the idea of justice in political economy-第7章

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not　the　qualities　of　the　single　individual；　but　of　families　as　a
whole；　a　conception　which　decreases　more　and　more　with　higher
culture。　Inherited　wealth；　as　long　as　it　appears　necessarily　and
obviously　coupled　with　its　possessor；　is　under　some　conditions
regarded　as　a　just　standard　of　the　distribution　of　goods。　So　the
distribution　of　public　lands　according　to　the　possessions　in
cattle　and　real　estate　appeared　quite　just　to　many　a　day　laborer
and　〃kossaeth〃　in　the　eastern　provinces　of　Prussia；　while　to　one
who　knew　the　public　land　systems　in　France　or　southern　Germany　it
seemed　an　outrageous　injustice。
　　　　For　all　community　of　production；　labor　is　the　most　obvious
standard；　hence　perhaps　it　is　the　most　usual；　most　generally
comprehensible。　As　soon　as　it　becomes　necessary　to　compare　many
different　kinds　of　labor；　only　an　abstraction　totally　foreign　to
public　sentiment　will　conceive　the　idea　of　reducing　all　this
labor　to　mere　quantities　of　handiwork；　natural　public　sentiment
will　simply　value　more　highly　the　labor　which　requires　more
education　or　talent。
　　　　Those　qualities　will　always　be　most　highly　considered　which
serve　the　common　objects；　those　which　only　relate　to　the
individual　and　his　selfish　aims　are　less　esteemed。　Only　a
complete　misconception　therefore　could　establish　individual　needs
as　a　standard　of　distributing　justice。　Older　socialism　wisely
held　aloof　at　all　times　from　this　aberration。　Even　the　first
really　social…democratic　platform　in　Germany；　that　of　Eisenach　of
1869；　did　not　vet　venture　to　commit　such　a　folly。　The　progressive
victory　of　vulgarity　and　rudeness　first　demanded　in　the　Gotha
platform　of　1875　the　division　of　the　aggregate　labor　products
among　individuals　according　to　their　〃reasonable　needs。〃　The
proviso　of　reasonableness　was　intended　to　prevent　excesses；　it
does　not　remove　the　low　conception。　With　his　needs　a　man　serves
himself　only；　with　his　labor；　his　virtue；　his　accomplishments；　he
serves；　mankind；　and　these　determine　the　judgment　which　esteems
them　as　just。
　　　　When　the　great　social　communities　which　follow　the　most
various　interests　and　what　is　just　in　them　are　concerned；　the
attempt　will　always　be　made；　more　or　less；　to　weigh　the　different
qualities　and　accomplishments　of　men　in　their　result　and　in　their
connection　with　the　objects　of　the　community。　Talents　and
knowledge；　virtues　and　accomplishments；　merit　in　short　is
considered。　Moral　qualities　are　often　apparently　overlooked；
great　talents　whose　achievements　and　deeds　are　generally　visible
are　apparently　over…estimated。　But　only　because　one　is　more
noticed　than　the　other；　and　the　moral　judgment　which　values
individuals　according　to　what　they　are　to　the　whole　can　naturally
only　judge　by　what　it　sees。
　　　　And　therein　lies　the　contrast　between　moral　and　economic
value。　In　the　ordinary　economic　valuation　activities　and　products
have　value　in　the　same　measure；　as　individuals　covet　them　for　the
satisfaction　of　their　personal　needs。　In　the　moral　valuation；　on
which　the　judgment　as　to　justice　depends；　the　activities　of
individuals　receive　their　value；　according　as　they　serve　the
inherent　ends　of　the　whole。　True　justice；　says　Ihering；　is　a
balancing　between　consequences　and　acts；　which　is　weighed　equally
to　all　citizens　according　to　the　measure　of　the　value　of　these
acts　to　society。　Both　valuations　go　in　life　side　by　side；
combating　and　influencing　one　another。　The　one　rules　the　market；
the　other　moral　judgments　and　conceptions。　They　approach　each
other　as　mankind　grows　more　perfect。　Through　what　mechanism　the
arising　conflicts　are　lessened　and　mitigated；　we　still　have　to
discuss。

