an enquiry concerning human understanding-第34章

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and　arguing　from　that　superior　intelligence；　which　can　leave
nothing　imperfect；　why　may　you　not　infer　a　more　finished
scheme　or　plan；　which　will　receive　its　completion　in　some
distant　point　of　space　or　time？　Are　not　these　methods　of
reasoning　exactly　similar？　And　under　what　pretence　can　you
embrace　the　one；　while　you　reject　the　other？

　　　　　The　infinite　difference　of　the　subjects；　replied　he；　is
a　sufficient　foundation　for　this　difference　in　my
conclusions。　In　works　of　　art　and　contrivance；　it　is
allowable　to　advance　from　the　effect　to　the　cause；　and
returning　back　from　the　cause；　to　form　new　inferences
concerning　the　effect；　and　examine　the　alterations；　which　it
has　probably　undergone；　or　may　still　undergo。　But　what　is
the　foundation　of　this　method　of　reasoning？　Plainly　this；
that　man　is　a　being；　whom　we　know　by　experience；　whose
motives　and　designs　we　are　acquainted　with；　and　whose
projects　and　inclinations　have　a　certain　connexion　and
coherence；　according　to　the　laws　which　nature　has
established　for　the　government　of　such　a　creature。　When；
therefore；　we　find；　that　any　work　has　proceeded　from　the
skill　and　industry　of　man；　as　we　are　otherwise　acquainted
with　the　nature　of　the　animal；　we　can　draw　a　hundred
inferences　concerning　what　may　be　expected　from　him；　and
these　inferences　will　all　be　founded　in　experience　and
observation。　But　did　we　know　man　only　from　the　single　work
or　production　which　we　examine；　it　were　impossible　for　us　to
argue　in　this　manner；　because　our　knowledge　of　all　the
qualities；　which　we　ascribe　to　him；　being　in　that　case
derived　from　the　production；　it　is　impossible　they　could
point　to　any　thing　farther；　or　be　the　foundation　of　any　new
inference。　The　print　of　a　foot　in　the　sand　can　only　prove；
when　considered　alone；　that　there　was　some　figure　adapted　to
it；　by　which　it　was　produced：　But　the　print　of　a　human　foot
proves　likewise；　from　our　other　experience；　that　there　was
probably　another　foot；　which　also　left　its　impression；
though　effaced　by　time　or　other　accidents。　Here　we　mount
from　the　effect　to　the　cause；　and　descending　again　from　the
cause；　infer　alterations　in　the　effect；　but　this　is　not　a
continuation　of　the　same　simple　chain　of　reasoning。　We
comprehend　in　this　case　a　hundred　other　experiences　and
observations；　concerning　the　　figure　and　members　of
that　species　of　animal；　without　which　this　method　of
argument　must　be　considered　as　fallacious　and　sophistical。

　　　　　The　case　is　not　the　same　with　our　reasonings　from　the
works　of　nature。　The　Deity　is　known　to　us　only　by　his
productions；　and　is　a　single　being　in　the　universe；　not
comprehended　under　any　species　or　genus；　from　whose
experienced　attributes　or　qualities；　we　can；　by　analogy；
infer　any　attribute　or　quality　in　him。　As　the　universe　shews
wisdom　and　goodness；　we　infer　wisdom　and　goodness。　As　it
shews　a　particular　degree　of　these　perfections；　we　infer　a
particular　degree　of　them；　precisely　adapted　to　the　effect
which　we　examine。　But　farther　attributes　or　farther　degrees
of　the　same　attributes；　we　can　never　be　authorised　to　infer
or　suppose；　by　any　rules　of　just　reasoning。　Now；　without
some　such　licence　of　supposition；　it　is　impossible　for　us　to
argue　from　the　cause；　or　infer　any　alteration　in　the　effect；
beyond　what　has　immediately　fallen　under　our　observation。
Greater　good　produced　by　this　Being　must　still　prove　a
greater　degree　of　goodness：　A　more　impartial　distribution　of
rewards　and　punishments　must　proceed　from　a　greater　regard
to　justice　and　equity。　Every　supposed　addition　to　the　works
of　nature　makes　an　addition　to　the　attributes　of　the　Author
of　nature；　and　consequently；　being　entirely　unsupported　by
any　reason　or　argument；　can　never　be　admitted　but　as　mere
conjecture　and　hypothesis。＇36＇

