the ethics(part ii)-第14章

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To　the　first　objection　I　answer；　that　I　admit　that　the　will　has　a



wider　scope　than　the　　understanding；　if　by　the　understanding　be



meant　only　clear　and　distinct　ideas；　but　I　deny　　that　the　will



has　a　wider　scope　than　the　perceptions；　and　the　faculty　of



forming　　conceptions；　nor　do　I　see　why　the　faculty　of　volition



should　be　called　infinite；　any　more　　than　the　faculty　of　feeling：　



for；　as　we　are　able　by　the　same　faculty　of　volition　to　affirm　an　



infinite　number　of　things　（one　after　the　other；　for　we　cannot



affirm　an　infinite　number　　simultaneously）；　so　also　can　we；　by



the　same　faculty　of　feeling；　feel　or　perceive　（in　　succession）　an



infinite　number　of　bodies。　　If　it　be　said　that　there　is　an



infinite　number　of　　things　which　we　cannot　perceive；　I　answer；



that　we　cannot　attain　to　such　things　by　any　　thinking；　nor；



consequently；　by　any　faculty　of　volition。　　But；　it　may　still　be



urged；　if　God　　wished　to　bring　it　about　that　we　should　perceive



them；　he　would　be　obliged　to　endow　us　　with　a　greater　faculty　of



perception；　but　not　a　greater　faculty　of　volition　than　we　have　



already。　　This　is　the　same　as　to　say　that；　if　God　wished　to　bring



it　about　that　we　should　　understand　an　infinite　number　of　other



entities；　it　would　be　necessary　for　him　to　give　us　a　　greater



understanding；　but　not　a　more　universal　idea　of　entity　than　that



which　we　have　　already；　in　order　to　grasp　such　infinite　entities。　



We　have　shown　that　will　is　a　universal　　entity　or　idea；　whereby



we　explain　all　particular　volitionsin　other　words；　that　which



is　　common　to　all　such　volitions。







As；　then；　our　opponents　maintain　that　this　idea；　common　or



universal　to　all　volitions；　is　a　　faculty；　it　is　little　to　be



wondered　at　that　they　assert；　that　such　a　faculty　extends　itself



into　　the　infinite；　beyond　the　limits　of　the　understanding：　　for



what　is　universal　is　predicated　alike　　of　one；　of　many；　and　of　an



infinite　number　of　individuals。







To　the　second　objection　I　reply　by　denying；　that　we　have　a　free



power　of　suspending　　our　judgment：　　for；　when　we　say　that　anyone



suspends　his　judgment；　we　merely　mean　that　　he　sees；　that　he　does



not　perceive　the　matter　in　question　adequately。　　Suspension　of　



judgment　is；　therefore；　strictly　speaking；　a　perception；　and　not



free　will。　　In　order　to　　illustrate　the　point；　let　us　suppose　a



boy　imagining　a　horse；　and　perceive　nothing　else。　　　Inasmuch　as



this　imagination　involves　the　existence　of　the　horse　（II。　xvii。



Cor。）；　and　the　boy　　does　not　perceive　anything　which　would



exclude　the　existence　of　the　horse；　he　will　　necessarily　regard



the　horse　as　present：　　he　will　not　be　able　to　doubt　of　its



existence；　　although　he　be　not　certain　thereof。　　We　have　daily



experience　of　such　a　state　of　things　in　　dreams；　and　I　do　not



suppose　that　there　is　anyone；　who　would　maintain　that；　while　he



is　　dreaming；　he　has　the　free　power　of　suspending　his　judgment



concerning　the　things　in　his　　dream；　and　bringing　it　about　that



he　should　not　dream　those　things；　which　he　dreams　that　　he　sees；



yet　it　happens；　notwithstanding；　that　even　in　dreams　we　suspend



our　judgment；　　namely；　when　we　dream　that　we　are　dreaming。







Further；　I　grant　that　no　one　can　be　deceived；　so　far　as　actual



perception　extendsthat　is；　I　　grant　that　the　mind's



imaginations；　regarded　in　themselves；　do　not　involve　error　（II。



xvii。　　note）；　but　I　deny；　that　a　man　does　not；　in　the　act　of



perception；　make　any　affirmation。　　For　　what　is　the　perception　of



a　winged　horse；　save　affirming　that　a　horse　has　wings？　　If　the　



mind　could　perceive　nothing　else　but　the　winged　horse；　it　would



regard　the　same　as　present　　to　itself：　　it　would　have　no　reasons



for　doubting　its　existence；　nor　any　faculty　of　dissent；　　unless



