　more　sensible　on　account　of　the　lively　imagination　and
strong　passions　which　must　be　touched　by　the　poet　in　his
narration。　the　P/ELOPONNESIAN　war　is　a　proper　subject　for
history；　the　siege　of　A/THENS　for　an　epic　poem；　and　the
death　of　A/LCIBIADES　for　a　tragedy。

　　　　　As　the　difference；　therefore；　betwixt　history　and　epic
poetry　consists　only　in　the　degrees　of　connection　which　bind
together　those　several　events　of　which　their　subject　is
composed；　it　will　be　difficult；　if　not　impossible；　by　words
to　determine　exactly　the　bounds　which　separate　them　from
each　other。　That　is　a　matter　of　taste　more　than　of
reasoning；　and　perhaps　this　unity　may　often　be　discovered　in
a　subject　where；　at　first　view；　and　from　an　abstract
consideration；　we　should　least　expect　to　find　it。

　　　　　It　is　evident　that　H/OMER；　in　the　course　of　his
narration；　exceeds　the　first　proposition　of　his　subject；　and
that　the　anger　of　A/CHILLES；　which　caused　the　death　of
H/ECTOR；　is　not　the　same　with　that　which　produced　so　many
ills　to　the　G/REEKS。　But　the　strong　connection　betwixt
these　two　movements；　the　quick　transition　from　one　to　the
other；　the　contrast　betwixt　the　effects　of　concord　and
discord　amongst　the　princes；　and　the　natural　curiosity　we
have　to　see　A/CHILLES　in　action　after　so　long　repose　　all
these　causes　carry　on　the　reader；　and　produce　a　sufficient
unity　in　the　subject。

　　　　　It　may　be　objected　to　M/ILTON　that　he　has　traced　up
his　causes　to　too　great　a　distance；　and　that　the　rebellion
of　the　angels　produces　the　fall　of　man　by　a　train　of　events
which　is　both　very　long　and　very　casual。　Not　to　mention　that
the　creation　of　the　world；　which　he　has　related　at　length；
is　no　more　the　cause　of　that　catastrophe　than　of　the　battle
of　P/HARSALIA；　or　any　other　event　that　has　ever　harpooned。
But　if　we　consider；　on　the　other　hand；　that　all　these
events；　the　rebellion　of　the　angels；　the　creation　of　the
world；　and　the　fall　of　man；　　each　other　in　being
miraculous；　and　out　of　the　common　course　of　nature；　that
they　are　supposed　to　be　　in　time；　and　that；
being　detached　from　all　other　events；　and　being　the　only
original　facts　which　revelation　discovers；　they　strike　the
eye　at　once；　and　naturally　recall　each　other　to　the　thought
or　imagination　　if　we　consider　all　these　circumstances；　I
say；　we　shall　find　that　these　parts　of　the　action　have　a
sufficient　unity　to　make　them　be　comprehended　in　one　fable
or　narration。　To　which　we　may　add　that　the　rebellion　of　the
angels　and　the　fall　of　man　have　a　peculiar　resemblance；　as
being　counterparts　to　each　other；　and　presenting　to　the
reader　the　same　moral　of　obedience　to　our　Creator。