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　IV

　　　　If　in　the　economic　order　we　could　recognize　only　the　ruling
of　blind　forces；　of　selfish　interests；　natural　masses　and
mechanical　processes；　it　would　be　a　constant　battle；　a　chaotic
anarchy；　it　would　present　the　〃bellum　omnium　contra　omnes。〃　That
this　is　not　the　case　was　perceived　by　those　who　saw　in　the
exertion　of　egoism　the　only　motive　force　of　economic　life；　they
helped　themselves　over　the　inexplicable　conclusion　that　out　of
the　blind　struggle　of　selfish　individuals　peaceful　society　should
grow　out；　with　the　ideal　conception　of　a　pre…established　harmony
of　forces　as　in　the　conception　of　Leibnitz。　And　yet　any　impartial
glance　at　life　tells　us　that　this　harmony　does　not　exist；　but
that　it　is　striven　for　slowly　and　gradually。
　　　　No；　harmony　does　not　exist　per　se；　selfish　impulses　combat
each　other；　natural　masses　tend　to　destroy　each　other；　the
mechanical　action　of　natural　forces　interferes　relentlessly　still
to…day；　the　struggle　for　existence　is　to…day　still　carried　on　in
the　struggle　of　competition；　the　buoyancy　of　individual　activity
has　even　with　the　noblest　and　most　distinguished　men　a　flavor　of
egoism；　with　the　masses　it　is；　inwardly　curbed　indeed　by　the
moral　results　of　social　life；　the　potent　cause　of　most　actions。
While　struggle　and　strife　never　cease　they　do　not　preserve　the
same　character　throughout　the　course　of　history。　The　struggle
which　ended　in　annihilation；　in　subjugation；　turns　into　a
peaceful　contest　which　is　decided　by　an　umpire。　The　forms　of
dependence　grow　milder　and　more　human。　Class　government　grows
more　moderate。　Every　brutal　strength；　every　undue　assertion　of
superior　force　is　made　punishable　by　law。　Demand　and　supply；　as
they　confront　each　other　in　the　different　systems　of　custom　and
law；　are　quite　different　in　their　result。　In　short　all　emanations
of　egoism　are　moderated；　regulated　and　restrained　by　the　moral
cultivation　of　the　labor　of　many　thousand　years。　That　this　is　so
is　the　simple　consequence　of　those　ideal　conceptions　which
originate　in　social　life；　form　the　centre　of　all　religions；　all
systems　of　social　ethics；　all　morals　and　all　law。　And　in　the
realm　of　these　ideal　conceptions　the　idea　of　justice；　if　not　the
first　and　only　power；　is　none　the　less　one　of　the　most　important。
Others　of　equal　might　are　grouped　with　it。　Aside　from　the　idea　of
God；　of　immortality；　of　perfection　and　of　progress；　the　idea　of
justice　which　gives　each　one　his　share；　is　confronted　in　the
field　of　social　policy　by　some　other　ideas。　These　are　in　the
first　place　the　idea　of　community；　which　allots　to　the　whole　that
which　belongs　to　it；　which　regards　the　promotion　of　the　whole
more　than　the　rights　of　the　parts；　in　the　secund　place　the　idea
of　benevolence；　which　in　its　consciousness　of　community　gives
more　to　the　poor　man　than　he　can　justly　demand；　finally；　the　idea
of　liberty；　which　permits　each　part　to　act　freely；　placing
numerous　limits　upon　justice　and　the　community。　That　this　results
in　many　restrictions　upon　the　exercise　of　justice　we　will　here
only　suggest；　not　demonstrate。　But　the　fact　always　remains　that
the　constantly　growing　and　developing　conceptions　of　justice
extend　their　influence　daily　and　hourly　into　the　activity　of
practical　life；　that　in　the　form　of　moral　and　religious　sense　of
duty；　social　custom　and　actual　law；　they　regulate　and　modify　rude
forces　and　selfish　impulses。　The　conflict　between　interest　and
moral　ideas　will　of　course　never　cease；　but　only　be　moderated。
All　human　life　only　exists　under　the　presumption　of　this　never
ceasing　internal　combat。　There　are　always　claims　of　economic
justice　which　appear　to　be　only　bold　ideal　dreams；　but　there　are
always　many　which　have　conquered　in　life；　or　at　least　have
obtained　for　themselves　the　majorities；　the　leading　powers。　And
to　them　the　more　refined　economic　culture　owes　its　humane
character。
　　　　Practically　the　most　important　form　in　which　these　ideas
conquer　is　that　of　custom　and　of　law。　Without　these　formal　means
the　conceptions　and　judgments　of　justice　cannot　easily　be
realized；　cannot　easily　be　transmitted　from　generation　to
generation。　Custom　and　law　lend　permanence　and　stability　to　ideas
of　morality；　and　effect　the　agreement　of　men　about　that　which
ought　to　be。　From　the　moral　disposition　of　men　arise　rules　of
custom；　which　as　distinct　rules　of　life　curb　the　wild　play　of
passions　and　impulses。　Custom　is　that　which　we　regularly
practice；　originating　in　experience　and　recollection；　in　the
judicious　conception　of　common　purpose　and　in　moral　reflectio