　　　　　The　great　source　of　our　mistake　in　this　subject；　and　of
the　unbounded　licence　of　conjecture；　which　we　indulge；　is；
that　we　tacitly　consider　ourselves；　as　in　the　place　of　the
Supreme　Being；　and　conclude；　that　he　will；　on　every
occasion；　observe　the　same　conduct；　which　we　ourselves；　in
his　situation；　would　have　embraced　as　reasonable　and
eligible。　But；　besides　that　the　ordinary　course　of　nature
may　convince　us；　that　almost　everything　is　regulated　by
principles　and　maxims　very　different　from　ours；　besides
this；　I　say；　it　must　evidently　appear　contrary　to　all　rules
of　analogy　to　reason；　from　the　intentions　and　projects　of
men；　to　those　of　a　Being　so　different；　and　so　much　superior。
In　human　nature；　there　is　a　certain　experienced　coherence　of
designs　and　inclinations；　so　that　when；　from　any　fact；　we
have　discovered　one　intention　of　any　man；　it　may　often　be
reasonable；　from　experience；　to　infer　another；　and　draw　a
long　chain　of　conclusions　concerning　his　past　or　future
conduct。　But　this　method　of　reasoning　can　never　have　place
with　regard　to　a　Being；　so　remote　and　incomprehensible；　who
bears　much　less　analogy　to　any　other　being　in　the　universe
than　the　sun　to　a　waxen　taper；　and　who　discovers　himself
only　by　some　faint　traces　or　outlines；　beyond　which　we　have
no　authority　to　ascribe　to　him　any　attribute　or　perfection。
What　we　imagine　to　be　a　superior　perfection；　may　really　be　a
defect。　Or　were　it　ever　so　much　a　perfection；　the　ascribing
of　it　to　the　Supreme　Being；　where　it　appears　not　to　have
been　really　exerted；　to　the　full；　in　his　works；　savours　more
of　flattery　and　panegyric；　than　of　just　reasoning　and　sound
philosophy。　All　the　philosophy；　therefore；　in　the　world；　and
all　the　religion；　which　is　nothing　but　a　species　of
philosophy；　will　never　be　able　to　carry　us　beyond　the　usual
course　of　experience；　or　give　us　measures　of　conduct　and
behaviour　different　from　those　which　are　furnished　by
reflections　on　common　life。　No　new　fact　can　ever　be　inferred
from　the　religious　hypothesis；　no　event　foreseen　or
foretold；　no　reward　or　punishment　expected　or　dreaded；
beyond　what　is　already　known　by　practice　and　observation。　So
that　my　apology　for　E/PICURUS　will　still　appear　solid　and
satisfactory；　nor　have　the　political　interests　of　society
any　connexion　with　the　philosophical　disputes　concerning
metaphysics　and　religion。

　　　　　There　is　still　one　circumstance；　replied　I；　which　you
seem　to　have　overlooked。　Though　I　should　allow　your
premises；　I　must　deny　your　conclusion。　You　conclude；　that
religious　doctrines　and　reasonings　　have　no　influence
on　life；　because　they　　to　have　no　influence；　never
considering；　that　men　reason　not　in　the　same　manner　you　do；
but　draw　many　consequences　from　the　belief　of　a　divine
Existence；　and　suppose　that　the　Deity　will　inflict
punishments　on　vice；　and　bestow　rewards　on　virtue；　beyond
what　appear　in　the　ordinary　course　of　nature。　Whether　this
reasoning　of　theirs　be　just　or　not；　is　no　matter。　Its
influence　on　their　life　and　conduct　must　still　be　the　same。
And　those；　who　attempt　to　disabuse　them　of　such　prejudices；
may；　for　aught　I　know；　be　good　reasoners；　but　I　cannot　allow
them　to　be　good　citizens　and　politicians；　since　they　free
men　from　one　restraint　upon　their　passions；　and　make　the
infringement　of　the　laws　of　society；　in　one　respect；　more
easy　and　secure。

　　　　　After　all；　I　may；　perhaps；　agree　to　your　general
conclusion　in　favour　of　liberty；　though　upon　different
premises　from　those；　on　which　you　endeavour　to　found　it。　I
think；　that　the　state　ought　to　tolerate　every　principle　of
philosophy；　nor　is　there　an　instance；　that　any　government
has　suffered　in　its　political　interests　by　such　indulgence。
There　is　no　enthusiasm　among　philosophers；　their　doctrines
are　not　very　alluring　to　the　people；　and　no　restraint　can　be
put　upon　their　reasonings；　but　what　must　be　of　dangerous
consequence　to　the　sciences；　and　even　to　the　state；　by
paving　the　way　for　persecution　and　oppression　in　points；
where　the　generality　of　mankind　are　more　deeply　interested
and　concerned。

　　　　　But　there　occurs　to　me　（continued　I）　with　regard　to
your　main　topic；　a　difficulty；　which　I　shall　just　propose　to
you　without　insisting　on　it；　lest　it　lead　into　reasonings　of
too　nice　and　delicate　a　nature。　In　a　word；　I　much　doubt
whether　it　be　possible　for　a　cause　to　be　known　only　by　its
effect　（as　you　have　all　along　supp