the commonwealth of oceana-第49章

按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！


or　the　prerogative　tribe；　consists　of　seven　deputies　（whereof　three　are　of　the　horse）　annually　elected　out　of　every　tribe　of　Oceana；　which　being　fifty；　amounts　to　150　horse　and　200　foot。　And　the　prerogative　consisting　of　three　of　these　lists；　consists　of　450　horse　and　600　foot；　besides　those　of　the　provinces　to　be　hereafter　mentioned；　by　which　means　the　overbalance　in　the　suffrage　remaining　to　the　foot　by　150　votes；　you　have　to　the　support　of　a　true　and　natural　aristocracy　the　deepest　root　of　a　democracy　that　has　been　ever　planted。　　　　　〃Wherefore　there　is　nothing　in　art　or　nature　better　qualified　for　the　result　than　this　assembly。　it　is　noted　out　of　Cicero　by　Machiavel；　'That　the　people；　though　they　are　not　so　prone　to　find　out　truth　of　themselves　as　to　follow　custom　or　run　into　error　yet　if　they　be　shown　truth；　they　not　only　acknowledge　and　embrace　it　very　suddenly；　but　are　the　most　constant　and　faithful　guardians　and　conservators　of　it。'　it　is　your　duty　and　office；　whereto　you　are　also　qualified　by　the　orders　of　this　commonwealth；　to　have　the　people　as　you　have　your　hawks　and　greyhounds；　in　leashes　and　slips；　to　range　the　fields　and　beat　the　bushes　for　them；　for　they　are　of　a　nature　that　is　never　good　at　this　sport；　but　when　you　spring　or　start　their　proper　quarry。　Think　not　that　they　will　stand　to　ask　you　what　it　is；　or　less　know　it　than　your　hawks　and　greyhounds　do　theirs；　but　presently　make　such　a　flight　or　course；　that　a　huntsman　may　as　well　undertake　to　run　with　his　dogs；　or　a　falconer　to　fly　with　his　hawk；　as　an　aristocracy　at　this　game　to　compare　with　the　people。　The　people　of　Rome　were　possessed　of　no　less　a　prey　than　the　empire　of　the　world；　when　the　nobility　turned　tails；　and　perched　among　daws　upon　the　tower　of　monarchy。　For　though　they　did　not　all　of　them　intend　the　thing；　they　would　none　of　them　endure　the　remedy；　which　was　the　agrarian。　　　　　〃But　the　prerogative　tribe　has　not　only　the　result；　but　is　the　supreme　judicature；　and　the　ultimate　appeal　in　this　commonwealth。　For　the　popular　government　that　makes　account　to　be　of　any　standing；　must　make　sure　in　the　first　place　of　the　appeal　to　the　people。　As　an　estate　in　trust　becomes　a　man's　own　if　he　be　not　answerable　for　it；　so　the　power　of　a　magistracy　not　accountable　to　the　people；　from　whom　it　was　received；　becoming　of　private　use；　the　commonwealth　loses　her　liberty　Wherefore　the　right　of　supreme　judicature　in　the　people　（Without　which　there　can　be　no　such　thing　as　popular　government）　is　confirmed　by　the　constant　practice　of　all　commonwealths；　as　that　of　Israel　in　the　cases　of　Achan；　and　of　the　tribe　of　Benjamin；　adjudged　by　the　congregation。　　　　　〃The　dicasterian；　or　court　called　the　heliaia　in　Athens；　which　（the　comitia　of　that　commonwealth　consisting　of　the　whole　people；　and　so　being　too　numerous　to　be　a　judicatory）　was　constituted　sometimes　of　500；　at　others　of　1；000；　or；　according　to　the　greatness　of　the　cause；　of　1；500；　elected　by　the　lot　out　of　the　whole　body　of　the　people；　had；　with　the　nine　Archons　that　were　presidents；　the　cognizance　of　such　causes　as　were　of　highest　importance　in　that　State。　The　five　ephors　in　Lacedaemon；　which　were　popular　magistrates；　might　question　their　kings；　as　appears　by　the　cases　of　Pausanias；　and　of　Agis；　who　being　upon　his　trial　in　this　court；　was　cried　to　by　his　mother　to　appeal　to　the　people；　as　Plutarch　has　it　in　his　life。　The　tribunes　of　the　people　of　Rome　（like；　in　the　nature　of　their　magistracy；　and　for　some　time　in　number；　to　the　ephors；　as　being；　according　to　Halicarnassus　and　Plutarch；　instituted　in　imitation　of　them）　had　power　to　summon　any　man；　his　magistracy　at　least　being　expired　（for　from　the　Dictator　there　lay　no　appeal）　to　answer　for　himself　to　the　people。　As　in　the　case　of　Coriolanus；　who　was　going　about　to　force　the　people；　by　withholding　corn　from　them　in　a　famine；　to　relinquish　the　magistracy　of　the　tribunes；　in　that　of　Spurius　Cassius　for　affecting　tyranny；　of　Marcus　Sergius　for　running　away　at　Veii；　of　Caius　Lucretius　for　spoiling　his　province；　of　Junius　Silanus　for　making　war　without　a　command　from　the　people　against　the　Cimbri；　with　divers　others。　