essays on life, art and science-第25章

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〃thought〃　in　the　same　sense　as　that　in　which　it　is　generally　used　by
people　who　say　that　they　think　this　or　that。　　At　any　rate；　it　will
be　enough　if　I　take　Professor　Max　Muller's　own　definition；　and　say
that　its　essence　consists　in　a　bringing　together　of　mental　images
and　ideas　with　deductions　therefrom；　and　with　a　corresponding　power
of　detaching　them　from　one　another。　　Hobbes；　the　Professor　tells　us；
maintained　this　long　ago；　when　he　said　that　all　our　thinking
consists　of　addition　and　subtractionthat　is　to　say；　in　bringing
ideas　together；　and　in　detaching　them　from　one　another。

Turning　from　thought　to　language；　we　observe　that　the　word　is
derived　from　the　French　langue；　or　tongue。　　Strictly；　therefore；　it
means　tonguage。　　This；　however；　takes　account　of　but　a　very　small
part　of　the　ideas　that　underlie　the　word。　　It　does；　indeed；　seize　a
familiar　and　important　detail　of　everyday　speech；　though　it　may　be
doubted　whether　the　tongue　has　more　to　do　with　speaking　than　lips；
teeth　and　throat　have；　but　it　makes　no　attempt　at　grasping　and
expressing　the　essential　characteristic　of　speech。　　Anything　done
with　the　tongue；　even　though　it　involve　no　speaking　at　all；　is
tonguage；　eating　oranges　is　as　much　tonguage　as　speech　is。　　The
word；　therefore；　though　it　tells　us　in　part　how　speech　is　effected；
reveals　nothing　of　that　ulterior　meaning　which　is　nevertheless
inseparable　from　any　right　use　of　the　words　either　〃speech〃　or
〃language。〃　　It　presents　us　with　what　is　indeed　a　very　frequent
adjunct　of　conversation；　but　the　use　of　written　characters；　or　the
finger…speech　of　deaf　mutes；　is　enough　to　show　that　the　word
〃language〃　omits　all　reference　to　the　most　essential　characteristics
of　the　idea；　which　in　practice　it　nevertheless　very　sufficiently
presents　to　us。　　I　hope　presently　to　make　it　clear　to　you　how　and
why　it　should　do　so。　　The　word　is　incomplete　in　the　first　place；
because　it　omits　all　reference　to　the　ideas　which　words；　speech　or
language　are　intended　to　convey；　and　there　can　be　no　true　word
without　its　actually　or　potentially　conveying　an　idea。　　Secondly；　it
makes　no　allusion　to　the　person　or　persons　to　whom　the　ideas　are　to
be　conveyed。　　Language　is　not　language　unless　it　not　only　expresses
fairly　definite　and　coherent　ideas；　but　unless　it　also　conveys　these
ideas　to　some　other　living　intelligent　being；　either　man　or　brute；
that　can　understand　them。　　We　may　speak　to　a　dog　or　horse；　but　not
to　a　stone。　　If　we　make　pretence　of　doing　so　we　are　in　reality　only
talking　to　ourselves。　　The　person　or　animal　spoken　to　is　half　the
battlea　half；　moreover；　which　is　essential　to　there　being　any
battle　at　all。　　It　takes　two　people　to　say　a　thinga　sayee　as　well
as　a　sayer。　　The　one　is　as　essential　to　any　true　saying　as　the
other。　　A。　may　have　spoken；　but　if　B。　has　not　heard；　there　has　been
nothing　said；　and　he　must　speak　again。　　True；　the　belief　on　A。's
part　that　he　had　a　bona　fide　sayee　in　B。；　saves　his　speech　qua　him；
but　it　has　been　barren　and　left　no　fertile　issue。　　It　has　failed　to
fulfil　the　conditions　of　true　speech；　which　involve　not　only　that　A。
should　speak；　but　also　that　B。　should　hear。　　True；　again；　we　often
speak　of　loose；　incoherent；　indefinite　language；　but　by　doing　so　we
imply；　and　rightly；　that　we　are　calling　that　language　which　is　not
true　language　at　all。　　People；　again；　sometimes　talk　to　themselves
without　intending　that　any　other　person　should　hear　them；　but　this
is　not　well　done；　and　does　harm　to　those　who　practise　it。　　It　is
abnormal；　whereas　our　concern　is　with　normal　and　essential
characteristics；　we　may；　therefore；　neglect　both　delirious
babblings；　and　the　cases　in　which　a　person　is　regarding　him　or
herself；　as　it　were；　from　outside；　and　treating　himself　as　though　he
were　some　one　else。

