darwin and modern science-第158章

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In　the　views　of　Wundt　and　Fouillee　we　find　the　fundamental　idea　of　idealism：　　psychical　phenomena　as　expressions　of　the　innermost　nature　of　existence。　　They　differ　from　the　older　Idealism　in　the　great　stress　which　they　lay　on　evolution　as　a　real；　historical　process　which　is　going　on　through　steady　conflict　with　external　conditions。　　The　Romantic　dread　of　reality　is　broken。　　It　is　beyond　doubt　that　Darwin's　emphasis　on　the　struggle　for　life　as　a　necessary　condition　of　evolution　has　been　a　very　important　factor　in　carrying　philosophy　back　to　reality　from　the　heaven　of　pure　ideas。　　The　philosophy　of　Ardigo；　on　the　other　side；　appears　more　as　a　continuation　and　deepening　of　positivism；　though　the　Italian　thinker　arrived　at　his　point　of　view　independently　of　French…English　positivism。　　The　idea　of　continuous　evolution　is　here　maintained　in　opposition　to　Comte's　and　Mill's　philosophy　of　discontinuity。　　From　Wundt　and　Fouillee　Ardigo　differs　in　conceiving　psychical　evolution　not　as　an　immediate　revelation　of　the　innermost　nature　of　existence；　but　only　as　a　single；　though　the　most　accessible　example；　of　evolution。

III。　　To　the　French　philosophers　Boutroux　and　Bergson；　evolution　proper　is　continuous　and　qualitative；　while　outer　experience　and　physical　science　give　us　fragments　only；　sporadic　processes　and　mechanical　combinations。　　To　Bergson；　in　his　recent　work　〃L'Evolution　Creatrice〃；　evolution　consists　in　an　elan　de　vie　which　to　our　fragmentary　observation　and　analytic　reflexion　appears　as　broken　into　a　manifold　of　elements　and　processes。　　The　concept　of　matter　in　its　scientific　form　is　the　result　of　this　breaking　asunder；　essential　for　all　scientific　reflexion。　　In　these　conceptions　the　strongest　opposition　between　inner　and　outer　conditions　of　evolution　is　expressed：　　in　the　domain　of　internal　conditions　spontaneous　development　of　qualitative　formsin　the　domain　of　external　conditions　discontinuity　and　mechanical　combination。

We　see；　then；　that　the　theory　of　evolution　has　influenced　philosophy　in　a　variety　of　forms。　　It　has　made　idealistic　thinkers　revise　their　relation　to　the　real　world；　it　has　led　positivistic　thinkers　to　find　a　closer　connection　between　the　facts　on　which　they　based　their　views；　it　has　made　us　all　open　our　eyes　for　new　possibilities　to　arise　through　the　prima　facie　inexplicable　〃spontaneous〃　variations　which　are　the　condition　of　all　evolution。　　This　last　point　is　one　of　peculiar　interest。　　Deeper　than　speculative　philosophy　and　mechanical　science　saw　in　the　days　of　their　triumph；　we　catch　sight　of　new　streams；　whose　sources　and　laws　we　have　still　to　discover。　　Most　sharply　does　this　appear　in　the　theory　of　mutation；　which　is　only　a　stronger　accentuation　of　a　main　point　in　Darwinism。　　It　is　interesting　to　see　that　an　analogous　problem　comes　into　the　foreground　in　physics　through　the　discovery　of　radioactive　phenomena；　and　in　psychology　through　the　assumption　of　psychical　new　formations　（as　held　by　Boutroux；　William　James　and　Bergson）。　　From　this　side；　Darwin's　ideas；　as　well　as　the　analogous　ideas　in　other　domains；　incite　us　to　renewed　examination　of　our　first　principles；　their　rationality　and　their　value。　　On　the　other　hand；　his　theory　of　the　struggle　for　existence　challenges　us　to　examine　the　conditions　and　discuss　the　outlook　as　to　the　persistence　of　human　life　and　society　and　of　the　values　that　belong　to　them。　　It　is　not　enough　to　hope　（or　fear？）　the　rising　of　new　forms；　we　have　also　to　investigate　the　possibility　of　upholding　the　forms　and　ideals　which　have　hitherto　been　the　bases　of　human　life。　　Darwin　has　here　given　his　age　the　most　earnest　and　most　impressive　lesson。　　This　side　of　Darwin's　theory　is　of　peculiar　interest　to　some　special　philosophical　problems　to　which　I　now　pass。

IV。

Among　philosophical　problems　the　problem　of　knowledge　has　in　the　last　century　occupied　a　foremost　place。　　It　is　natural；　then；　to　ask　how　Darwin　and　the　hypothesis　whose　most　eminent　representative　he　is；　stand　to　this　problem。

