the ethics(part ii)-第13章

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negation；　save　that　which　an　　idea；　inasmuch　as　it　is　an　idea；



involves。







》》》》》ProofThere　is　in　the　mind　no　absolute　faculty　of　positive



or　negative　volition；　but　　only　particular　volitions；　namely；



this　or　that　affirmation；　and　this　or　that　negation。　　Now　let　　us



conceive　a　particular　volition；　namely；　the　mode　of　thinking



whereby　the　mind　affirms；　　that　the　three　interior　angles　of　a



triangle　are　equal　to　two　right　angles。　　This　affirmation　



involves　the　conception　or　idea　of　a　triangle；　that　is；　without



the　idea　of　a　triangle　it　cannot　　be　conceived。　　It　is　the　same



thing　to　say；　that　the　concept　A　must　involve　the　concept　B；　　as



it　is　to　say；　that　A　cannot　be　conceived　without　B。　　Further；



this　affirmation　cannot　be　　made　（II。　Ax。　iii。）　without　the　idea



of　a　triangle。　　Therefore；　this　affirmation　can　neither　be　　nor



be　conceived；　without　the　idea　of　a　triangle。　　Again；　this　idea



of　a　triangle　must　involve　　this　same　affirmation；　namely；　that



its　three　interior　angles　are　equal　to　two　right　angles。　　



Wherefore；　and　vice　versa；　this　idea　of　a　triangle　can　neither　be



nor　be　conceived　without　　this　affirmation；　therefore；　this



affirmation　belongs　to　the　essence　of　the　idea　of　a　triangle；　



and　is　nothing　besides。　　What　we　have　said　of　this　volition



（inasmuch　as　we　have　selected　　it　at　random）　may　be　said　of　any



other　volition；　namely；　that　it　is　nothing　but　an　idea。　　　Q。E。D。







ProofWill　and　understanding　are　nothing　beyond　the



individual　volitions　and　ideas　　（II。　xlviii。　and　note）。　　But　a



particular　volition　and　a　particular　idea　are　one　and　the　same　



（by　the　foregoing　Prop。）；　therefore；　will　and　understanding　are



one　and　the　same。　　Q。E。D。







*****NoteWe　have　thus　removed　the　cause　which　is　commonly



assigned　for　error。　　For　　we　have　shown　above；　that　falsity



consists　solely　in　the　privation　of　knowledge　involved　in　　ideas



which　are　fragmentary　and　confused。　　Wherefore；　a　false　idea；



inasmuch　as　it　is　false；　　does　not　involve　certainty。　　When　we



say；　then；　that　a　man　acquiesces　in　what　is　false；　and　　that　he



has　no　doubts　on　the　subject；　we　do　not　say　that　he　is　certain；



but　only　that　he　does　　not　doubt；　or　that　he　acquiesces　in　what



is　false；　inasmuch　as　there　are　no　reasons；　which　　should　cause



his　imagination　to　waver　（see　II。　xliv。　note）。　　Thus；　although



the　man　be　　assumed　to　acquiesce　in　what　is　false；　we　shall　never



say　that　he　is　certain。　　For　by　certainty　　we　mean　something



positive　（II。　xliii。　and　note）；　not　merely　the　absence　of　doubt。







However；　in　order　that　the　foregoing　proposition　may　be　fully



explained；　I　will　draw　　attention　to　a　few　additional　points；　and



I　will　furthermore　answer　the　objections　which　　may　be　advanced



against　our　doctrine。　　Lastly；　in　order　to　remove　every　scruple；



I　have　　thought　it　worth　while　to　point　out　some　of　the



advantages；　which　follow　therefrom。　　I　say　　〃some；〃　for　they　will



be　better　appreciated　from　what　we　shall　set　forth　in　the　fifth



part。







I　begin；　then；　with　the　first　point；　and　warn　my　readers　to　make



an　accurate　distinction　　between　an　idea；　or　conception　of　the



mind；　and　the　images　of　things　which　we　imagine。　　　It　is　further



necessary　that　they　should　distinguish　between　idea　and　words；



whereby　we　　signify　things。　　These　threenamely；　images；　words；



and　ideasare　by　many　persons　either　　entirely　confused



together；　or　not　distinguished　with　sufficient　accuracy　or　care；



and　hence　　people　are　generally　in　ignorance；　how　absolutely



necessary　is　a　knowledge　of　this　doctrine　　of　the　will；　both　for



philosophic　purposes　and　for　the　wise　ordering　of　life。　　Those



who　　think　that　ideas　consist　in　images　which　are　formed　in　us　by



