an enquiry concerning human understanding-第11章

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accurate。　But　with　regard　to　the　present　subject；　there　are
some　considerations　which　seem　to　remove　all　this　accusation
of　arrogance　or　suspicion　of　mistake。

　　　　　It　is　certain　that　the　most　ignorant　and　stupid
peasants　　nay　infants；　nay　even　brute　beasts　　improve　by
experience；　and　learn　the　qualities　of　natural　objects；　by
observing　the　effects　which　result　from　them。　When　a　child
has　felt　the　sensation　of　pain　from　touching　the　flame　of　a
candle；　he　will　be　careful　not　to　put　his　hand　near　any
candle；　but　will　expect　a　similar　effect　from　a　cause　which
is　similar　in　its　sensible　qualities　and　appearance。　If　you
assert；　therefore；　that　the　understanding　of　the　child　is
led　into　this　conclusion　by　any　process　of　argument　or
ratiocination；　I　may　justly　require　you　to　produce　that
argument；　nor　have　you　any　pretence　to　refuse　so　equitable　a
demand。　You　cannot　say　that　the　argument　is　abstruse；　and
may　possibly　escape　your　enquiry；　since　you　confess　that　it
is　obvious　to　the　capacity　of　a　mere　infant。　If　you
hesitate；　therefore；　a　moment；　or　if；　after　reflection；　you
produce　any　intricate　or　profound　argument；　you；　in　a
manner；　give　up　the　question；　and　confess　that　it　is　not
reasoning　which　engages　us　to　suppose　the　past　resembling
the　future；　and　to　expect　similar　effects　from　causes　which
are；　to　appearance；　similar。　This　is　the　proposition　which　I
intended　to　enforce　in　the　present　section。　If　I　be　right；　I
pretend　not　to　have　made　any　mighty　discovery。　And　if　I　be
wrong；　I　must　acknowledge　myself　to　be　indeed　a　very
backward　scholar；　since　I　cannot　now　discover　an　argument
which；　it　seems；　was　perfectly　familiar　to　me　long　before　I
was　out　of　my　cradle。

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　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　SECTION　V。
　　　　　　　　　　　　Sceptical　Solution　of　these　Doubts。
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　PART　I。
　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　
　　　　　T/HE　passion　for　philosophy；　like　that　for　religion；
seems　liable　to　this　inconvenience；　that；　though　it　aims　at
the　correction　of　our　manners；　and　extirpation　of　our　vices；
it　may　only　serve；　by　imprudent　management；　to　foster　a
predominant　inclination；　and　push　the　mind；　with　more
determined　resolution；　towards　that　side　which　already
　too　much；　by　the　bias　and　propensity　of　the　natural
temper。　It　is　certain　that；　while　we　aspire　to　the
magnanimous　firmness　of　the　philosophic　sage；　and　endeavour
to　confine　our　pleasures　altogether　within　our　own　minds；　we
may；　at　last；　render　our　philosophy　like　that　of
E/PICTETUS；　and　other　；　only　a　more　refined　system
of　selfishness；　and　reason　ourselves　out　of　all　virtue　as
well　as　social　enjoyment。　While　we　study　with　attention　the
vanity　of　human　life；　and　turn　all　our　thoughts　towards　the
empty　and　transitory　nature　of　riches　and　honours；　we　are；
perhaps；　all　the　while　flattering　our　natural　indolence；
which；　hating　the　bustle　of　the　world；　and　drudgery　of
business；　seeks　a　pretence　of　reason　to　give　itself　a　full
and　uncontrolled　indulgence。　There　is；　however；　one　species
of　philosophy　which　seems　little　liable　to　this
inconvenience；　and　that　because　it　strikes　in　with　no
disorderly　passion　of　the　human　mind；　nor　can　mingle　itself
with　any　natural　affection　or　propensity；　and　that　is　the
A/CADEMIC　or　S/CEPTICAL　philosophy。　The　academics　always
talk　of　doubt　and　suspense　of　judgment；　of　danger　in　hasty
determinations；　of　confining　to　very　narrow　bounds　the
enquiries　of　the　understanding；　and　of　renouncing　all
speculations　which　lie　not　within　the　limits　of　common　life
and　practice。　Nothing；　therefore；　can　be　more　contrary　than
such　a　philosophy　to　the　supine　indolence　of　the　mind；　its
rash　arrogance；　its　lofty　pretensions；　and　its　superstitious
credulity。　Every　passion　is　mortified　by　it；　except　the　love
of　truth；　and　that　passion　never　is；　nor　can　be；　carried　to
too　high　a　degree。　It　is　surprising；　therefore；　that　this
philosophy；　which；　in　almost　every　instance；　must　be
harmless　and　innocent；　should　be　the　subject　of　so　much
groundless　reproach　and　obloquy。　But；　perhaps；　the　very
circumstance　which　renders　it　so　innocent　is　what　chiefly
exposes　it　to　the　public　hatred　and　resentment。　By
flattering　no　irregular　passion；　it　gains　few　partizans：　By
opposing　so　many　vices　and　follies；　it　raises　to　itself
abundance　of　enemies；　who　stigmatize　it　as　libertine；
profane；　and　irreligious。

