an enquiry concerning human understanding-第40章

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circumstances；　it　is　still　supposed　imperfect；　without　the
assistance　of　experience；　which　is　alone　able　to　give
stability　and　certainty　to　the　maxims；　derived　from　study
and　reflection。

　　　　　But　notwithstanding　that　this　distinction　be　thus
universally　received；　both　in　the　active　and　speculative
scenes　of　life；　I　shall　not　scruple　to　pronounce；　that　it
is；　at　bottom；　erroneous；　at　least；　superficial。

　　　　　If　we　examine　those　arguments；　which；　in　any　of　the
sciences　above　mentioned；　are　supposed　to　be　mere　effects　of
reasoning　and　reflection；　they　will　be　found　to　terminate；
at　last；　in　some　general　principle　or；　conclusion；　for　which
we　can　assign　no　reason　but　observation　and　experience。　The
only　difference　between　them　and　those　maxims；　which　are
vulgarly　esteemed　the　result　of　pure　experience；　is；　that
the　former　cannot　be　established　without　some　process　of
thought；　and　some　reflection　on　what　we　have　observed；　in
order　to　distinguish　its　circumstances；　and　trace　its
consequences：　Whereas　in　the　latter；　the　experienced　event
is　exactly　and　fully　familiar　to　that　which　we　infer　as　the
result　of　any　particular　situation。　The　history　of　a
T/IBERIUS　or　a　N/ERO　makes　us　dread　a　like　tyranny；　were
our　monarchs　freed　from　the　restraints　of　laws　and　senates：
But　the　observation　of　any　fraud　or　cruelty　in　private　life
is　sufficient；　with　the　aid　of　a　little　thought；　to　give　us
the　same　apprehension；　while　it　serves　as　an　instance　of　the
general　corruption　of　human　nature；　and　shows　us　the　danger
which　we　must　incur　by　reposing　an　entire　confidence　in
mankind。　In　both　cases；　it　is　experience　which　is　ultimately
the　foundation　of　our　inference　and　conclusion。

