an enquiry concerning human understanding-第3章
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human nature。 It is remarkable concerning the operations of
the mind； that； though most intimately present to us； yet；
whenever they become the object of reflexion； they seem
involved in obscurity； nor can the eye readily find those
lines and boundaries； which discriminate and distinguish
them。 The objects are too fine to remain long in the same
aspect or situation； and must be apprehended in an instant；
by a superior penetration； derived from nature； and improved
by habit and reflexion。 It becomes； therefore； no
inconsiderable part of science barely to know the different
operations of the mind； to separate them from each other； to
class them under their proper heads； and to correct all that
seeming disorder； in which they lie involved； when made the
object of reflexion and enquiry。 This talk of ordering and
distinguishing； which has no merit； when performed with
regard to external bodies； the objects of our senses； rises
in its value； when directed towards the operations of the
mind； in proportion to the difficulty and labour； which we
meet with in performing it。 And if we can go no farther than
this mental geography； or delineation of the distinct parts
and powers of the mind； it is at least a satisfaction to go
so far； and the more obvious this science may appear （and it
is by no means obvious） the more contemptible still must the
ignorance of it be esteemed； in all pretenders to learning
and philosophy。
Nor can there remain any suspicion； that this science
is uncertain and chimerical； unless we should entertain such
a scepticism as is entirely subversive of all speculation；
and even action。 It cannot be doubted； that the mind is
endowed with several powers and faculties； that these powers
are distinct from each other； that what is really distinct
to the immediate perception may be distinguished by
reflexion； and consequently； that there is a truth and
falsehood in all propositions on this subject； and a truth
and falsehood； which lie not beyond the compass of human
understanding。 There are many obvious distinctions of this
kind； such as those between the will and understanding； the
imagination and passions； which fall within the
comprehension of every human creature； and the finer and
more philosophical distinctions are no less real and
certain； though more difficult to be comprehended。 Some
instances； especially late ones； of success in these
enquiries； may give us a juster notion of the certainty and
solidity of this branch of learning。 And shall we esteem it
worthy the labour of a philosopher to give us a true system
of the planets； and adjust the position and order of those
remote bodies； while we affect to overlook those； who； with
so much success； delineate the parts of the mind； in which
we are so intimately concerned？＇3＇
But may we not hope； that philosophy； cultivated with
care； and encouraged by the attention of the public； may
carry its researches still farther； and discover； at least
in some degree； the secret springs and principles； by which
the human mind is actuated in its operations？ Astronomers
had long contented themselves with proving； from the
phaenomena； the true motions； order； and magnitude of the
heavenly bodies： Till a philosopher； at last； arose； who
seems； from the happiest reasoning； to have also determined
the laws and forces； by which the revolutions of the planets
are governed and directed。 The like has been performed with
regard to other parts of nature。 And there is no reason to
despair of equal success in our enquiries concerning the
mental powers and economy； if prosecuted with equal capacity
and caution。 It is probable； that one operation and
principle of the mind depends on another； which； again； may
be resolved into one more general and universal： And how far
these researches may possibly be carried； it will be
difficult for us； before； or even after； a careful trial；
exactly to determine。 This is certain； that attempts of this
kind are every day made even by those who philosophize the
most negligently： And nothing can be more requisite than to
enter upon the enterprize with thorough care and attention；
that； if it lie within the compass of human understanding；
it may at last be happily achieved； if not； it may； however；
be rejected with some confidence and security。 This last
conclusion； surely； is not desirable； nor ought it to be
embraced too rashly。 For how much must we diminish from the
beauty and value of this species of philosophy； upon such a
supposition？ Moralists have hitherto been accustomed； when
they considered the vast multitude and diversity of those
actions that excite our approbation or dislike； to search
for some common principle； on which this variety of
sentiments might depend。 And though they have sometimes
carried the matter too far； by their passion for some one
general principle； it must； however； be confessed； that they
are excusable in expecting to find some general principles；
into which all the vices and virtues were justly to be
resolved。 The like has been the endeavour of critics；
logicians； and even politicians： Nor have their attempts
been wholly unsuccessful； though perhaps longer time；
greater accuracy； and more ardent application may bring
these sciences still nearer their perfection。 To throw up at
once all pretensions of this kind may justly be deemed more
rash； precipitate； and dogmatical； than even the boldest and
most affirmative philosophy；that has ever attempted to
impose its crude dictates and principles on mankind。
What though these reasonings concerning human nature
seem abstract； and of difficult comprehension？ This affords
no presumption of their falsehood。 On the contrary； it seems
impossible； that what has hitherto escaped so many wise and
profound philosophers can be very obvious and easy。 And
whatever pains these researches may cost us； we may think
ourselves sufficiently rewarded； not only in point of profit
but of pleasure； if； by that means； we can make any addition
to our stock of knowledge； in subjects of such unspeakable
importance。
But as； after all； the abstractedness of these
speculations is no recommendation； but rather a disadvantage
to them； and as this difficulty may perhaps be surmounted by
care and art； and the avoiding of all unnecessary detail； we
have； in the following enquiry； attempted to throw some
light upon subjects； from which uncertainty has hitherto
deterred the wise； and obscurity the ignorant。 Happy； if we
can unite the boundaries of the different species of
philosophy； by reconciling profound enquiry with clearness；
and truth with novelty！ And still more happy； if； reasoning
in this easy manner； we can undermine the foundations of an
abstruse philosophy； which seems to have hitherto served
only as a shelter to superstition； and a cover to absurdity
and error！
* * * *
SECTION II。
Of the Origin of Ideas。
E/VERY one will readily allow； that there is a
considerable difference between the perceptions of the mind；
when a man feels the pain of excessive heat； or the pleasure
of moderate warmth； and when he afterwards recalls to his
memory this sensation； or anticipates it by his imagination。
These faculties may mimic or copy the perceptions of the
senses； but they never can entirely reach the force and
vivacity of the original sentiment。 The utmost we say of
them； even when they operate with greatest vigour； is； that
they represent their object in so lively a manner； that we
could say we feel or see it： But； except the mind
be disordered by disease or madness； they never can arrive
at such a pitch of vivacity； as to render these perceptions
altogether undistinguishable。 All the colours of poetry；
however splendid； can never paint natural objects in such a
manner as to make the description be taken for a real
landskip。 The most lively thought is still inferior to the
dullest sensation。
We may observe a like distinction to run through all
the other perceptions of the mind。 A man in a fit of anger；
is actuated in a very different manner from one who only
thinks