contact　with　external　bodies；　　persuade　themselves　that　the　ideas



of　those　things；　whereof　we　can　form　no　mental　picture；　　are　not



ideas；　but　only　figments；　which　we　invent　by　the　free　decree　of



our　will；　they　thus　　regard　ideas　as　though　they　were　inanimate



pictures　on　a　panel；　and；　filled　with　this　　misconception；　do　not



see　that　an　idea；　inasmuch　as　it　is　an　idea；　involves　an



affirmation　or　　negation。　　Again；　those　who　confuse　words　with



ideas；　or　with　the　affirmation　which　an　　idea　involves；　think



that　they　can　wish　something　contrary　to　what　they　feel；　affirm；



or　　deny。　　This　misconception　will　easily　be　laid　aside　by　one；



who　reflects　on　the　nature　of　　knowledge；　and　seeing　that　it　in



no　wise　involves　the　conception　of　extension；　will　therefore　



clearly　understand；　that　an　idea　（being　a　mode　of　thinking）　does



not　consist　in　the　image　of　　anything；　nor　in　words。　　The　essence



of　words　and　images　is　put　together　by　bodily　　motions；　which　in



no　wise　involve　the　conception　of　thought。







These　few　words　on　this　subject　will　suffice：　　I　will　therefore



pass　on　to　consider　the　　objections；　which　may　be　raised　against



our　doctrine。　　Of　these；　the　first　is　advanced　by　　those；　who



think　that　the　will　has　a　wider　scope　than　the　understanding；　and



that　therefore　　it　is　different　therefrom。　　The　reason　for　their



holding　the　belief；　that　the　will　has　wider　　scope　than　the



understanding；　is　that　they　assert；　that　they　have　no　need　of　an



increase　in　　their　faculty　of　assent；　that　is　of　affirmation　or



negation；　in　order　to　assent　to　an　infinity　of　　things　which　we



do　not　perceive；　but　that　they　have　need　of　an　increase　in　their



faculty　of　　understanding。　　The　will　is　thus　distinguished　from



the　intellect；　the　latter　being　finite　and　　the　former　infinite。　



Secondly；　it　may　be　objected　that　experience　seems　to　teach　us　



especially　clearly；　that　we　are　able　to　suspend　our　judgment



before　assenting　to　things　　which　we　perceive；　this　is　confirmed



by　the　fact　that　no　one　is　said　to　be　deceived；　in　so　　far　as　he



perceives　anything；　but　only　in　so　far　as　he　assents　or



dissents。







For　instance；　he　who　feigns　a　winged　horse；　does　not　therefore



admit　that　a　winged　horse　　exists；　that　is；　he　is　not　deceived；



unless　he　admits　in　addition　that　a　winged　horse　does　　exist。　



Nothing　therefore　seems　to　be　taught　more　clearly　by　experience；



than　that　the　will　　or　faculty　of　assent　is　free　and　different



from　the　faculty　of　understanding。　　Thirdly；　it　may　　be　objected



that　one　affirmation　does　not　apparently　contain　more　reality



than　another；　in　　other　words；　that　we　do　not　seem　to　need　for



affirming；　that　what　is　true　is　true；　any　　greater　power　than　for



affirming；　that　what　is　false　is　true。　　We　have；　however；　seen



that　　one　idea　has　more　reality　or　perfection　than　another；　for



as　objects　are　some　more　　excellent　than　others；　so　also　are　the



ideas　of　them　some　more　excellent　than　others；　this　　also　seems



to　point　to　a　difference　between　the　understanding　and　the　will。　



Fourthly；　it　　may　be　objected；　if　man　does　not　act　from　free



will；　what　will　happen　if　the　incentives　to　　action　are　equally



balanced；　as　in　the　case　of　Buridan's　ass？　　Will　he　perish　of



hunger　and　　thirst？　　If　I　say　that　he　would　not；　he　would　then



determine　his　own　action；　and　would　　consequently　possess　the



faculty　of　going　and　doing　whatever　he　liked。　　Other　objections　



might　also　be　raised；　but；　as　I　am　not　bound　to　put　in　evidence



everything　that　anyone　may　　dream；　I　will　only　set　myself　to　the



task　of　refuting　those　I　have　mentioned；　and　that　as　　briefly　as



possible。







To　the　first　objection　I　answer；　that　I　admit　that　the　will　has　a



wider　scope　than　the　　understanding；　if　by　the　un