an enquiry concerning human understanding-第35章

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whether　it　be　possible　for　a　cause　to　be　known　only　by　its
effect　（as　you　have　all　along　supposed）　or　to　be　of　so
singular　and　particular　a　nature　as　to　have　no　parallel　and
no　similarity　with　any　other　cause　or　object；　that　has　ever
fallen　under　our　observation。　It　is　only　when　two　
of　objects　are　found　to　be　constantly　conjoined；　that　we　can
infer　the　one　from　the　other；　and　were　an　effect　presented；
which　was　entirely　singular；　and　could　not　be　comprehended
under　any　known　；　I　do　not　see；　that　we　could　form
any　conjecture　or　inference　at　all　concerning　its　cause。　If
experience　and　observation　and　analogy　be；　indeed；　the　only
guides　which　we　can　reasonably　follow　in　inferences　of　this
nature；　both　the　effect　and　cause　must　bear　a　similarity　and
resemblance　to　other　effects　and　causes；　which　we　know；　and
which　we　have　found；　in　many　instances；　to　be　conjoined　with
each　other。　I　leave　it　to　your　own　reflection　to　pursue　the
consequences　of　this　principle。　I　shall　just　observe；　that；
as　the　antagonists　of　E/PICURUS　always　suppose　the
universe；　an　effect　quite　singular　and　unparalleled；　to　be
the　proof　of　a　Deity；　a　cause　no　less　singular　and
unparalleled；　your　reasonings；　upon　that　supposition；　seem；
at　least；　to　merit　our　attention。　There　is；　I　own；　some
difficulty；　how　we　can　ever　return　from　the　cause　to　the
effect；　and；　reasoning　from　our　ideas　of　the　former；　infer
any　alteration　on　the　latter；　or　any；　addition　to　it。

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　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　SECTION　XII。
　　　　　　　　　Of　the　Academical　or　Sceptical　Philosophy。
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　PART　I。
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　
　　　　　T/HERE　is　not　a　greater　number　of　philosophical
reasonings；　displayed　upon　any　subject；　than　those；　which
prove　the　existence　of　a　Deity；　and　refute　the　fallacies　of
；　and　yet　the　most　religious　philosophers　still
dispute　whether　any　man　can　be　so　blinded　as　to　be　a
speculative　atheist。　How　shall　we　reconcile　these
contradictions？　The　knights　errant；　who　wandered　about　to
clear　the　world　of　dragons　and　giants；　never　entertained　the
least　doubt　with　regard　to　the　existence　of　these　monsters。

　　　　　The　　is　another　enemy　of　religion；　who
naturally　provokes　the　indignation　of　all　divines　and　graver
philosophers；　though　it　is　certain；　that　no　man　ever　met
with　any　such　absurd　creature；　or　conversed　with　a　man；　who
had　no　opinion　or　principle　concerning　any　subject；　either
of　action　or　speculation。　This　begets　a　very　natural
question；　What　is　meant　by　a　sceptic？　And　how　far　it　is
possible　to　push　these　philosophical　principles　of　doubt　and
uncertainty？

　　　　　There　is　a　species　of　scepticism；　　to　all
study　and　philosophy；　which　is　much　inculcated　by　D/ES
C/ARTES　and　others；　as　a　sovereign　preservative　against
error　and　precipitate　judgement。　It　recommends　an　universal
doubt；　not　only　of　all　our　former　opinions　and　principles；
but　also　of　our　very　faculties；　of　whose　veracity；　say　they；
we　must　assure　ourselves；　by　a　chain　of　reasoning；　deduced
from　some　original　principle；　which　cannot　possibly　be
fallacious　or　deceitful。　But　neither　is　there　any　such
original　principle；　which　has　a　prerogative　above　others；
that　are　self…evident　and　convincing：　Or　if　there　were；
could　we　advance　a　step　beyond　it；　but　by　the　use　of　those
very　faculties；　of　which　we　are　supposed　to　be　already
diffident。　The　C/ARTESIAN　doubt；　therefore；　were　it　ever
possible　to　be　attained　by　any　human　creature　（as　it　plainly
is　not）　would　be　entirely　incurable；　and　no　reasoning　could
ever　bring　us　to　a　state　of　assurance　and　conviction　upon
any　subject。

