an enquiry concerning human understanding-第14章

按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！


one　of　the　best　reliques；　which　a　devotee　could　procure；
would　be　the　handywork　of　a　saint；　and　if　his　cloaths　and
furniture　are　ever　to　be　considered　in　this　light；　it　is
because　they　were　once　at　his　disposal；　and　were　moved　and
affected　by　him；　in　which　respect　they　are　to　be　considered
as　imperfect　effects；　and　as　connected　with　him　by　a　shorter
chain　of　consequences　than　any　of　those；　by　which　we　learn
the　reality　of　his　existence。

　　　　　Suppose；　that　the　son　of　a　friend；　who　had　been　long
dead　or　absent；　were　presented　to　us；　it　is　evident；　that
this　object　would　instantly　revive　its　correlative　idea；　and
recall　to　our　thoughts　all　past　intimacies　and
familiarities；　in　more　lively　colours　than　they　would
otherwise　have　appeared　to　us。　This　is　another　phaenomenon；
which　seems　to　prove　the　principle　above　mentioned。

　　　　　We　may　observe；　that；　in　these　phaenomena；　the　belief
of　the　correlative　object　is　always　presupposed；　without
which　the　relation　could　have　no　effect。　The　influence　of
the　picture　supposes；　that　we　　our　friend　to　have
once　existed。　Contiguity　to　home　can　never　excite　our　ideas
of　home；　unless　we　　that　it　really　exists。　Now　I
assert；　that　this　belief；　where　it　reaches　beyond　the　memory
or　senses；　is　of　a　similar　nature；　and　arises　from　similar
causes；　with　the　transition　of　thought　and　vivacity　of
conception　here　explained。　When　I　throw　a　piece　of　dry　wood
into　a　fire；　my　mind　is　immediately　carried　to　conceive；
that　it　augments；　not　extinguishes　the　flame。　This
transition　of　thought　from　the　cause　to　the　effect　proceeds
not　from　reason。　It　derives　its　origin　altogether　from
custom　and　experience。　And　as　it　first　begins　from　an
object；　present　to　the　senses；　it　renders　the　idea　or
conception　of　flame　more　strong　and　lively　than　any　loose；
floating　reverie　of　the　imagination。　That　idea　arises
immediately。　The　thought　moves　instantly　towards　it；　and
conveys　to　it　all　that　force　of　conception；　which　is　derived
from　the　impression　present　to　the　senses。　When　a　sword　is
levelled　at　my　breast；　does　not　the　idea　of　wound　and　pain
strike　me　more　strongly；　than　when　a　glass　of　wine　is
presented　to　me；　even　though　by　accident　this　idea　should
occur　after　the　appearance　of　the　latter　object？　But　what　is
there　in　this　whole　matter　to　cause　such　a　strong
conception；　except　only　a　present　object　and　a　customary
transition　of　the　idea　of　another　object；　which　we　have　been
accustomed　to　conjoin　with　the　former？　This　is　the　whole
operation　of　the　mind；　in　all　our　conclusions　concerning
matter　of　fact　and　existence；　and　it　is　a　satisfaction　to
find　some　analogies；　by　which　it　may　be　explained。　The
transition　from　a　present　object　does　in　all　cases　give
strength　and　solidity　to　the　related　idea。

　　　　　Here；　then；　is　a　kind　of　pre…established　harmony
between　the　course　of　nature　and　the　succession　of　our
ideas；　and　though　the　powers　and　forces；　by　which　the　former
is　governed；　be　wholly　unknown　to　us；　yet　our　thoughts　and
conceptions　have　still；　we　find；　gone　on　in　the　same　train
with　the　other　works　of　nature。　Custom　is　that　principle；　by
which　this　correspondence　has　been　effected；　so　necessary　to
the　subsistence　of　our　species；　and　the　regulation　of　our
conduct；　in　every　circumstance　and　occurrence　of　human　life。
Had　not　the　presence　of　an　object；　instantly　excited　the
idea　of　those　objects；　commonly　conjoined　with　it；　all　our
knowledge　must　have　been　limited　to　the　narrow　sphere　of　our
memory　and　senses；　and　we　should　never　have　been　able　to
adjust　means　to　ends；　or　employ　our　natural　powers；　either
to　the　producing　of　good；　or　avoiding　of　evil。　Those；　who
delight　in　the　discovery　and　contemplation　of　；　have　here　ample　subject　to　employ　their　wonder　and
admiration。