　　　　　These　loose　hints　I　have　thrown　together　in　order　to
excite　the　curiosity　of　philosophers；　and　beget　a　suspicion
at　least　if　not　a　full　persuasion　that　this　subject　is　very
copious；　and　that　many　operations　of　the　human　mind　depend
on　the　connection　or　association　of　ideas　which　is　here
explained。　Particularly；　the　sympathy　betwixt　the　passions
and　imagination　will；　perhaps；　appear　remarkable；　while　we
observe　that　the　affections；　excited　by　one　object；　pass
easily　to　another　connected　with　it；　but　transfuse
themselves　with　difficulty；　or　not　at　all；　along　different
objects　which　have　no　manner　of　connection　together。　By　　　　　
introducing　into　any　composition　personages　and　actions
foreign　to　each　other；　an　injudicious　author　loses　that
communication　of　emotions　by　which　alone　he　can　interest　the
heart　and　raise　the　passions　to　their　proper　height　and
period。　the　full　explication　of　this　principle　and　all　its
consequences　would　lead　us　into　reasonings　too　profound　and
too　copious　for　these　Essays。　It　is　sufficient　for　us；　at
present；　to　have　established　this　conclusion；　that　the　three
connecting　principles　of　all　ideas　are　the　relations　of
；　；　and　。
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　*　*　*　*
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　SECTION　IV。
　　　　　Sceptical　Doubts　Concerning　the　Operations　of　the
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Understanding。
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　PART　I。
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　
　　　　　A/LL　the　objects　of　human　reason　or　enquiry　may
naturally　be　divided　into　two　kinds；　to　wit；　；　and　。　Of　the　first　kind　are　the
sciences　of　Geometry；　Algebra；　and　Arithmetic；　and　in　short；
every　affirmation　which　is　either　intuitively　or
demonstratively　certain。　；　is　a　proposition
which　expresses　a　relation　between　these　figures。　；　expresses
a　relation　between　these　numbers。　Propositions　of　this　kind
are　discoverable　by　the　mere　operation　of　thought；　without
dependence　on　what　is　anywhere　existent　in　the　universe。
Though　there　never　were　a　circle　or　triangle　in　nature；　the
truths　demonstrated　by　Euclid　would　for　ever　retain　their
certainty　and　evidence。

　　　　　Matters　of　fact；　which　are　the　second　objects　of　human
reason；　are　not　ascertained　in　the　same　manner；　nor　is　our
evidence　of　their　truth；　however　great；　of　a　like　nature
with　the　foregoing。　The　contrary　of　every　matter　of　fact　is
still　possible；　because　it　can　never　imply　a　contradiction；
and　is　conceived　by　the　mind　with　the　same　facility　and
distinctness；　as　if　ever　so　conformable　to　reality。　　is　no　less　intelligible　a
proposition；　and　implies　no　more　contradiction　than　the
affirmation；　。　We　should　in　vain；
therefore；　attempt　to　demonstrate　its　falsehood。　Were　it
demonstratively　false；　it　would　imply　a　contradiction；　and
could　never　be　distinctly　conceived　by　the　mind。

　　　　　It　may；　therefore；　be　a　subject　worthy　of　curiosity；　to
enquire　what　is　the　nature　of　that　evidence　which　assures　us
of　any　real　existence　and　matter　of　fact；　beyond　the　present
testimony　of　our　senses；　or　the　records　of　our　memory。　This
part　of　philosophy；　it　is　observable；　has　been　little
cultivated；　either　by　the　ancients　or　moderns；　and　therefore
our　doubts　and　errors；　in　the　prosecution　of　so　important　an
enquiry；　may　be　the　more　excusable；　while　we　march　through
such　difficult　paths　without　any　guide　or　direction。　They
may　even　prove　useful；　by　exciting　curiosity；　and　destroying
that　implicit　faith　and　security；　which　is　the　bane　of　all
reasoning　and　free　enquiry。　The　discovery　of　defects　in　the
common　philosophy；　if　any　such　there　be；　will　not；　I
presume；　be　a　discouragement；　but　rather　an　incitement；　as
is　usual；　to　attempt　something　more　full　and　satisfactory
than　has　yet　been　proposed　to　the　public。

　　　　　All　reasonings　concerning　matter　of　fact　seem　to　be
founded　on　the　relation　of　。　By　means　of
that　relation　alone　we　can　go　beyond　the　evidence　of　our
memory　and　senses。　If　you　were　to　ask　a　man；　why　he　believes
any　matter　of　fact；　which　is　absent；　for　instance；　that　his
friend　is　in　the　country；　or　in　F/RANCE；　he　would　give　you
a　reason；　and　this　reason　would　be　some　other　fact；　as　a
letter　received　from　him；　or　the　knowledge　of　his　former
resolutions　and　promises。　A　man　finding　a　watch　or　any　other
machine　in　a　desert　island；　would　conclude　that　there　had
once　been　men　in　that　island。　All　our　reasonings　concerning
fact　are　of　the　same　nature。　And　here　it　is　constantly
supposed　that　there　is　a　connexion　between　the　present　fact
and　that　which　is　inferred　from　it。　Were　there　nothing　to