an enquiry concerning human understanding-第39章

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Release；　1995）。


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　　　　　＇2＇This　is　not　intended　any　way　to　detract　from　the
merit　of　Mr。　L/OCKE；　who　was　really　a　great　philosopher　and
a　just　and　modest　reasoner。　It　is　only　meant　to　show　the
common　fate　of　such　abstract　philosophy。　＇This　note　was
removed　by　Hume　from　later　editions　of　the　。　
J。F。＇
　　　　　＇3＇That　faculty　by　which　we　discern　truth　and
falsehood；　and　that　by　which　we　perceive　vice　and　virtue；
had　long　been　confounded　with　each　other；　and　all　morality
was　supposed　to　be　built　on　external　an　immutable　relations
which；　to　every　intelligent　mind；　were　equally　invariable　as
any　proposition　concerning　quantity　or　number。　But　a　late
philosopher　＇Francis　Hutcheson＇　has　taught　us；　by　the　most
convincing　arguments；　that　morality　is　nothing　in　the
abstract　nature　of　things；　but　is　entirely　relative　to　the
sentiment　or　mental　taste　of　each　particular　being；　in　the
same　manner　as　the　distinctions　of　sweet　and　bitter；　hot　and
cold　arise　from　the　particular　feeling　of　each　sense　or
organ。　Moral　perceptions；　therefore；　ought　not　to　be　classed
with　the　operations　of　the　understanding；　but　with　the
tastes　or　sentiments。