　　　　　I　shall　add；　for　a　further　confirmation　of　the
foregoing　theory；　that；　as　this　operation　of　the　mind；　by
which　we　infer　like　effects　from　like　causes；　and　；　is　so　essential　to　the　subsistence　of　all　human
creatures；　it　is　not　probable；　that　it　could　be　trusted　to
the　fallacious　deductions　of　our　reason；　which　is　slow　in
its　operations；　appears　not；　in　any　degree；　during　the　first
years　of　infancy；　and　at　best　is；　in　every　age　and　period　of
human　life；　extremely　liable　to　error　and　mistake。　It　is
more　conformable　to　the　ordinary　wisdom　of　nature　to　secure
so　necessary　an　act　of　the　mind；　by　some　instinct　or
mechanical　tendency；　which　may　be　infallible　in　its
operations；　may　discover　itself　at　the　first　appearance　of
life　and　thought；　and　may　be　independent　of　all　the　laboured
deductions　of　the　understanding。　As　nature　has　taught　us　the
use　of　our　limbs；　without　giving　us　the　knowledge　of　the
muscles　and　nerves；　by　which　they　are　actuated；　so　has　she
implanted　in　us　an　instinct；　which　carries　forward　the
thought　in　a　correspondent　course　to　that　which　she　has
established　among　external　objects；　though　we　are　ignorant
of　those　powers　and　forces；　on　which　this　regular　course　and
succession　of　objects　totally　depends。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　*　*　*　*
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　SECTION　VI。
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　Of　Probability。＇14＇

　　　　　T/HOUGH　there　be　no　such　thing　as　Chance　in　the　world；
our　ignorance　of　the　real　cause　of　any　event　has　the　same
influence　on　the　understanding；　and　begets　a　like　species　of
belief　or　opinion。

　　　　　There　is　certainly　a　probability；　which　arises　from　a
superiority　of　chances　on　any　side；　and　according　as　this
superiority　increases；　and　surpasses　the　opposite　chances；
the　probability　receives　a　proportionable　increase；　and
begets　still　a　higher　degree　of　belief　or　assent　to　that
side；　in　which　we　discover　the　superiority。　If　a　dye　were
marked　with　one　figure　or　number　of　spots　on　four　sides；　and
with　another　figure　or　number　of　spots　on　the　two　remaining
sides；　it　would　be　more　probable；　that　the　former　would　turn
up　than　the　latter；　though；　if　it　had　a　thousand　sides
marked　in　the　same　manner；　and　only　one　side　different；　the
probability　would　be　much　higher；　and　our　belief　or
expectation　of　the　event　more　steady　and　secure。　This
process　of　the　thought　or　reasoning　may　seem　trivial　and
obvious；　but　to　those　who　consider　it　more　narrowly；　it　may；
perhaps；　afford　matter　for　curious　speculation。

　　　　　It　seems　evident；　that；　when　the　mind　looks　forward　to
discover　the　event；　which　may　result　from　the　throw　of　such
a　dye；　it　considers　the　turning　up　of　each　particular　side
as　alike　probable；　and　this　is　the　very　nature　of　chance；　to
render　all　the　particular　events；　comprehended　in　it；
entirely　equal。　But　finding　a　greater　number　of　sides　concur
in　the　one　event　than　in　the　other；　the　mind　is　carried　more
frequently　to　that　event；　and　meets　it　oftener；　in　revolving
the　various　possibilities　or　chances；　on　which　the　ultimate
result　depends。　This　concurrence　of　several　views　in　one
particular　event　begets　immediately；　by　an　inexplicable
contrivance　of　nature；　the　sentiment　of　belief；　and　gives
that　event　the　advantage　over　its　antagonist；　which　is
supported　by　a　smaller　number　of　views；　and　recurs　less
frequently　to　the　mind。　If　we　allow；　that　belief　is　nothing
but　a　firmer　and　stronger　conception　of　an　object　than　what
attends　the　mere　fictions　of　the　imagination；　this　operation
may；　perhaps；　in　some　measure；　be　accounted　for。　The
concurrence　of　these　several　views　or　glimpses　imprints　the
idea　more　strongly　on　the　imagination；　gives　it　superior
force　and　vigour；　renders　its　influence　on　the　passions　and
affections　more　sensible；　and　in　a　word；　begets　that
reliance　or　security；　which　constitutes　the　nature　of　belief
and　opinion。

　　　　　The　case　is　the　same　with　the　probability　of　causes；　as
with　that　of　chance。　There　are　some　causes；　which　are
entirely　uniform　and　constant　in　producing　a　particular
effect；　and　no　instance　has　ever　yet　been　found　of　any
failure　or　irregularity　in　their　operation。　Fire　has　always
burned；　and　water　suffocated　every　human　creature：　The
production　of　motion　by　impulse　and　gravity　is　an　universal
law；　which　has　hitherto　admitted　of　no　exception。　But　there
are　other　causes；　which　have　been　fo