an enquiry concerning human understanding-第21章

按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！


countries？　We　learn　thence　the　great　force　of　custom　and
education；　which　mould　the　human　mind　from　its　infancy　and
form　it　into　a　fixed　and　established　character。　Is　the
behaviour　and　conduct　of　the　one　sex　very　unlike　that　of　the
other？　Is　it　thence　we　become　acquainted　with　the　different
characters　which　nature　has　impressed　upon　the　sexes；　and
which　she　preserves　with　constancy　and　regularity？　Are　the
actions　of　the　same　person　much　diversified　in　the　different
periods　of　his　life；　from　infancy　to　old　age？　This　affords
room　for　many　general　observations　concerning　the　gradual
change　of　our　sentiments　and　inclinations；　and　the　different
maxims　which　prevail　in　the　different　ages　of　human
creatures。　Even　the　characters；　which　are　peculiar　to　each
individual；　have　a　uniformity　in　their　influence；　otherwise
our　acquaintance　with　the　persons　and　our　observation　of
their　conduct　could　never　teach　us　their　dispositions；　or
serve　to　direct　our　behaviour　with　regard　to　them。

　　　　　I　grant　it　possible　to　find　some　actions；　which　seem　to
have　no　regular　connexion　with　any　known　motives；　and　are
exceptions　to　all　the　measures　of　conduct　which　have　ever
been　established　for　the　government　of　men。　But　if　we　would
willingly　know　what　judgment　should　be　formed　of　such
irregular　and　extraordinary　actions；　we　may　consider　the
sentiments　commonly　entertained　with　regard　to　those
irregular　events　which　appear　in　the　course　of　nature；　and
the　operations　of　external　objects。　All　causes　are　not
conjoined　to　their　usual　effects　with　like　uniformity。　An
artificer；　who　handles　only　dead　matter；　may　be　disappointed
of　his　aim；　as　well　as　the　politician；　who　directs　the
conduct　of　sensible　and　intelligent　agents。

　　　　　The　vulgar；　who　take　things　according　to　their　first
appearance；　attribute　the　uncertainty　of　events　to　such　an
uncertainty　in　the　causes　as　makes　the　latter　often　fail　of
their　usual　influence；　though　they　meet　with　no　impediment
in　their　operation。　But　philosophers；　observing　that；　almost
in　every　part　of　nature；　there　is　contained　a　vast　variety
of　springs　and　principles；　which　are　hid；　by　reason　of　their
minuteness　or　remoteness；　find；　that　it　is　at　least　possible
the　contrariety　of　events　may　not　proceed　from　any
contingency　in　the　cause；　but　from　the　secret　operation　of
contrary　causes。　This　possibility　is　converted　into
certainty　by　farther　observation；　when　they　remark　that；
upon　an　exact　scrutiny；　a　contrariety　of　effects　always
betrays　a　contrariety　of　causes；　and　proceeds　from　their
mutual　opposition。　A　peasant　can　give　no　better　reason　for
the　stopping　of　any　clock　or　watch　than　to　say　that　it　does
not　commonly　go　right：　But　an　artist　easily　perceives　that
the　same　force　in　the　spring　or　pendulum　has　always　the　same
influence　on　the　wheels；　but　fails　of　its　usual　effects；
perhaps　by　reason　of　a　grain　of　dust；　which　puts　a　stop　to
the　whole　movement。　From　the　observation　of　several　parallel
instances；　philosophers　form　a　maxim　that　the　connexion
between　all　causes　and　effects　is　equally　necessary；　and
that　its　seeming　uncertainty　in　some　instances　proceeds　from
the　secret　opposition　of　contrary　causes。

　　　　　Thus；　for　instance；　in　the　human　body；　when　the　usual
symptoms　of　health　or　sickness　disappoint　our　expectation；
when　medicines　operate　not　with　their　wonted　powers；　when
irregular　events　follow　from　any　particular　cause；　the
philosopher　and　physician　are　not　surprised　at　the　matter；
nor　are　ever　tempted　to　deny；　in　general；　the　necessity　and
uniformity　of　those　principles　by　which　the　animal　economy
is　conducted。　They　know　that　a　human　body　is　a　mighty
complicated　machine：　That　many　secret　powers　lurk　in　it；
which　are　altogether　beyond　our　comprehension：　That　to　us　it
must　often　appear　very　uncertain　in　its　operations：　And　that
therefore　the　irregular　events；　which　outwardly　discover
themselves；　can　be　no　proof　that　the　laws　of　nature　are　not
observed　with　the　greatest　regularity　in　its　internal
operations　and　government。