　　　　　It　had　been　usual　with　philosophers　to　divide　all　the
passions　of　the　mind　into　two　classes；　the　selfish　and
benevolent；　which　were　supposed　to　stand　in　constant
opposition　and　contrariety；　nor　was　it　thought　that　the
latter　could　ever　attain　their　proper　object　but　at　the
expense　of　the　former。　Among　the　selfish　passions　were
ranked　avarice；　ambition；　revenge；　among　the　benevolent；
natural　affection；　friendship；　public　spirit。　Philosophers
may　now　perceive　the　impropriety　of　this　division。　＇See
Butler's　。＇　It　has　been　proved；　beyond　all
controversy；　that　even　the　passions　commonly　esteemed
selfish　carry　the　mind　beyond　self　directly　to　the　object；
that　though　the　satisfaction　of　these　passions　gives　us
enjoyment；　yet　the　prospect　of　this　enjoyment　is　not　the
cause　of　the　passion；　but；　on　the　contrary；　the　passion　is
antecedent　to　the　enjoyment；　and　without　the　former　the
latter　could　never　possibly　exist；　that　the　case　is
precisely　the　same　with　passions　denominated　benevolent；　and
consequently　that　a　man　is　no　more　interested　when　he　seeks
his　own　glory　than　when　the　happiness　of　his　friend　is　the
object　of　his　wishes；　nor　is　he　any　more　disinterested　when
he　sacrifices　his　ease　and　quiet　to　public　good　than　when　he
labors　for　the　gratification　of　avarice　or　ambition。　Here；
therefore；　is　a　considerable　adjustment　in　the　boundaries　of
the　passions；　which　had　been　confounded　by　the　negligence　or
inaccuracy　of　former　philosophers。　These　two　instances　may
suffice　to　show　us　the　nature　and　importance　of　that　species
of　philosophy。　＇This　note　was　removed　by　Hume　from　later
editions　of　the　。　…　…　J。F。＇
　　　　　＇4＇I/T　is　probable　that　no　more　was　meant　by　these；
who　denied　innate　ideas；　than　that　all　ideas　were　copies　of
our　impressions；　though　it　must　be　confessed；　that　the
terms；　which　they　employed；　were　not　chosen　with　such
caution；　nor　so　exactly　defined；　as　to　prevent　all　mistakes
about　their　doctrine。　For　what　is　meant　by　？　If
innate　be　equivalent　to　natural；　then　all　the　perceptions
and　ideas　of　the　mind　must　be　allowed　to　be　innate　or
natural；　in　whatever　sense　we　take　the　latter　word；　whether
in　opposition　to　what　is　uncommon；　artificial；　or
miraculous。　If　by　innate　be　meant；　contemporary　to　our
birth；　the　dispute　seems　to　be　frivolous；　nor　is　it　worth
while　to　enquire　at　what　time　thinking　begins；　whether
before；　at；　or　after　our　birth。　Again；　the　word　；
seems　to　be　commonly　taken　in　a　very　loose　sense；　by　L/OCKE
and　others；　as　standing　for　any　of　our　perceptions；　our
sensations　and　passions；　as　well　as　thoughts。　Now　in　this
sense；　I　should　desire　to　know；　what　can　be　meant　by
asserting；　that　self…love；　or　resentment　of　injuries；　or　the
passion　between　the　sexes　is　not　innate？
　　　　　But　admitting　these　terms；　　and　；
in　the　sense　above　explained；　and　understanding　by　；
what　is　original　or　copied　from　no　precedent　perception；
then　may　we　assert　that　all　our　impressions　are　innate；　and
our　ideas　not　innate。
　　　　　To　be　ingenuous；　I　must　own　it　to　be　my　opinion；　that
L/OCKE　was　betrayed　into　this　question　by　the　schoolmen；
who；　making　use　of　undefined　terms；　draw　out　their　disputes
to　a　tedious　length；　without　ever　touching　the　point　in
question。　A　like　ambiguity　and　circumlocution　seem　to　run
through　that　philosopher's　reasonings　on　this　as　well　as
most　other　subjects。
　　　　　＇5＇Resemblance。
　　　　　＇6＇Contiguity。
　　　　　＇7＇Cause　and　Effect。
　　　　　＇8＇For　instance；　Contrast　or　Contrariety　is　also　a
connexion　among　Ideas：　but　it　may　perhaps；　be　considered　as
a　mixture　of　　and　。　Where　two
objects　are　contrary；　the　one　destroys　the　other；　that　is；
the　cause　of　its　annihilation；　and　the　idea　of　the
annihilation　of　an　object；　implies　the　idea　of　its　former
existence。
　　　　　＇9＇＇The　remainder　of　this　section　was　removed　from　the
final　two　editions　of　　which　were　authorized　by　Hume。　　JF＇
　　　　　＇10＇Contrary　to　Aristotle　＇cf。　1450a＇。
　　　　　＇11＇The　word；　Power；　is　here　used　in　a　loose　and
popular　sense。　The　more　accurate　explication　of　it　would
give　additional　evidence　to　this　argument。　See　Sect。　7。
　　　　　＇12＇N/OTHING　is　more　useful　than　for　writers；　even；　on
；　；　or　　subjects；　to　distinguish
between　reason　and　experience；　and　to　suppose；　that　these
species　of　argumentation　are　entirely　different　from　each
other。　The　former　are　taken　for　the　mere　result　of　our
intellectual　faculties；　which；　by　considering　　the
nature　of　things；　and　examining　the　effects；　that　must
follow　from　their　operation；　establish　particular　principles
of　science　and　philosophy。　The　latter　are　supposed　to　be
derived　entirely　from　sense　and　observation；　by　which　we
learn　what　has　actually　resulted　from　the　operation　of
particular　objects；　and　are　thence　able　to　infer；　what　will；
for　the　future；　result　from　them。　Thus；　for　instance；　the
limitations　and　restraints　of　civil　government；　and　a　legal
constitution；　may　be　defended；　either　from　；　which
reflecting　on　the　great　frailty　and　corruption　of　human
nature；　teaches；　that　no　man　can　safely　be　trusted　with
unlimited　authority；　or　from　　and　history；　which
inform　us　of　the　enormous　abuses；　that　ambition；　in　every
age　and　country；　has　been　found　to　make　so　imprudent　a
confidence。

　　　　　The　same　distinction　between　reason　and　experience　is
maintained　in　all　our　deliberations　concerning　the　conduct
of　life；　while　the　experienced　statesman；　general；
physician；　or　merchant　is　trusted　and　followed；　and　the
unpractised　novice；　with　whatever　natural　talents　endowed；
neglected　and　despised。　Though　it　be　allowed；　that　reason
may　form　very　plausible　conjectures　with　regard　to　the
consequences　of　such　a　particular　conduct　in　such　particular
circumstances；　it　is　still　supposed　imperfect；　without　the
assistance　of　experience；　which　is　alone　able　to　g