the commonwealth of oceana-第2章
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mber of men； within the compass of the few or aristocracy； overbalance them； the empire （without the interposition of force） is a commonwealth。 If force be interposed in any of these three cases； it must either frame the government to the foundation； or the foundation to the government； or holding the government not according to the balance； it is not natural； but violent； and therefore if it be at the devotion of a prince； it is tyranny； if at the devotion of the few； oligarchy； or if in the power of the people； anarchy： Each of which confusions； the balance standing otherwise； is but of short continuance； because against the nature of the balance； which； not destroyed； destroys that which opposes it。 But there be certain other confusions； which； being rooted in the balance； are of longer continuance； and of worse consequence； as； first； where a nobility holds half the property； or about that proportion； and the people the other half； in which case； without altering the balance there is no remedy but the one must eat out the other； as the people did the nobility in Athens； and the nobility the people in Rome。 Secondly； when a prince holds about half the dominion； and the people the other half （which was the case of the Roman emperors； planted partly upon their military colonies and partly upon the Senate and the people）； the government becomes a very shambles； both of the princes and the people。 Somewhat of this nature are certain governments at this day； which are said to subsist by confusion。 In this case； to fix the balance is to entail misery； but in the three former； not to fix it is to lose the government。 Wherefore it being unlawful in Turkey that any should possess land but the Grand Seignior； the balance is fixed by the law； and that empire firm。 Nor； though the kings often sell was the throne of Oceana known to shake； until the statute of alienations broke the pillars； by giving way to the nobility to sell their estates。 While Lacedaemon held to the division of land made by Lycurgus； it was immovable； but； breaking that； could stand no longer。 This kind of law fixing the balance in lands is called agrarian； and was first introduced by God himself； who divided the land of Canaan to his people by lots； and is of such virtue that wherever it has held； that government has not altered； except by consent； as in that unparalleled example of the people of Israel； when being in liberty they would needs choose a king。 But without an agrarian law； government； whether monarchical； aristocratical； or popular； has no long lease。 As for dominion； personal or in money； it may now and then stir up a Melius or a Manlius； which； if the Commonwealth be not provided with some kind of dictatorian power； may be dangerous； though it has been seldom or never successful； because to property producing empire； it is required that it should have some certain root or foothold； which； except in land； it cannot have； being otherwise as it were upon the wing。 Nevertheless； in such cities as subsist mostly by trade； and have little or no land； as Holland and Genoa； the balance of treasure may be equal to that of land in the cases mentioned。 But Leviathan； though he seems to skew at antiquity； following his furious master Carneades； has caught hold of the public sword； to which he reduces all manner and matter of government； as； where he affirms this opinion （that any monarch receives his power by covenant； that is to say； upon conditions）〃 to proceed from the not understanding this easy truth； that covenants being but words and breath； have no power to oblige； contain； constrain； or protect any man； but what they have from the public sword。〃 But as he said of the law； that without this sword it is but paper； so he might have thought of this sword； that without a hand it is but cold iron。 The hand which holds this sword is the militia of a nation； and the militia of a nation is either an army in the field； or ready for the field upon occasion。 But an army is a beast that has a great belly； and must be fed： wherefore this will come to what pastures you have； and what pastures you have will come to the balance of property； without which the public sword is but a name or mere spitfrog。 Wherefore； to set that which Leviathan says of arms and of contracts a little straighter； he that can graze this beast with the great belly； as the Turk does his Timariots； may well deride him that imagines he received his power by covenant； or is obliged to any such toy。 It being in this case only that covenants are but words and breath。 But if the property of the nobility； stocked with their tenants and retainers； be the pasture of that beast； the ox knows his master's crib； and it is impossible for a king in such a constitution to reign otherwise than by covenant； or if he break it； it is words that come to blows。 〃But；〃 says he； 〃when an assembly of men is made sovereign； then no man imagines any such covenant to have part in the institution。〃 But what was that by Publicola of appeal to the people； or that whereby the people had their tribunes？ 〃Fie；〃 says he； 〃nobody is so dull as to say that the people of Rome made a covenant with the Romans； to hold the sovereignty on such or such conditions； which； not performed； the Romans might depose the Roman people。〃 In which there be several remarkable things； for he holds the Commonwealth of Rome to have consisted of one assembly； whereas it consisted of the Senate and the people； that they were not upon covenant； whereas every law enacted by them was a covenant between them； that the one assembly was made sovereign； whereas the people； who only were sovereign； were such from the beginning； as appears by the ancient style of their covenants or laws 〃The Senate has resolved； the people have decreed；〃 that a council being made sovereign； cannot be made such upon conditions； whereas the Decemvirs being a council that was made sovereign； was made such upon conditions； that all conditions or covenants making a sovereign being made； are void； whence it must follow that； the Decemviri being made； were ever after the lawful government of Rome； and that it was unlawful for the Commonwealth of Rome to depose the Decemvirs； as also that Cicero； if he wrote otherwise out of his commonwealth； did not write out of nature。 But to come to others that see more of this balance。 You have Aristotle full of it in divers places； especially where he says； that 〃immoderate wealth； as where one man or the few have greater possessions than the equality or the frame of the commonwealth will bear； is an occasion of sedition； which ends for the greater part in monarchy and that for this cause the ostracism has been received in divers places； as in Argos and Athens。 But that it were better to prevent the growth in the beginning； than； when it has got head； to seek the remedy of such an evil。〃 Machiavel has missed it very narrowly and more dangerously for not fully perceiving that if a commonwealth be galled by the gentry it is by their overbalance； he speaks of the gentry as hostile to popular governments； and of popular governments as hostile to the gentry； and makes us believe that the people in such are so enraged against them； that where they meet a gentleman they kill him： which can never be proved by any one example； unless in civil war； seeing that even in Switzerland the gentry are not only safe； but in honor。 But the balance； as I have laid it down； though unseen by Machiavel； is that which interprets him； and that which he confirms by his judgment in many others as well as in this place； where he concludes； 〃That he who will go about to make a commonwealth where there be many gentlemen； unless he first destroys them； undertakes an impossibility。 And that he who goes about to introduce monarchy where the condition of the people is equal； shall never bring it to pass； unless he cull out such of them as are the most turbulent and ambitious； and make them gentlemen or noblemen； not in name but in effect； that is； by enriching them with lands； castles； and treasures； that may gain them power among the rest； and bring in the rest to dependence upon themselves； to the end that； they maintaining their ambition by the prince； t