　　　　　The　philosopher；　if　he　be　consistent；　must　apply　the
same　reasoning　to　the　actions　and　volitions　of　intelligent
agents。　The　most　irregular　and　unexpected　resolutions　of　men
may　frequently　be　accounted　for　by　those　who　know　every
particular　circumstance　of　their　character　and　situation。　A
person　of　an　obliging　disposition　gives　a　peevish　answer：
But　he　has　the　toothache；　or　has　not　dined。　A　stupid　fellow
discovers　an　uncommon　alacrity　in　his　carriage：　But　he　has
met　with　a　sudden　piece　of　good　fortune。　Or　even　when　an
action；　as　sometimes　happens；　cannot　be　particularly
accounted　for；　either　by　the　person　himself　or　by　others；　we
know；　in　general；　that　the　characters　of　men　are；　to　a
certain　degree；　inconstant　and　irregular。　This　is；　in　a
manner；　the　constant　character　of　human　nature；　though　it　be
applicable；　in　a　more　particular　manner；　to　some　persons　who
have　no　fixed　rule　for　their　conduct；　but　proceed　in　a
continued　course　of　caprice　and　inconstancy。　The　internal
principles　and　motives　may　operate　in　a　uniform　manner；
notwithstanding　these　seeming　irregularities；　in　the　same
manner　as　the　winds；　rain；　cloud；　and　other　variations　of
the　weather　are　supposed　to　be　governed　by　steady
principles；　though　not　easily　discoverable　by　human　sagacity
and　enquiry。

　　　　　Thus　it　appears；　not　only　that　the　conjunction　between
motives　and　voluntary　actions　is　as　regular　and　uniform　as
that　between　the　cause　and　effect　in　any　part　of　nature；　but
also　that　this　regular　conjunction　has　been　universally
acknowledged　among　mankind；　and　has　never　been　the　subject
of　dispute；　either　in　philosophy　or　common　life。　Now；　as　it
is　from　past　experience　that　we　draw　all　
concerning　the　future；　and　as　we　conclude　that　objects　will
always　be　conjoined　together　which　we　find　to　have　always
been　conjoined；　it　may　seem　superfluous　to　prove　that　this
experienced　uniformity　in　human　actions　is　a　source　whence
we　draw　inferences　concerning　them。　But　in　order　to　throw
the　argument　into　a　greater　variety　of　lights　we　shall　also
insist；　though　briefly；　on　this　latter　topic。

　　　　　The　mutual　dependence　of　men　is　so　great　in　all
societies　that　scarce　any　human　action　is　entirely　complete
in　itself；　or　is　performed　without　some　reference　to　the
actions　of　others；　which　are　requisite　to　make　it　answer
fully　the　intention　of　the　agent。　The　poorest　artificer；　who
labours　alone；　expects　at　least　the　protection　of　the
magistrate；　to　ensure　him　the　enjoyment　of　the　fruits　of　his
labour。　He　also　expects　that；　when　he　carries　his　goods　to
market；　and　offers　them　at　a　reasonable　price；　he　shall　find
purchasers；　and　shall　be　able；　by　the　money　he　acquires；　to
engage　others　to　supply　him　with　those　commodities　which　are
requisite　for　his　subsistence。　In　proportion　as　men　extend
their　dealings；　and　render　their　intercourse　with　others
more　complicated；　they　always　comprehend；　in　their　schemes
of　life；　a　greater　variety　of　voluntary　actions；　which　they
expect；　from　the　proper　motives；　to　co…　operate　with　their
own。　In　all　these　conclusions　they　take　their　measures　from
past　experience；　in　the　same　manner　as　in　their　reasonings
concerning　external　objects；　and　firmly　believe　that　men；　as
well　as　all　the　elements；　are　to　continue；　in　their
operations；　the　same　that　they　have　ever　found　them。　A
manufacturer　reckons　upon　the　labour　of　his　servants　for　the
execution　of　any　work　as　much　as　upon　the　tools　which　he
employs；　and　would　be　equally　surprised　were　his
expectations　disappointed。　In　short；　this　experimental
inference　and　reasoning　concerning　the　actions　of　others
enters　so　much　into　human　life　that　no　man；　while　awake；　is
ever　a　moment　without　employing　it。　Have　we　not　reason；
therefore；　to　affirm　that　all　mankind　have　always　agreed　in
the　doctrine　of　necessity　according　to　the　foregoing
definition　and　explication　of　it？

　　　　　Nor　have　philosophers　even　entertained　a　different
opinion　from　the　people　in　this　particular。　For；　not　to
mention　that　almost　every　action　of　their　life　supposes　that
opinion；　there　are　even　few　of　the　speculative　parts　of
learning　to　which　it　is　not　essential。　What　wou