the writings-2-第46章

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be　true　that　the　principle　of　the　Nebraska　Bill　was　the　cause

that　led　to　the　adoption　of　these　measures。　　It　is　now　more　than

fifty　years　since　the　last　of　these　States　adopted　its　system　of

emancipation。



If　the　Nebraska　Bill　is　the　real　author　of　the　benevolent　works；

it　is　rather　deplorable　that　it　has　for　so　long　a　time　ceased

working　altogether。　　Is　there　not　some　reason　to　suspect　that　it

was　the　principle　of　the　Revolution；　and　not　the　principle　of　the

Nebraska　Bill；　that　led　to　emancipation　in　these　old　States？

Leave　it　to　the　people　of　these　old　emancipating　States；　and　I　am

quite　certain　they　will　decide　that　neither　that　nor　any　other

good　thing　ever　did　or　ever　will　come　of　the　Nebraska　Bill。



In　the　course　of　my　main　argument；　Judge　Douglas　interrupted　me

to　say　that　the　principle　of　the　Nebraska　Bill　was　very　old；　that

it　originated　when　God　made　man；　and　placed　good　and　evil　before

him；　allowing　him　to　choose　for　himself；　being　responsible　for

the　choice　he　should　make。　　At　the　time　I　thought　this　was　merely

playful；　and　I　answered　it　accordingly。　　But　in　his　reply　to　me

he　renewed　it　as　a　serious　argument。　　In　seriousness；　then；　the

facts　of　this　proposition　are　not　true　as　stated。　　God　did　not

place　good　and　evil　before　man；　telling　him　to　make　his　choice。

On　the　contrary；　he　did　tell　him　there　was　one　tree　of　the　fruit

of　which　he　should　not　eat；　upon　pain　of　certain　death。　　I　should

scarcely　wish　so　strong　a　prohibition　against　slavery　in

Nebraska。



But　this　argument　strikes　me　as　not　a　little　remarkable　in

another　particularin　its　strong　resemblance　to　the　old　argument

for　the　divine　right　of　kings。〃　By　the　latter；　the　king　is　to　do

just　as　he　pleases　with　his　white　subjects；　being　responsible　to

God　alone。　　By　the　former；　the　white　man　is　to　do　just　as　he

pleases　with　his　black　slaves；　being　responsible　to　God　alone。

The　two　things　are　precisely　alike；　and　it　is　but　natural　that

they　should　find　similar　arguments　to　sustain　them。



I　had　argued　that　the　application　of　the　principle　of　self…

government；　as　contended　for；　would　require　the　revival　of　the

African　slave　trade；　that　no　argument　could　be　made　in　favor　of　a

man's　right　to　take　slaves　to　Nebraska　which　could　not　be　equally

well　made　in　favor　of　his　right　to　bring　them　from　the　coast　of

Africa。　　The　Judge　replied　that　the　Constitution　requires　the

suppression　of　the　foreign　slave　trade；　but　does　not　require　the

prohibition　of　slavery　in　the　Territories。　　That　is　a　mistake　in

point　of　fact。　　The　Constitution　does　not　require　the　action　of

Congress　in　either　case；　and　it　does　authorize　it　in　both。　　And

so　there　is　still　no　difference　between　the　cases。



In　regard　to　what　I　have　said　of　the　advantage　the　slave　States

have　over　the　free　in　the　matter　of　representation；　the　Judge

replied　that　we　in　the　free　States　count　five　free　negroes　as

five　white　people；　while　in　the　slave　States　they　count　five

slaves　as　three　whites　only；　and　that　the　advantage；　at　last；　was

on　the　side　of　the　free　States。



Now；　in　the　slave　States　they　count　free　negroes　just　as　we　do；

and　it　so　happens　that；　besides　their　slaves；　they　have　as　many

free　negroes　as　we　have；　and　thirty　thousand　over。　　Thus；　their

free　negroes　more　than　balance　ours；　and　their　advantage　over　us；

in　consequence　of　their　slaves；　still　remains　as　I　stated　it。



In　reply　to　my　argument　that　the　compromise　measures　of　1850　were

a　system　of　equivalents；　and　that　the　provisions　of　no　one　of

them　could　fairly　be　carried　to　other　subjects　without　its

corresponding　equivalent　being　carried　with　it；　the　Judge　denied

outright　that　these　measures　had　any　connection　with　or

dependence　upon　each　other。　　This　is　mere　desperation。　　If　they

had　no　connection；　why　are　they　always　spoken　of　in　connection？

Why　has　he　so　spoken　of　them　a　thousand　times？　　Why　has　he

constantly　called　them　a　series　of　measures？　　Why　does　everybody