And　the　crimes　of　this　nature　were　called　loesoe　majestatis；　or　high　treason。　Examples　of　such　as　were　arraigned　or　tried　for　peculation；　or　defraudation　of　the　commonwealth；　were　Marcus　Curius　for　intercepting　the　money　of　the　Samnites；　Salinator　for　the　unequal　division　of　spoils　to　his　soldiers；　Marcus　Posthumius　for　cheating　the　commonwealth　by　a　feigned　shipwreck。　Causes　of　these　two　kinds　were　of　a　more　public　nature；　but　the　like　power　upon　appeals　was　also　exercised　by　the　people　in　private　matters；　even　during　the　time　of　the　kings；　as　in　the　case　of　Horatius。　Nor　is　it　otherwise　with　Venice；　where　the　Doge　Loredano　was　sentenced　by　the　great　Council；　and　Antonio　Grimani；　afterward　doge；　questioned；　for　that　he；　being　admiral；　had　suffered　the　Turk　to　take　Lepanto　in　view　of　his　fleet。　　　　　〃Nevertheless；　there　lay　no　appeal　from　the　Roman　dictator　to　the　people；　which；　if　there　had；　might　have　cost　the　commonwealth　dear；　when　Spurius　Melius；　affecting　empire；　circumvented　and　debauched　the　tribunes：　whereupon　Titus　Quintus　Cincinnatus　was　created　Dictator；　who　having　chosen　Servilius　Ahala　to　be　his　lieutenant；　or　magister　equitum；　sent　him　to　apprehend　Melius；　whom；　while　he　disputed　the　commands　of　the　Dictator　and　implored　the　aid　of　the　people；　Ahala　cut　off　upon　the　place。　By　which　example　you　may　see　in　what　cases　the　dictator　may　prevent　the　blow　which　is　ready　sometimes　to　fall　ere　the　people　be　aware　of　the　danger。　Wherefore　there　lies　no　appeal　from　the　Dieci；　or　the　Council　of　Ten；　in　Venice；　to　the　Great　Council；　nor　from　our　Council　of　War　to　the　people。　For　the　way　of　proceeding　of　this　tribe；　or　the　ballot；　it　is；　as　was　once　said　for　all；　Venetian。　　　　　〃This　discourse　of　judicatories　whereupon　we　are　fallen；　brings　us　rather　naturally　than　of　design　from　the　two　general　orders　of　every　commonwealth；　that　is　to　say；　from　the　debating　part；　or　the　Senate；　and　the　resolving　part；　or　the　people；　to　the　third；　which　is　the　executive　part　or　the　magistracy；　whereupon　I　shall　have　no　need　to　dwell；　for　the　executive　magistrates　of　this　commonwealth　are　the　strategus　in　arms；　the　signory　in　their　several　courts；　as　the　chancery；　the　exchequer；　as　also　the　councils　in　divers　cases　within　their　instructions；　the　censors　as　well　in　their　proper　magistracy；　as　in　the　Council　of　Religion；　the　tribunes　in　the　government　of　the　prerogative；　and　that　judicatory；　and　the　judges　with　their　courts；　of　all　which　so　much　is　already　said　or　known　as　may　suffice。　　　　　〃The　Tuesday　lectures　or　orations　to　the　people　will　be　of　great　benefit　to　the　Senate；　the　prerogative；　and　the　whole　nation。　To　the　Senate；　because　they　will　not　only　teach　your　Senators　elocution；　but　keep　the　system　of　the　government　in　their　memories。　Elocution　is　of　great　use　to　your　Senators；　for　if　they　do　not　understand　rhetoric　（giving　it　at　this　time　for　granted　that　the　art　were　not　otherwise　good）　and　come　to　treat　with；　or　vindicate　the　cause　of　the　commonwealth　against　some　other　nation　that　is　good　at　it；　the　advantage　will　be　subject　to　remain　upon　the　merit　of　the　art；　and　not　upon　the　merit　of　the　cause。　Furthermore；　the　genius　or　soul　of　this　government　being　in　the　whole　and　in　every　part；　they　will　never　be　of　ability　in　determination　upon　any　particular；　unless　at　the　same　time　they　have　an　idea　of　the　whole。　That　this　therefore　must　be；　in　that　regard；　of　equal　benefit　to　the　prerogative；　is　plain；　though　these　have　a　greater　concernment　in　it。　For　this　commonwealth　is　the　estate　of　the　people；　and　a　man；　you　know；　though　he　be　virtuous；　yet　if　he　does　not　understand　his　estate；　may　run　out　or　be　cheated　of　it。　Last　of　all；　the　treasures　of　the　politics　will　by　this　means　be　so　opened；　rifled；　and　dispersed；　that　this　nation　will　as　soon　dote；　like　the　Indians；　upon　glass　beads；　as　disturb　your　government　with　whimsies　and　freaks　of　mother…wit；　or　suffer　themselves　to　be　stuttered　out　of　their　liberties。　There　is　not　any　reason　why　your　grandees；　your　wise　men　of　this　age；　that　laugh　out　and　openly　at　a　commonwealth　as　the　most　ridiculous　thing；　do　not　appear　to　be；　as　in　this　reg