an enquiry concerning human understanding-第23章

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mentioned。　We　may；　perhaps；　find　that　it　is　with　difficulty
we　are　induced　to　fix　such　narrow　limits　to　human
understanding：　But　we　can　afterwards　find　no　difficulty　when
we　come　to　apply　this　doctrine　to　the　actions　of　the　will。
For　as　it　is　evident　that　these　have　a　regular　conjunction
with　motives　and　circumstances　and　characters；　and　as　we
always　draw　inferences　from　one　to　the　other；　we　must　be
obliged　to　acknowledge　in　words　that　necessity；　which　we
have　already　avowed；　in　every　deliberation　of　our　lives；　and
in　every　step　of　our　conduct　and　behaviour。＇22＇

　　　　　But　to　proceed　in　this　reconciling　project　with　regard
to　the　question　of　liberty　and　necessity；　the　most
contentious　question　of　metaphysics；　the　most　contentious
science；　it　will　not　require　many　words　to　prove；　that　all
mankind　have　ever　agreed　in　the　doctrine　of　liberty　as　well
as　in　that　of　necessity；　and　that　the　whole　dispute；　in　this
respect　also；　has　been　hitherto　merely　verbal。　For　what　is
meant　by　liberty；　when　applied　to　voluntary　actions？　We
cannot　surely　mean　that　actions　have　so　little　connexion
with　motives；　inclinations；　and　circumstances；　that　one　does
not　follow　with　a　certain　degree　of　uniformity　from　the
other；　and　that　one　affords　no　inference　by　which　we　can
conclude　the　existence　of　the　other。　For　these　are　plain　and
acknowledged　matters　of　fact。　By　liberty；　then；　we　can　only
mean　；　this　is；　if　we　choose　to　remain
at　rest；　we　may；　if　we　choose　to　move；　we　also　may。　Now　this
hypothetical　liberty　is　universally　allowed　to　belong　to
every　one　who　is　not　a　prisoner　and　in　chains。　Here；　then；
is　no　subject　of　dispute。

　　　　　Whatever　definition　we　may　give　of　liberty；　we　should
be　careful　to　observe　two　requisite　circumstances；　；
that　it　be　consistent　with　plain　matter　of　fact；　；
that　it　be　consistent　with　itself。　If　we　observe　these
circumstances；　and　render　our　definition　intelligible；　I　am
persuaded　that　all　mankind　will　be　found　of　one　opinion　with
regard　to　it。

　　　　　It　is　universally　allowed　that　nothing　exists　without　a
cause　of　its　existence；　and　that　chance；　when　strictly
examined；　is　a　mere　negative　word；　and　means　not　any　real
power　which　has　anywhere　a　being　in　nature。　But　it　is
pretended　that　some　causes　are　necessary；　some　not
necessary。　Here　then　is　the　advantage　of　definitions。　Let
any　one　　a　cause；　without　comprehending；　as　a　part
of　the　definition；　a　　with　its　effect；
and　let　him　show　distinctly　the　origin　of　the　idea；
expressed　by　the　definition；　and　I　shall　readily　give　up　the
whole　controversy。　But　if　the　foregoing　explication　of　the
matter　be　received；　this　must　be　absolutely　impracticable。
Had　not　objects　a　regular　conjunction　with　each　other；　we
should　never　have　entertained　any　notion　of　cause　and
effect；　and　this　regular　conjunction　produces　that　inference
of　the　understanding；　which　is　the　only　connexion；　that　we
can　have　any　comprehension　of。　Whoever　attempts　a　definition
of　cause；　exclusive　of　these　circumstances；　will　be　obliged
either　to　employ　unintelligible　terms　or　such　as　are
synonymous　to　the　term　which　he　endeavours　to　define。＇23＇
And　if　the　definition　above　mentioned　be　admitted；　liberty；
when　opposed　to　necessity；　not　to　constraint；　is　the　same
thing　with　chance；　which　is　universally　allowed　to　have　no
existence。
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　*　*　*　*
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　PART　II。
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　
　　　　　T/HERE　is　no　method　of　reasoning　more　common；　and　yet
none　more　blameable；　than；　in　philosophical　disputes；　to
endeavour　the　refutation　of　any　hypothesis；　by　a　pretence　of
its　dangerous　consequences　to　religion　and　morality。　When
any　opinion　leads　to　absurdities；　it　is　certainly　false；　but
it　is　not　certain　that　an　opinion　is　false；　because　it　is　of
dangerous　consequence。　Such　topics；　therefore；　ought
entirely　to　be　forborne；　as　serving　nothing　to　the　discovery
of　truth；　but　only　to　make　the　person　of　an　antagonist
odious。　This　I　observe　in　general；　without　pretending　to
draw　any　advantage　from　it。　I　frankly　submit　to　an
examination　of　this　kind；　and　shall　venture　to　affirm　that
the　doctrines；　both　of　necessity　and　of　liberty；　as　above
explained；　are　not　only　consistent　with　morality；　but　are
absolutely　essential　to　its　support。