call　them　a　compromise？　　Why　was　California　kept　out　of　the　Union

six　or　seven　months；　if　it　was　not　because　of　its　connection　with

the　other　measures？　　Webster's　leading　definition　of　the　verb　〃to

compromise〃　is　〃to　adjust　and　settle　a　difference；　by　mutual

agreement；　with　concessions　of　claims　by　the　parties。〃　This

conveys　precisely　the　popular　understanding　of　the　word

〃compromise。



We　knew；　before　the　Judge　told　us；　that　these　measures　passed

separately；　and　in　distinct　bills；　and　that　no　two　of　them　were

passed　by　the　votes　of　precisely　the　same　members。　　But　we　also

know；　and　so　does　he　know；　that　no　one　of　them　could　have　passed

both　branches　of　Congress　but　for　the　understanding　that　the

others　were　to　pass　also。　　Upon　this　understanding；　each　got

votes　which　it　could　have　got　in　no　other　way。　　It　is　this　fact

which　gives　to　the　measures　their　true　character；　and　it　is　the

universal　knowledge　of　this　fact　that　has　given　them　the　name　of

〃compromises；〃　so　expressive　of　that　true　character。



I　had　asked：　〃If；　in　carrying　the　Utah　and　New　Mexico　laws　to

Nebraska；　you　could　clear　away　other　objection；　how　could　you

leave　Nebraska　'perfectly　free'　to　introduce　slavery　before　she

forms　a　constitution；　during　her　territorial　government；　while

the　Utah　and　New　Mexico　laws　only　authorize　it　when　they　form

constitutions　and　are　admitted　into　the　Union？〃　　To　this　Judge

Douglas　answered　that　the　Utah　and　New　Mexico　laws　also

authorized　it　before；　and　to　prove　this　he　read　from　one　of　their

laws；　as　follows：　〃That　the　legislative　power　of　said　Territory

shall　extend　to　all　rightful　subjects　of　legislation；　consistent

with　the　Constitution　of　the　United　States　and　the　provisions　of

this　act。〃



Now　it　is　perceived　from　the　reading　of　this　that　there　is

nothing　express　upon　the　subject；　but　that　the　authority　is

sought　to　be　implied　merely　for　the　general　provision　of　〃all


rightful　subjects　of　legislation。〃　In　reply　to　this　I　insist；　as

a　legal　rule　of　construction；　as　well　as　the　plain；　popular　view

of　the　matter；　that　the　express　provision　for　Utah　and　New　Mexico

coming　in　with　slavery；　if　they　choose；　when　they　shall　form

constitutions；　is　an　exclusion　of　all　implied　authority　on　the

same　subject；　that　Congress　having　the　subject　distinctly　in

their　minds　when　they　made　the　express　provision；　they　therein

expressed　their　whole　meaning　on　that　subject。



The　Judge　rather　insinuated　that　I　had　found　it　convenient　to

forget　the　Washington　territorial　law　passed　in　1853。　　This　was　a

division　of　Oregon；　organizing　the　northern　part　as　the　Territory

of　Washington。　　He　asserted　that　by　this　act　the　Ordinance　of

'87；　theretofore　existing　in　Oregon；　was　repealed；　that　nearly

all　the　members　of　Congress　voted　for　it；　beginning　in　the　House

of　Representatives　with　Charles　Allen　of　Massachusetts；　and

ending　with　Richard　Yates　of　Illinois；　and　that　he　could　not

understand　how　those　who　now　opposed　the　Nebraska　Bill　so　voted

there；　unless　it　was　because　it　was　then　too　soon　after　both　the

great　political　parties　had　ratified　the　compromises　of　1850；　and

the　ratification　therefore　was　too　fresh　to　be　then　repudiated。



Now　I　had　seen　the　Washington　act　before；　and　I　have　carefully

examined　it　since；　and　I　aver　that　there　is　no　repeal　of　the

Ordinance　of　'87；　or　of　any　prohibition　of　slavery；　in　it。　　In

express　terms；　there　is　absolutely　nothing　in　the　whole　law　upon

the　subjectin　fact；　nothing　to　lead　a　reader　to　think　of　the

subject。　　To　my　judgment　it　is　equally　free　from　everything　from

which　repeal　can　be　legally　implied；　but；　however　this　may　be；

are　men　now　to　be　entrapped　by　a　legal　implication；　extracted

from　covert　language；　introduced　perhaps　for　the　very　purpose　of

entrapping　them？　　I　sincerely　wish　every　man　could　read　this　law

quite　through；　carefully　watching　every　sentence　and　every　line

for　a　repeal　of　the　Ordinance　of　'87；　or　anything　equivalent　to

it。



Another　point　on　the　Washington　ac