the idea of justice in political economy-第9章
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further victories of justice。 By demanding a just distribution of
incomes; socialism has introduced nothing new; but has in
contrast to the errors which were created by materialistic
epigones in a short period of so…called philosophy of
enlightenment; only returned to the great traditions of all
idealistic social philosophy。 The error of socialism was simply
that it overlooked the difference between material and formal
justice; as well as the significance of other equally justified
social ideal conceptions; that it imagined the individual
conceptions of certain idealists of what is just; would suffice
to overthrow suddenly and immediately primeval institutions。 With
its crude excrescences it returned to standards of justice which
perhaps correspond to the first stages of civilization; certainly
to rough views; but not to refined conceptions of higher
morality。
Socialism can teach us not to demand a false justice; it
should never hinder us from fighting for a true justice。 History
tells us that progress has usually been tedious; it shows us just
as much that at length the greatest formal difficulties have been
overcome; that especially in the great epochs of faith in ideals
which rejuvenate and ennoble men; the juster right; the refined
morals have triumphed over the powers of egoism; of sluggishness;
of stupidity; and now better and juster institutions have grown
up。 There was a time when the demand for a just system of trade;
which is universally conceded to…day; appeared as an ideal far in
advance of the times。 Robberies; thefts; frauds; brawls in the
market…places; extortions of gifts were the older forms of
transferring property。 Here a thousand years' work in
civilization has developed; in connection with the progress of
reined conceptions of justice; the institutions of law; which
to…day govern and bind all intercourse as a matter of course。
The leading conceptions in this work of civilization in the
past and present do naturally not relate to the whole society and
all its purposes; nor to all qualities of men。 In every ordinary
barter two persons; whose other qualities are not conceded in
this relation; which is confined to this one barter; meet with
the purpose of advancing their mutual interests by the exchange
of certain goods。 This result is reached if they exchange values
essentially equal; if both sides make equal profits。 〃The giving
and the taking;〃 Herbart says; 〃everywhere presupposes
compensation; i。e。; equality of the given and the taken。〃
Conceding the standards of equality only; can there be any
dissent。 The savage sees equality in purely external
circumstances; in the fact that the furs just fill the kettle for
which he trades them。 The civilized man asks for equality of
money value; the formalist for the equal absence of fraud; force
and error。 The principle however; always remains the same。
Equality measured in some way is required。 And if the equality of
both sides required by the conventional standard exists; justice
is secured because the logical judgment and the moral test does
not bring the single agreement into relation with the total
distribution of incomes; with the total worthiness of the
persons。 Only a fool could require as a demand of justice; that
the grocer grade the price of a pound of coffee according to the
wealth of each customer; or that in a publishing contract the
publisher should pay to the author of an unsalable scientific
book a large sum because it is a work of great labor and skill。
The justice of a single bargain is the so…called exchanging
justice; as Trendelenburg in his admirable essays on Aristotle
has proved to be the real meaning of the great Stagaryte。 This
exchanging justice is nevertheless not in strict contrast to
distributive justice; it is only one of its subdivisions; which
concerts not the whole society and all its purposes; but simply a
part of them and an especial purpose。
As long as the value of every good thing is a different one
for each man; so long a certain inequality of profits will not
seem unjust。 Only when this equality oversteps certain bounds;
when its cause is not the free decision of a free man; does a
lively feeling of injustice arise and seek a legal remedy。 For
thousands of years the selfish impulses of those who in the
social struggle of competition are the stronger; have demanded
unconditional freedom of contract; and this demand is always
opposed by public conscience and the demand of the weaker; which
establishes the conception of justum pretium; which requires a
governmental regulation of prices; statutes on usury;
consideration for the 〃laesio enormis;〃 public control of abuses
in trade and traffic; a restriction of exploitation。 This
requirement disappears only when two real equals meet; who as a
rule derive equal benefit from their commercial relations。
The older economic school of Adam Smith; as we suggested in
our introduction; had found its ideal of justice exclusively in
the freedom of contracts。 Presuming that all men are by nature
equal; it demanded only freedom for these equal men; in the hope
that this would result in agreements about equal values with
equal profits for both parties。 It knew neither the social
classes nor the social institutions in their significance for
economic life; for it the social mechanism was composed
exclusively of the activity of individuals and their single
agreements。 And therefore it could not demand any other kind of
justice。 This was not wrong; but it was only a part of the 〃just〃
which it demanded。
We demand to…day above all; besides a just system of barter;
just economic institutions; i。e。; we demand that the complexes of
rules of morals and right which govern groups of men who live and
work together should harmonize in their results with those ideal
conceptions of justice which on the basis of our moral and
religious conceptions are prevalent to…day; or which are gaining
recognition。 We do not acknowledge any one of these institutions
to be above history; as having always existed or as necessity
everlasting。 We test the result of every one of them; and ask of
each: How did it originate; what conceptions of justice have
generated it; what necessity exists for it to…day?
To be sure we also know how to appreciate the value of the
institutions transmitted to us; we know that the sacred
traditions of the past fill our mind with awe; that even the form
of traditional law has a restraining effect on rough characters;
that a lasting condition of social peace is based on the greatest
possible restriction of formal breach of law。 We admit that
institutions must never disappear in form and substance; that
nations can never create anything wholly new; but must always
build on what exists。 In this lasting continuity of the whole we
have a guarantee that the struggle for that which is good and
just will not expire fruitlessly; though this would always
happen; if each generation had to begin this struggle anew; and
was not furnished with the inheritance of tried wisdom and
justice; contained in traditional institutions。 We admit that
every momentary condition of peace in society; as it is preserved
by an existing law of property; inheritance and some other
institutions; is more valuable than a dangerously unsettling war
for a juster law of property and inheritance; when the
traditional law still corresponds to the equilibrium of the
forces existing in society and to the prevalent ideal
conceptions。 In this case every struggle for more just laws is
for the time being hopeless and vain。 It can only harm and
destroy。 Even the most violent revolution can not replace the
mental transformation of men which is the precondition of a
juster law。 The essential point is always that the forces
themselves and the conceptions of justice have changed。 Then only
can a struggle succeed。
Because this will always be; we do not fear; like the
alarmists and the pusillanimous of all times; every struggle for
juster laws。 And on this account we do not see in every
manifestation of the self…esteem of the lower classes a simply
outrageous revolt against the doctrine of the natural