the ethics(part ii)-第12章

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specie）。







》》》》》ProofIt　is　in　the　nature　of　reason　to　regard　things；　not



as　contingent；　but　as　　necessary　（II。　xliv。）。　　Reason　perceives



this　necessity　of　things　（II。　xli。）　trulythat　is　（I。　Ax。　　vi。）；



as　it　is　in　itself。　　But　（I。　xvi。）　this　necessity　of　things　is



the　very　necessity　of　the　eternal　　nature　of　God；　therefore；　it



is　in　the　nature　of　reason　to　regard　things　under　this　form　of　



eternity。　　We　may　add　that　the　bases　of　reason　are　the　notions



（II。　xxxviii。）；　which　answer　　to　things　common　to　all；　and　which



（II。　xxxvii。）　do　not　answer　to　the　essence　of　any　　particular



thing：　　which　must　therefore　be　conceived　without　any　relation　to



time；　under　a　　certain　form　of　eternity。







XLV。　Every　idea　of　every　body；　or　of　every　particular　thing



actually　existing；　necessarily　　involves　the　eternal　and　infinite



essence　of　God。







》》》》》ProofThe　idea　of　a　particular　thing　actually　existing



necessarily　involves　both　the　　existence　and　the　essence　of　the



said　thing　（II。　viii。）。　　Now　particular　things　cannot　be　



conceived　without　God　（I。　xv。）；　but；　inasmuch　as　（II。　vi。）　they



have　God　for　their　cause；　　in　so　far　as　he　is　regarded　under　the



attribute　of　which　the　things　in　question　are　modes；　　their　ideas



must　necessarily　involve　（I。　Ax。　iv。）　the　conception　of　the



attributes　of　those　　ideasthat　is　（I。　vi。）；　the　eternal　and



infinite　essence　of　God。　　Q。E。D。







*****NoteBy　existence　I　do　not　here　mean　durationthat　is；



existence　in　so　far　as　it　is　　conceived　abstractedly；　and　as　a



certain　form　of　quantity。　　I　am　speaking　of　the　very　nature　　of



existence；　which　is　assigned　to　particular　things；　because　they



follow　in　infinite　numbers　　and　in　infinite　ways　from　the　eternal



necessity　of　God's　nature　（I。　xvi。）。　　I　am　speaking；　I　　repeat；



of　the　very　existence　of　particular　things；　in　so　far　as　they　are



in　God。　　For　although　　each　particular　thing　be　conditioned　by



another　particular　thing　to　exist　in　a　given　way；　yet　　the　force



whereby　each　particular　thing　perseveres　in　existing　follows　from



the　eternal　　necessity　of　God's　nature　（cf。　I。　xxiv。　Cor。）。







XLVI。　　The　knowledge　of　the　eternal　and　infinite　essence　of　God



which　every　idea　　involves　is　adequate　and　perfect。







》》》》》ProofThe　proof　of　the　last　proposition　is　universal；　and



whether　a　thing　be　　considered　as　a　part　or　a　whole；　the　idea



thereof；　whether　of　the　whole　or　of　a　part　（by　　the　last　Prop。）；



will　involve　God's　eternal　and　infinite　essence。　　Wherefore；



that；　which　　gives　knowledge　of　the　eternal　and　infinite　essence



of　God；　is　common　to　all；　and　is　equally　　in　the　part　and　in　the



whole；　therefore　（II。　xxxviii。）　this　knowledge　will　be　adequate。　



　Q。E。D。







XLVII。　The　human　mind　has　an　adequate　knowledge　of　the　eternal



and　infinite　essence　of　　God。







》》》》》ProofThe　human　mind　has　ideas　（II。　xxii。）；　from　which　（II。



xxiii。）　it　perceives　　itself　and　its　own　body　（II。　xix。）　and



external　bodies　（II。　xvi。　Cor。　i。　and　II。　xvii。）　as　actually　



existing；　therefore　（II。　xlv。　and　xlvi。）　it　has　an　adequate



knowledge　of　the　eternal　and　　infinite　essence　of　God。　　Q。E。D。







*****NoteHence　we　see；　that　the　infinite　essence　and　the



eternity　of　God　are　known　to　　all。　　Now　as　all　things　are　in　God；



and　are　conceived　through　God；　we　can　from　this　　knowledge　infer



many　things；　which　we　may　adequately　know；　and　we　may　form　that



third　　kind　of　knowledge　of　which　we　spoke　in　the　note　to　II。



xl。；　and　of　the　excellence　and　use　of　　which　we　shall　have



occasion　to　speak　in　Part　V。　　Men　have　not　so　clear　a　knowledge



of　　God　as　they　have　of　general　notions；　because　they　are　unable



to　imagine　God　as　they　do　　bodies；　and　also　because　they　have