the　imagination　of　a　winged　horse　be　joined　to　an　idea　which



precludes　the　　existence　of　the　said　horse；　or　unless　the　mind



perceives　that　the　idea　which　it　possess　of　a　　winged　horse　is



inadequate；　in　which　case　it　will　either　necessarily　deny　the



existence　of　　such　a　horse；　or　will　necessarily　be　in　doubt　on



the　subject。







I　think　that　I　have　anticipated　my　answer　to　the　third　objection；



namely；　that　the　will　is　　something　universal　which　is　predicated



of　all　ideas；　and　that　it　only　signifies　that　which　is　　common　to



all　ideas；　namely；　an　affirmation；　whose　adequate　essence　must；



therefore；　in　　so　far　as　it　is　thus　conceived　in　the　abstract；　be



in　every　idea；　and　be；　in　this　respect　alone；　　the　same　in　all；



not　in　so　far　as　it　is　considered　as　constituting　the　idea's



essence：　　for；　in　　this　respect；　particular　affirmations　differ



one　from　the　other；　as　much　as　do　ideas。　　For　　instance；　the



affirmation　which　involves　the　idea　of　a　circle；　differs　from



that　which　　involves　the　idea　of　a　triangle；　as　much　as　the　idea



of　a　circle　differs　from　the　idea　of　a　　triangle。







Further；　I　absolutely　deny；　that　we　are　in　need　of　an　equal　power



of　thinking；　to　affirm　　that　that　which　is　true　is　true；　and　to



affirm　that　that　which　is　false　is　true。　　These　two　



affirmations；　if　we　regard　the　mind；　are　in　the　same　relation　to



one　another　as　being　and　　not…being；　for　there　is　nothing



positive　in　ideas；　which　constitutes　the　actual　reality　of　



falsehood　（II。　xxxv。　note；　and　xlvii。　note）。







We　must　therefore　conclude；　that　we　are　easily　deceived；　when　we



confuse　universals　with　　singulars；　and　the　entities　of　reason



and　abstractions　with　realities。　　As　for　the　fourth　　objection；　I



am　quite　ready　to　admit；　that　a　man　placed　in　the　equilibrium



described　　（namely；　as　perceiving　nothing　but　hunger　and　thirst；



a　certain　food　and　a　certain　drink；　　each　equally　distant　from



him）　would　die　of　hunger　and　thirst。　　If　I　am　asked；　whether　such



　an　one　should　not　rather　be　considered　an　ass　than　a　man；　I



answer；　that　I　do　not　know；　　neither　do　I　know　how　a　man　should



be　considered；　who　hangs　himself；　or　how　we　should　　consider



children；　fools；　madmen；　&c。







It　remains　to　point　out　the　advantages　of　a　knowledge　of　this



doctrine　as　bearing　on　　conduct；　and　this　may　be　easily　gathered



from　what　has　been　said。　　The　doctrine　is　good；







1。　Inasmuch　as　it　teaches　us　to　act　solely　according　to　the



decree　of　God；　and　to　be　　partakers　in　the　Divine　nature；　and　so



much　the　more；　as　we　perform　more　perfect　actions　　and　more　and



more　understand　God。　　Such　a　doctrine　not　only　completely



tranquilizes　our　　spirit；　but　also　shows　us　where　our　highest



happiness　or　blessedness　is；　namely；　solely　in　　the　knowledge　of



God；　whereby　we　are　led　to　act　only　as　love　and　piety　shall　bid



us。　　We　　may　thus　clearly　understand；　how　far　astray　from　a　true



estimate　of　virtue　are　those　who　　expect　to　be　decorated　by　God



with　high　rewards　for　their　virtue；　and　their　best　actions；　　as



for　having　endured　the　direst　slavery；　as　if　virtue　and　the



service　of　God　were　not　in　　itself　happiness　and　perfect　freedom。







2。　Inasmuch　as　it　teaches　us；　how　we　ought　to　conduct　ourselves



with　respect　to　the　gifts　　of　fortune；　or　matters　which　are　not



in　our　power；　and　do　not　follow　from　our　nature。　　For　　it　shows



us；　that　we　should　await　and　endure　fortune's　smiles　or　frowns



with　an　equal　　mind；　seeing　that　all　things　follow　from　the



eternal　decree　of　God　by　the　same　necessity；　　as　it　follows　from



the　essence　of　a　triangle；　that　the　three　angles　are　equal　to　two



right　　angles。







3。　This　doctrine　raises　social　life；　inasmuch　as　it　teaches　us　to



hate　no　man；　neither　to　　despise；　to　deride；　to　envy；　or　to　be



angry　with