　　　　　It　must；　however；　be　confessed；　that　this　species　of
scepticism；　when　more　moderate；　may　be　understood　in　a　very
reasonable　sense；　and　is　a　necessary　preparative　to　the
study　of　philosophy；　by　preserving　a　proper　impartiality　in
our　judgements；　and　weaning　our　mind　from　all　those
prejudices；　which　we　may　have　imbibed　from　education　or　rash
opinion。　To　begin　with　clear　and　self…evident　principles；　to
advance　by　timorous　and　sure　steps；　to　review　frequently　our
conclusions；　and　examine　accurately　all　their　consequences；
though　by　these　means　we　shall　make　both　a　slow　and　a　short
progress　in　our　systems；　are　the　only　methods；　by　which　we
can　ever　hope　to　reach　truth；　and　attain　a　proper　stability
and　certainty　in　our　determinations。

　　　　　There　is　another　species　of　scepticism；　　to
science　and　enquiry；　when　men　are　supposed　to　have
discovered；　either　the　absolute　fallaciousness　of　their
mental　faculties；　or　their　unfitness　to　reach　any　fixed
determination　in　all　those　curious　subjects　of　speculation；
about　which　they　are　commonly　employed。　Even　our　very　senses
are　brought　into　dispute；　by　a　certain　species　of
philosophers；　and　the　maxims　of　common　life　are　subjected　to
the　same　doubt　as　the　most　profound　principles　or
conclusions　of　metaphysics　and　theology。　As　these
paradoxical　tenets　（if　they　may　be　called　tenets）　are　to　be
met　with　in　some　philosophers；　and　the　refutation　of　them　in
several；　they　naturally　excite　our　curiosity；　and　make　us
enquire　into　the　arguments；　on　which　they　may　be　founded。

　　　　　I　need　not　insist　upon　the　more　trite　topics；　employed
by　the　sceptics　in　all　ages；　against　the　evidence　of
；　such　as　those　which　are　derived　from　the
imperfection　and　fallaciousness　of　our　organs；　on　numberless
occasions；　the　crooked　appearance　of　an　oar　in　water；　the
various　aspects　of　objects；　according　to　their　different
distances；　the　double　images　which　arise　from　the　pressing
one　eye；　with　many　other　appearances　of　a　like　nature。　These
sceptical　topics；　indeed；　are　only　sufficient　to　prove；　that
the　senses　alone　are　not　implicitly　to　be　depended　on；　but
that　we　must　correct　their　evidence　by　reason；　and　by
considerations；　derived　from　the　nature　of　the　medium；　the
distance　of　the　object；　and　the　disposition　of　the　organ；　in
order　to　render　them；　within　their　sphere；　the　proper
criteria　of　truth　and　falsehood。　There　are　other　more
profound　arguments　against　the　senses；　which　admit　not　of　so
easy　a　solution。

　　　　　It　seems　evident；　that　men　are　carried；　by　a　natural
instinct　or　prepossession；　to　repose　faith　in　their　senses；
and　that；　without　any　reasoning；　or　even　almost　before　the
use　of　reason；　we　always　suppose　an　external　universe；　which
depends　not　on　our　perception；　but　would　exist；　though　we
and　every　sensible　creature　were　absent　or　annihilated。　Even
the　animal　creation　are　governed　by　a　like　opinion；　and
preserve　this　belief　of　external　objects；　in　all　their
thoughts；　designs；　and　actions。

　　　　　It　seems　also　evident；　that；　when　men　follow　this　blind
and　powerful　instinct　of　nature；　they　always　suppose　the
very　images；　presented　by　the　senses；　to　be　the　external
objects；　and　never　entertain　any　suspicion；　that　the　one　are
nothing　but　representations　of　the　other。　This　very　table；
which　we　see　white；　and　which　we　feel　hard；　is　believed　to
exist；　independent　of　our　perception；　and　to　be　something
external　to　our　mind；　which　perceives　it。　Our　presence
bestows　not　being　on　it：　Our　absence　does　not　annihilate　it。
It　preserves　its　existence　uniform　and　entire；　independent
of　the　situation　of　intelligent　beings；　who　perceive　or
contemplate　it。

　　　　　But　this　universal　and　primary　opinion　of　all　men　is
soon　destroyed　by　the　slightest　philosophy；　which　teaches
us；　that　nothing　can　ever　be　present　to　the　mind　but　an
image　or　perception；　and　that　the　senses　are　only　the
inlets；　through　which　these　images　are　conveyed；　without
being　able　to　produce　any　immediate　intercourse　between　the
mind　and　the　object。　The　table；　which　we　see；　seems　to
diminish；　as　we　remove　farther　from　it：　But　the　real　table；
which　exists　independent　of　us；　suffers　no　alteration：　It
was；　therefore；　nothing　but　its　image；　which　was　present　to
the　mind。　These　are　the　obvious　dictates　of　reason；　and　no
man；　who　reflects；　ever　doubted；　that　the　existences；　which
we　consider；　when　we　say；　　and　；　are
nothing　but　perceptions　in　the　mind；　an