Inquiring；　then；　what　are　the　essentials；　the　presence　of　which
constitutes　language；　while　their　absence　negatives　it　altogether；
we　find　that　Professor　Max　Muller　restricts　them　to　the　use　of
grammatical　articulate　words　that　we　can　write　or　speak；　and　denies
that　anything　can　be　called　language　unless　it　can　be　written　or
spoken　in　articulate　words　and　sentences。　　He　also　denies　that　we
can　think　at　all　unless　we　do　so　in　words；　that　is　to　say；　in
sentences　with　verbs　and　nouns。　　Indeed　he　goes　so　far　as　to　say
upon　his　title…page　that　there　can　be　no　reasonwhich　I　imagine
comes　to　much　the　same　thing　as　thoughtwithout　language；　and　no
language　without　reason。

Against　the　assertion　that　there　can　be　no　true　language　without
reason　I　have　nothing　to　say。　　But　when　the　Professor　says　that
there　can　be　no　reason；　or　thought；　without　language；　his　opponents
contend；　as　it　seems　to　me；　with　greater　force；　that　thought；　though
infinitely　aided；　extended　and　rendered　definite　through　the
invention　of　words；　nevertheless　existed　so　fully　as　to　deserve　no
other　name　thousands；　if　not　millions　of　years　before　words　had
entered　into　it　at　all。　　Words；　they　say；　are　a　comparatively　recent
invention；　for　the　fuller　expression　of　something　that　was　already
in　existence。

Children；　they　urge；　are　often　evidently　thinking　and　reasoning；
though　they　can　neither　think　nor　speak　in　words。　　If　you　ask　me　to
define　reason；　I　answer　as　before　that　this　can　no　more　be　done　than
thought；　truth　or　motion　can　be　defined。　　Who　has　answered　the
question；　〃What　is　truth？〃　　Man　cannot　see　God　and　live。　　We　cannot
go　so　far　back　upon　ourselves　as　to　undermine　our　own　foundations；
if　we　try　to　do　we　topple　over；　and　lose　that　very　reason　about
which　we　vainly　try　to　reason。　　If　we　let　the　foundations　be；　we
know　well　enough　that　they　are　there；　and　we　can　build　upon　them　in
all　security。　　We　cannot；　then；　define　reason　nor　crib；　cabin　and
confine　it　within　a　thus…far…shalt…thou…go…and…no…further。　　Who　can
define　heat　or　cold；　or　night　or　day？　　Yet；　so　long　as　we　hold　fast
by　current　consent；　our　chances　of　error　for　want　of　better
definition　are　so　small　that　no　sensible　person　will　consider　them。
In　like　manner；　if　we　hold　by　current　consent　or　common　sense；　which
is　the　same　thing；　about　reason；　we　shall　not　find　the　want　of　an
academic　definition　hinder　us　from　a　reasonable　conclusion。　　What
nurse　or　mother　will　doubt　that　her　infant　child　can　reason　within
the　limits　of　its　own　experience；　long　before　it　can　formulate　its
reason　in　articulately　worded　thought？　　If　the　development　of　any
given　animal　is；　as　our　opponents　themselves　admit；　an　epitome　of
the　history　of　its　whole　anterior　development；　surely　the　fact　that
speech　is　an　accomplishment　acquired　after　birth　so　artificially
that　children　who　have　gone　wild　in　the　woods　lose　it　if　they　have
ever　learned　it；　points　to　the　conclusion　that　man's　ancestors　only
learned　to　express　themselves　in　articulate　language　at　a
comparatively　recent　period。　　Granted　that　they　learn　to　think　and
reason　continually　the　more　and　more　fully　for　having　done　so；　will
common　sense　permit　us　to　suppose　that　they　could　neither　think　nor
reason　at　all　till　they　could　convey　their　ideas　in　words？

I　will　return　later　to　the　reason　of　the　lower　animals；　but　will　now
deal　with　the　question　what　it　is　that　constitutes　language　in　the
most　comprehensive　sense　that　can　be　properly　attached　to　it。　　I
have　said　already　that　language　to　be　language　at　all　must　not　only
convey　fairly　definite　coherent　ideas；　but　must　also　convey　them　to
another　living　being。　　Whenever　two　living　beings　have　conveyed　and
received　ideas；　there　has　been　language；　whether　looks　or　gestures
or　words　spoken　or　written　have　been　the　vehicle　by　means　of　which
the　ideas　have　travelled。　　Some　ideas　crawl；　some　run；　some　fly；　and
in　this　case　words　are　the　wings　they　fly　with；　but　they　are　only
the　wings　of　thought　or　of　ideas；　they　are　not　the　thought　or　ideas
themselves；　nor　yet；　as　Professor　Max　Muller　would　have　it；
inseparably　connected　with　them。　　Last　summer　I　was　at　an　inn　in
Sicily；　where　there　was　a　deaf　and　dumb　waiter；　he　had　been　born　so；
and　could　neither　write　nor　read。　　What　had　he　to　do　with　words　or
words　with　him？　　Are　we　to　say；　then；　that　this　most　active；　amiable
and　intelligent　fellow　could　neither　think　nor　reason？　　One