　　　　　There　is　no　man　so　young　and　inexperienced；　as　not　to
have　formed；　from　observation；　many　general　and　just　maxims
concerning　human　affairs　and　the　conduct　of　life；　but　it
must　be　confessed；　that；　when　a　man　comes　to　put　these　in
practice；　he　will　be　extremely　liable　to　error；　till　time
and　farther　experience　both　enlarge　these　maxims；　and　teach
him　their　proper　use　and　application。　In　every　situation　or
incident；　there　are　many　particular　and　seemingly　minute
circumstances；　which　the　man　of　greatest　talent　is；　at
first；　apt　to　overlook；　though　on　them　the　justness　of　his
conclusions；　and　consequently　the　prudence　of　his　conduct；
entirely　depend。　Not　to　mention；　that；　to　a　young　beginner；
the　general　observations　and　maxims　occur　not　always　on　the
proper　occasions；　nor　can　be　immediately　applied　with　due
calmness　and　distinction。　The　truth　is；　an　unexperienced
reasoner　could　be　no　reasoner　at　all；　were　he　absolutely
unexperienced；　and　when　we　assign　that　character　to　any　one；
we　mean　it　only　in　a　comparative　sense；　and　suppose　him
possessed　of　experience；　in　a　smaller　and　more　imperfect
degree。
　　　　　＇13＇'Naturane　nobis；　inquit；　datum　dicam；　an　errore
quodam；　ut；　cum　ea　loca　videamus；　in　quibus　memoria　dignos
viros　acceperimus　multim　esse　versatos；　magis　moveamur；　quam
siquando　eorum　ipsorum　aut　facta　audiamus　aut　scriptum
aliquod　legamus？　Velut　ego　nunc　moveor。　Venit　enim　mihi
Plato　in　mentem；　quem　accepimus　primum　hic　disputare
solitum；　cuius　etiam　illi　hortuli　propinqui　non　memoriam
solum　mihi　afferunt；　sed　ipsum　videntur　in　conspectu　meo　hic
ponere。　Hic　Speusippus；　hic　Xenocrates；　hic　eius　auditor
Polemo；　cuius　ipsa　illa　sessio　fuit；　quam　videmus。　Equidem
etiam　curiam　nostram；　Hostiliam　dico；　non　hanc　novam；　quae
mihi　minor　esse　videtur　postquam　est　maior；　solebam　intuens；
Scipionem；　Catonem；　Laelium；　nostrum　vero　in　primis　avum
cogitare。　Tanta　vis　admonitionis　est　in　locis；　ut　non　sine
causa　ex　his　memopriae　deducta　sit　disciplina。'　　Cicero　de
Finibus。　Lib。　v。
　　　　　＇14＇Mr。　L/OCKE　divides　all　arguments　into
demonstrative　and　probable。　In　this　view；　we　must　say；　that
it　is　only　probable　that　all　men　must　die；　or　that　the　sun
will　rise　to…morrow。　But　to　conform　our　language　more　to
common　use；　we　ought　to　divide　arguments　into
；　；　and　。　By　proofs
meaning　such　arguments　from　experience　as　leave　no　room　for
doubt　or　opposition。
　　　　　＇15＇Section　II。
　　　　　＇16＇Mr。　L/OCKE；　in　his　chapter　of　power；　says　that；
finding　from　experience；　that　there　are　several　new
productions　in　matter；　and　concluding　that　there　must
somewhere　be　a　power　capable　of　producing　them；　we　arrive　at
last　by　this　reasoning　at　the　idea　of　power。　But　no
reasoning　can　ever　give　us　a　new；　original；　simple　idea；　as
this　philosopher　himself　confesses。　This；　therefore；　can
never　be　the　origin　of　that　idea。
　　　　　＇17＇IT　may　be　pretended；　that　the　resistance　which　we
meet　with　in　bodies；　obliging　us　frequently　to　exert　our
force；　and　call　up　all　our　power；　this　gives　us　the　idea　of
force　and　power。　It　is　this　；　or　strong　endeavour；　of
which　we　are　conscious；　that　is　the　original　impression　from
which　this　idea　is　copied。　But；　first；　we　attribute　power　to
a　vast　number　of　objects；　where　we　never　can　suppose　this
resistance　or　exertion　of　force　to　take　place；　to　the
Supreme　Being；　who　never　meets　with　any　resistance；　to　the
mind　in　its　command　over　its　ideas　and　limbs；　in　common
thinking　and　motion；　where　the　effect　follows　immediately
upon　the　will；　without　any　exertion　or　summoning　up　of
force；　to　inanimate　matter；　which　is　not　capable　of　this
sentiment。　；　This　sentiment　of　an　endeavour　to
overcome　resistance　has　no　known　connexion　with　any　event：
What　follows　it；　we　know　by　experience；　but　could　not　know
it　。　It　must；　however；　be　confessed；　that　the
animal　；　which　we　experience；　though　it　can　afford　no
accurate　precise　idea　of　power；　enters　very　much　into　that
vulgar；　inaccurate　idea；　which　is　formed　by　it。
　　　　　＇18＇＇Three　Greek　words＇
　　　　　＇19＇Section　XII。
　　　　　＇20＇I　N/EED　not　examine　at　length　the　
which　is　so　much　talked　of　in　the　new　philosophy；　and　which
is　ascribed　to　matter。　We　find　by　experience；　that　a　body　at
rest　or　in　motion　continues　for　ever　in　its　present　state；
till　put　from　it　by　some　new　cause；　and　that　a　body　impelled
takes　as　much　motion　from　the　impelling　body　as　it　acquires
itself。　These　are　facts。　When　we　call　this　a　；
we　only　mark　these　facts；　without　pretending　to　have　any
idea　of　the　inert　power；　in　the　same　manner　as；　when　we　talk
of　gravity；　we　mean　certain　effects；　without　comprehending
that　active　power。　It　was　never　the　meaning　of　Sir　I/SAAC
N/EWTON　to　rob　second　causes　of　all　force　or　energy；　though
some　of　his　followers　have　endeavoured　to　establish　that
theory　upon　his　authority。　On　the　contrary；　that　great
philosopher　had　recourse　to　an　etherial　active　fluid　to
explain　his　universal　attraction；　though　he　was　so　cautious
and　modest　as　to　allow；　that　it　was　a　mere　hypothesis；　no　to
be　insisted　on；　without　more　experiments。　I　must　confess；
that　there　is　something　in　the　fate　of　opinions　a　little
extraordinary。　D/ES　C/ARTES　insinuated　that　doctrine　of
the　universal　and　sole　efficacy　of　the　Deity；　without
insisting　on　it。　M/ALEBRANCHE　and　other　C/ARTESIANS　made
it　the　foundation　of　all　their　philosophy。　It　had；　however；
no　authority　in　E/NGLAND。　L/OCKE；　C/LARKE；　and
C/UDWORTH；　never　so　much　as　notice　of　it；　but　suppose　all
along；　that　matter　has　a　real；　though　subordinate　and
derived　power。　By　what　means　has　it　become　so　prevalent
among　our　modern　metaphysicians？
　　　　　＇21＇A/CCORDING　to　these　explications　and　definitions；
the　idea　of　power　is　relative　as　much　as　that　of　；
and　both　have　a　reference　to　an　effect；　or　some　other　event
constantly　conjoined　with　the　former。　When　we　consider　the
　circumstance　of　an　object；　by　which　the　degree　or
quantity　of　its　effect　is　fixed　and　determined；　we　call　that
its　power：　And　accordingly；　it　is　allowed　by　all
philosophers；　that　the　effect　is　the　measure　of　the　power。
But　if　they　had　any　idea　of　power；　as　it　is　in　itself；　why
could　not　they　Measure　it　in　itself？　The　dispute　whether　the
force　of　a　body　in　motion　be　as　its　velocity；　or　the　square
of　its　velocity；　this　dispute；　I　say；　need　not　be　decided　by
comparing　its　effects　in　equal　or　unequal　times；　but　by　a
direct　mensuratio