　　　　　Nor　need　we　fear　that　this　philosophy；　while　it
endeavours　to　limit　our　enquiries　to　common　life；　should
ever　undermine　the　reasonings　of　common　life；　and　carry　its
doubts　so　far　as　to　destroy　all　action；　as　well　as
speculation。　Nature　will　always　maintain　her　rights；　and
prevail　in　the　end　over　any　abstract　reasoning　whatsoever。
Though　we　should　conclude；　for　instance；　as　in　the　foregoing
section；　that；　in　all　reasonings　from　experience；　there　is　a
step　taken　by　the　mind　which　is　not　supported　by　any
argument　or　process　of　the　understanding；　there　is　no　danger
that　these　reasonings；　on　which　almost　all　knowledge
depends；　will　ever　be　affected　by　such　a　discovery。　If　the
mind　be　not　engaged　by　argument　to　make　this　step；　it　must
be　induced　by　some　other　principle　of　equal　weight　and
authority；　and　that　principle　will　preserve　its　influence　as
long　as　human　nature　remains　the　same。　What　that　principle
is　may　well　be　worth　the　pains　of　enquiry。

　　　　　Suppose　a　person；　though　endowed　with　the　strongest
faculties　of　reason　and　reflection；　to　be　brought　on　a
sudden　into　this　world；　he　would；　indeed；　immediately
observe　a　continual　succession　of　objects；　and　one　event
following　another；　but　he　would　not　be　able　to　discover　any
thing　farther。　He　would　not；　at　first；　by　any　reasoning；　be
able　to　reach　the　idea　of　cause　and　effect；　since　the
particular　powers；　by　which　all　natural　operations　are
performed；　never　appear　to　the　senses；　nor　is　it　reasonable
to　conclude；　merely　because　one　event；　in　one　instance；
precedes　another；　that　therefore　the　one　is　the　cause；　the
other　the　effect。　Their　conjunction　may　be　arbitrary　and
casual。　There　may　be　no　reason　to　infer　the　existence　of　one
from　the　appearance　of　the　other。　And　in　a　word；　such　a
person；　without　more　experience；　could　never　employ　his
conjecture　or　reasoning　concerning　any　matter　of　fact；　or　be
assured　of　any　thing　beyond　what　was　immediately　present　to
his　memory　and　senses。

　　　　　Suppose；　again；　that　he　has　acquired　more　experience；
and　has　lived　so　long　in　the　world　as　to　have　observed
familiar　objects　or　events　to　be　constantly　conjoined
together；　what　is　the　consequence　of　this　experience？　He
immediately　infers　the　existence　of　one　object　from　the
appearance　of　the　other。　Yet　he　has　not；　by　all　his
experience；　acquired　any　idea　or　knowledge　of　the　secret
power　by　which　the　one　object　produces　the　other；　nor　is　it
by　any　process　of　reasoning；　he　is　engaged　to　draw　this
inference。　But　still　he　finds　himself　determined　to　draw　it：
And　though　he　should　be　convinced　that　his　understanding　has
no　part　in　the　operation；　he　would　nevertheless　continue　in
the　same　course　of　thinking。　There　is　some　other　principle
which　determines　him　to　form　such　a　conclusion。

　　　　　This　principle　is　C/USTOM　or　H/ABIT。　For　wherever　the
repetition　of　any　particular　act　or　operation　produces　a
propensity　to　renew　the　same　act　or　operation；　without　being
impelled　by　any　reasoning　or　process　of　the　understanding；
we　always　say；　that　this　propensity　is　the　effect　of
。　By　employing　that　word；　we　pretend　not　to　have
given　the　ultimate　reason　of　such　a　propensity。　We　only
point　out　a　principle　of　human　nature；　which　is　universally
acknowledged；　and　which　is　well　known　by　its　effects。
Perhaps　we　can　push　our　enquiries　no　farther；　or　pretend　to
give　the　cause　of　this　cause；　but　must　rest　contented　with
it　as　the　ultimate　principle；　which　we　can　assign；　of　all
our　conclusions　from　experience。　It　is　sufficient
satisfaction；　that　we　can　go　so　far；　without　repining　at　the
narrowness　of　our　faculties　because　they　will　carry　us　no
farther。　And　it　is　certain　we　here　advance　a　very
intelligible　proposition　at　least；　if　not