Darwin　started　an　hypothesis。　　But　every　hypothesis　is　won　by　inference　from　certain　presuppositions；　and　every　inference　is　based　on　the　general　principles　of　human　thought。　　The　evolution　hypothesis　presupposes；　then；　human　thought　and　its　principles。　　And　not　only　the　abstract　logical　principles　are　thus　presupposed。　　The　evolution　hypothesis　purports　to　be　not　only　a　formal　arrangement　of　phenomena；　but　to　express　also　the　law　of　a　real　process。　　It　supposes；　then；　that　the　real　dataall　that　in　our　knowledge　which　we　do　not　produce　ourselves；　but　which　we　in　the　main　simply　receiveare　subjected　to　laws　which　are　at　least　analogous　to　the　logical　relations　of　our　thoughts；　in　other　words；　it　assumes　the　validity　of　the　principle　of　causality。　　If　organic　species　could　arise　without　cause　there　would　be　no　use　in　framing　hypotheses。　　Only　if　we　assume　the　principle　of　causality；　is　there　a　problem　to　solve。

Though　Darwinism　has　had　a　great　influence　on　philosophy　considered　as　a　striving　after　a　scientific　view　of　the　world；　yet　here　is　a　point　of　view　the　epistemologicalwhere　philosophy　is　not　only　independent　but　reaches　beyond　any　result　of　natural　science。　　Perhaps　it　will　be　said：　　the　powers　and　functions　of　organic　beings　only　persist　（perhaps　also　only　arise）　when　they　correspond　sufficiently　to　the　conditions　under　which　the　struggle　of　life　is　to　go　on。　　Human　thought　itself　is；　then；　a　variation　（or　a　mutation）　which　has　been　able　to　persist　and　to　survive。　　Is　not；　then；　the　problem　of　knowledge　solved　by　the　evolution　hypothesis？　　Spencer　had　given　an　affirmative　answer　to　this　question　before　the　appearance　of　〃The　Origin　of　Species〃。　　For　the　individual；　he　said；　there　is　an　a　priori；　original；　basis　（or　Anlage）　for　all　mental　life；　but　in　the　species　all　powers　have　developed　in　reciprocity　with　external　conditions。　　Knowledge　is　here　considered　from　the　practical　point　of　view；　as　a　weapon　in　the　struggle　for　life；　as　an　〃organon〃　which　has　been　continuously　in　use　for　generations。　　In　recent　years　the　economic　or　pragmatic　epistemology；　as　developed　by　Avenarius　and　Mach　in　Germany；　and　by　James　in　America；　points　in　the　same　direction。　　Science；　it　is　said；　only　maintains　those　principles　and　presuppositions　which　are　necessary　to　the　simplest　and　clearest　orientation　in　the　world　of　experience。　　All　assumptions　which　cannot　be　applied　to　experience　and　to　practical　work；　will　successively　be　eliminated。

In　these　views　a　striking　and　important　application　is　made　of　the　idea　of　struggle　for　life　to　the　development　of　human　thought。　　Thought　must；　as　all　other　things　in　the　world；　struggle　for　life。　　But　this　whole　consideration　belongs　to　psychology；　not　to　the　theory　of　knowledge　（epistemology）；　which　is　concerned　only　with　the　validity　of　knowledge；　not　with　its　historical　origin。　　Every　hypothesis　to　explain　the　origin　of　knowledge　must　submit　to　cross…examination　by　the　theory　of　knowledge；　because　it　works　with　the　fundamental　forms　and　principles　of　human　thought。　　We　cannot　go　further　back　than　these　forms　and　principles；　which　it　is　the　aim　of　epistemology　to　ascertain　and　for　which　no　further　reason　can　be　given。　　（The　present　writer；　many　years　ago；　in　his　〃Psychology〃　（Copenhagen；　1882；　English　translation　London；　1891）；　criticised　the　evolutionistic　treatment　of　the　problem　of　knowledge　from　the　Kantian　point　of　view。）

But　there　is　another　side　of　the　problem　which　is；　perhaps；　of　more　importance　and　which　epistemology　generally　overlooks。　　If　new　variations　can　arise；　not　only　in　organic　but　perhaps　also　in　inorganic　nature；　new　tasks　are　placed　before　the　human　mind。　　The　question　is；　then；　if　it　has　forms　in　which　there　is　room　for　the　new　matter？　　We　are　here　touching　a　possibility　which　the　great　master　of　epistemology　did　not　bring　to　light。　Kant　supposed　confidently　that　no　other　matter　of　knowledge　could　stream　forth　from　the　dark　source　which　he　called　〃the　thing…in…itself；〃　than　such　as　could　be　synthesised　in　our　existing　forms　of　knowledge。　　He　mentions　the　possibility　of　other　forms　than　the　human；　and　warns　us　against　the　dogmatic　assumption　that　the　human　conception　of　existence　should　be　absolutely　adequate。　　But　he　seems　to　be　quite　sure