　　　　　Necessity　may　be　defined　two　ways；　conformably　to　the
two　definitions　of　；　of　which　it　makes　an　essential
part。　It　consists　either　in　the　constant　conjunction　of　like
objects；　or　in　the　inference　of　the　understanding　from　one
object　to　another。　Now　necessity；　in　both　these　senses；
（which；　indeed；　are　at　bottom　the　same）　has　universally；
though　tacitly；　in　the　schools；　in　the　pulpit；　and　in　common
life；　been　allowed　to　belong　to　the　will　of　man；　and　no　one
has　ever　pretended　to　deny　that　we　can　draw　inferences
concerning　human　actions；　and　that　those　inferences　are
founded　on　the　experienced　union　of　like　actions；　with　like
motives；　inclinations；　and　circumstances。　The　only
particular　in　which　any　one　can　differ；　is；　that　either；
perhaps；　he　will　refuse　to　give　the　name　of　necessity　to
this　property　of　human　actions：　But　as　long　as　the　meaning
is　understood；　I　hope　the　word　can　do　no　harm：　Or　that　he
will　maintain　it　possible　to　discover　something　farther　in
the　operations　of　matter。　But　this；　it　must　be　acknowledged；
can　be　of　no　consequence　to　morality　or　religion；　whatever
it　may　be　to　natural　philosophy　or　metaphysics。　We　may　here
be　mistaken　in　asserting　that　there　is　no　idea　of　any　other
necessity　or　connexion　in　the　actions　of　body：　But　surely　we
ascribe　nothing　to　the　actions　of　the　mind；　but　what
everyone　does；　and　must　readily　allow　of。　We　change　no
circumstance　in　the　received　orthodox　system　with　regard　to
the　will；　but　only　in　that　with　regard　to　material　objects
and　causes。　Nothing；　therefore；　can　be　more　innocent；　at
least；　than　this　doctrine。

　　　　　All　laws　being　founded　on　rewards　and　punishments；　it
is　supposed　as　a　fundamental　principle；　that　these　motives
have　a　regular　and　uniform　influence　on　the　mind；　and　both
produce　the　good　and　prevent　the　evil　actions。　We　may　give
to　this　influence　what　name　we　please；　but；　as　it　is　usually
conjoined　with　the　action；　it　must　be　esteemed　a　；
and　be　looked　upon　as　an　instance　of　that　necessity；　which
we　would　here　establish。

　　　　　The　only　proper　object　of　hatred　or　vengeance　is　a
person　or　creature；　endowed　with　thought　and　consciousness；
and　when　any　criminal　or　injurious　actions　excite　that
passion；　it　is　only　by　their　relation　to　the　person；　or
connexion　with　him。　Actions　are；　by　their　very　nature；
temporary　and　perishing；　and　where　they　proceed　not　from
some　　in　the　character　and　disposition　of　the　person
who　performed　them；　they　can　neither　redound　to　his　honour；
if　good；　nor　infamy；　if　evil。　The　actions　themselves　may　be
blameable；　they　may　be　contrary　to　all　the　rules　of　morality
and　religion：　But　the　person　is　not　answerable　for　them；　and
as　they　proceeded　from　nothing　in　him　that　is　durable　and
constant；　and　leave　nothing　of　that　nature　behind　them；　it
is　impossible　he　can；　upon　their　account；　become　the　object
of　punishment　or　vengeance。　According　to　the　principle；
therefore；　which　denies　necessity；　and　consequently　causes；
a　man　is　as　pure　and　untainted；　after　having　committed　the
most　horrid　crime；　as　at　the　first　moment　of　his　birth；　nor
is　his　character　anywise　concerned　in　his　actions；　since
they　are　not　derived　from　it；　and　the　wickedness　of　the　one
can　never　be　used　as　a　proof　of　the　depravity　of　the　other。

　　　　　Men　are　not　blamed　for　such　actions　as　they　perform
ignorantly　and　casually；　whatever　may　be　the　consequences。
Why？　but　because　the　principles　of　these　actions　are　only
momentary；　and　terminate　in　them　alone。　Men　are　less　blamed
for　such　actions　as　they　perform　hastily　and
unpremeditatedly　than　for　such　as　proceed　from　deliberation。
For　what　reason？　but　because　a　hasty　temper；　though　a
constant　cause　or　principle　in　the　mind；　operates　o