associated　the　name　God　with　images　of　things　that　　they　are　in



the　habit　of　seeing；　as　indeed　they　can　hardly　avoid　doing；



being；　as　they　are；　　men；　and　continually　affected　by　external



bodies。　　Many　errors；　in　truth；　can　be　traced　to　　this　head；



namely；　that　we　do　not　apply　names　to　things　rightly。　　For



instance；　when　a　man　　says　that　the　lines　drawn　from　the　centre



of　a　circle　to　its　circumference　are　not　equal；　he　　then；　at　all



events；　assuredly　attaches　a　meaning　to　the　word　circle　different



from　that　　assigned　by　mathematicians。　　So　again；　when　men　make



mistakes　in　calculation；　they　have　　one　set　of　figures　in　their



mind；　and　another　on　the　paper。　　If　we　could　see　into　their



minds；　　they　do　not　make　a　mistake；　they　seem　to　do　so；　because



we　think；　that　they　have　the　same　　numbers　in　their　mind　as　they



have　on　the　paper。　　If　this　were　not　so；　we　should　not　　believe



them　to　be　in　error；　any　more　than　I　thought　that　a　man　was　in



error；　whom　I　lately　　heard　exclaiming　that　his　entrance　hall　had



flown　into　a　neighbour's　hen；　for　his　meaning　　seemed　to　me



sufficiently　clear。　　Very　many　controversies　have　arisen　from　the



fact；　that　　men　do　not　rightly　explain　their　meaning；　or　do　not



rightly　interpret　the　meaning　of　others。　　　For；　as　a　matter　of



fact；　as　they　flatly　contradict　themselves；　they　assume　now　one



side；　　now　another；　of　the　argument；　so　as　to　oppose　the



opinions；　which　they　consider　mistaken　　and　absurd　in　their



opponents。







XLVIII。　In　the　mind　there　is　no　absolute　or　free　will；　but　the



mind　is　determined　to　wish　　this　or　that　by　a　cause；　which　has



also　been　determined　by　another　cause；　and　this　last　by　　another



cause；　and　so　on　to　infinity。







》》》》》ProofThe　mind　is　a　fixed　and　definite　mode　of　thought　（II。



xi。）；　therefore　it　cannot　　be　the　free　cause　of　its　actions　（I。



xvii。　Cor。　ii。）；　in　other　words；　it　cannot　have　an　absolute　



faculty　of　positive　or　negative　volition；　but　（by　I。　xxviii。）　it



must　be　determined　by　a　cause；　　which　has　also　been　determined　by



another　cause；　and　this　last　by　another；　&c。　　Q。E。D。







*****NoteIn　the　same　way　it　is　proved；　that　there　is　in　the



mind　no　absolute　faculty　of　　understanding；　desiring；　loving；　&c。　



Whence　it　follows；　that　these　and　similar　faculties　are　　either



entirely　fictitious；　or　are　merely　abstract　and　general　terms；



such　as　we　are　　accustomed　to　put　together　from　particular



things。　　Thus　the　intellect　and　the　will　stand　in　　the　same



relation　to　this　or　that　idea；　or　this　or　that　volition；　as



〃lapidity〃　to　this　or　that　　stone；　or　as　〃man〃　to　Peter　and



Paul。　　The　cause　which　leads　men　to　consider　themselves　　free　has



been　set　forth　in　the　Appendix　to　Part　I。　　But；　before　I　proceed



further；　I　would　　here　remark　that；　by　the　will　to　affirm　and



decide；　I　mean　the　faculty；　not　the　desire。　　I　　mean；　I　repeat；



the　faculty；　whereby　the　mind　affirms　or　denies　what　is　true　or



false；　not　　the　desire；　wherewith　the　mind　wishes　for　or　turns



away　from　any　given　thing。　　After　we　　have　proved；　that　these



faculties　of　ours　are　general　notions；　which　cannot　be



distinguished　　from　the　particular　instances　on　which　they　are



based；　we　must　inquire　whether　volitions　　themselves　are　anything



besides　the　ideas　of　things。　　We　must　inquire；　I　say；　whether



there　　is　in　the　mind　any　affirmation　or　negation　beyond　that；



which　the　idea；　in　so　far　as　it　is　an　　idea；　involves。　　On　which



subject　see　the　following　proposition；　and　II。　Def。　iii。；　lest



the　　idea　of　pictures　should　suggest　itself。　　For　by　ideas　I　do



not　mean　images　such　as　are　　formed　at　the　back　of　the　eye；　or　in



the　midst　of　the　brain；　but　the　conceptions　of　thought。







XLIX。　There　is　in　the　mind　no　volition　or　affirmation　and



negation；　save　that　which　an　　idea；　inasmuch　as　it　is　an　idea；