the vested interests and the common man-第1章
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The Vested Interests and the Common Man
by Thorstein Veblen
1919
Chapter 1
The Instability of Knowledge and Belief
As is true of any other point of view that may be
characteristic of any other period of history； so also the modern
point of view is a matter of habit。 It is common to the modern
civilised peoples only in so far as these peoples have come
through substantially the same historical experience and have
thereby acquired substantially the same habits of thought and
have fallen into somewhat the same prevalent frame of mind。 This
modern point of view； therefore； is limited both in time and
space。 It is characteristic of the modern historical era and of
such peoples as lie within the range of that peculiar
civilisation which marks off the modern world from what has gone
before and from what still prevails outside of its range。 In
other words； it is a trait of modern Christendom； of Occidental
civilisation as it has run within the past few centuries。 This
general statement is not vitiated by the fact that there has been
some slight diffusion of these modern and Western ideas outside
of this range in recent times。
By historical accident it happens that the modern point of
view has reached its maturest formulation and prevails with the
least faltering among the French and English…speaking peoples； so
that these peoples may be said to constitute the center of
diffusion for that system of ideas which is called the modern
point of view。 Outward from this broad center the same range of
ideas prevail throughout Christendom； but they prevail with less
singleness of conviction among the peoples who are culturally
more remote from this center； increasingly so with each farther
remove。 These others have carried over a larger remainder of the
habits of thought of an earlier age； and have carried them over
in a better state of preservation。 It may also be that these
others； or some of them； have acquired habits of thought of a new
order which do not altogether fit into that system of ideas that
is commonly spoken of as the modern point of view。 That such is
the case need imply neither praise nor blame。 It is only that； by
common usage； these remainders of ancient habits of thought and
these newer preconceptions that do not fit into the framework of
West…European conventional thinking are not ordinarily rated as
intrinsic to the modern point of view。 They need not therefore be
less to the purpose as a guide and criterion of human living； it
is only that they are alien to those purposes which are
considered to be of prime consequence in civilised life as it is
guided and tested by the constituent principles of the modern
point of view。
What is spoken of as a point of view is always a composite
affair； some sort of a rounded and balanced system of principles
and standards； which are taken for granted； at least
provisionally； and which serve as a base of reference and
legitimation in all questions of deliberate opinion。 So when any
given usage or any line of conduct or belief is seen and approved
from the modern point of view； it comes to the same as saying
that these things are seen and accepted in the light of those
principles which modern men habitually consider to be final and
sufficient。 They are principles of right； equity； propriety；
duty； perhaps of knowledge； belief； and taste。
It is evident that these principles and standards of what is
right； good； true； and beautiful； will vary from one age to
another and from one people to another； in response to the
varying conditions of life； inasmuch as these principles are
always of the nature of habit； although the variation will of
course range only within the limits of that human nature that
finds expression in these same principles of right； good； truth；
and beauty。 So also； it will be found that something in the way
of a common measure of truth and sufficiency runs through any
such body of principles that are accepted as final and
self…evident at any given time and place； in case this
habitual body of principles has reached such a degree of poise
and consistency that they can fairly be said to constitute a
stable point of view。 It is only because there is such a degree
of consistency and such a common measure of validity among the
commonly accepted principles of conduct and belief today； that it
is possible to speak intelligently of the modern point of view；
and to contrast it with any other point of view which may have
prevailed earlier or elsewhere； as； e。g。； in the Middle Ages or
in Pagan Antiquity。
The Romans were given to saying。 Tempora mutantur； and the
Spanish have learned to speak indulgently in the name of
Costumbres del pais。 The common law of the English…speaking
peoples does not coincide at all points with what was
indefeasibly right and good in the eyes of the Romans； and still
less do its principles countenance all the vagaries of the Mosaic
code。 Yet； each and several； in their due time and institutional
setting； these have all been tried and found valid and have
approved themselves as securely and eternally right and good in
principle。
Evidently these principles； which so are made to serve as
standards of validity in law and custom； knowledge and belief；
are of the nature of canons； established rules； and have the
authority of precedent； prescription。 They have been defined by
the attrition of use and wont and disputation； and they are
accepted in a somewhat deliberate manner by common consent； and
are upheld by a deliberate public opinion as to what is right and
seemly。 In the popular apprehension； and indeed in the
apprehension of the trained jurists and scholars for the time
being； these constituent principles of the accepted point of view
are 〃fundamentally and eternally right and good。〃 But this
perpetuity with which they so are habitually invested in the
popular apprehension； in their time； is evidently such a
qualified perpetuity only as belongs to any settled outgrowth of
use and wont。 They are of an institutional character and they are
endowed with that degree of perpetuity only that belongs to any
institution。 So soon as a marked change of circumstances comes
on； a change of a sufficiently profound； enduring and
comprehensive character； such as persistently to cross or to go
beyond those lines of use and wont out of which these settled
principles have emerged； then these principles and their
standards of validity and finality must presently undergo a
revision； such as to bring on a new balance of principles；
embodying the habits of thought enforced by a new situation； and
expressing itself in a revised scheme of authoritative use and
wont； law and custom。 In the transition from the medieval to the
modern point of view； e。 g。； there is to be seen such a pervasive
change in men's habitual outlook； answering to the compulsion of
a new range of circumstances which then came to condition the
daily life of the peoples of Christendom。 In this mutation of the
habitual outlook； between medieval and modern times； the contrast
is perhaps most neatly shown in the altered standards of
knowledge and belief； rather than in the settled domain of law
and morals。 Not that the mutation of habits which then overtook
the Western world need have been less wide or less effectual in
matters of conduct； but the change which has taken effect in
science and philosophy； between the fourteenth century and the
nineteenth； e。 g。； appears to have been of a more recognizable
character； more easily defined in succinct and convincing terms。
It has also quite generally attracted the attention of those men
who have interested themselves in the course of historical
events； and it has therefore become something of a commonplace in
any standard historical survey of modern civilisation to say that
the scheme of knowledge and belief underwent a visible change
between the Middle Ages and modern times。
It will also be found true that the canons of knowledge and
belief； the principles governing what is f
