three dialogues-第7章

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extension。　Now；　though　it　be　acknowledged　that　　and
；　consisting　merely　in　the　relation　which　other　extended
beings　have　to　the　parts　of　our　own　bodies；　do　not　really　inhere
in　the　substances　themselves；　yet　nothing　obliges　us　to　hold　the
same　with　regard　to　；　which　is　something
abstracted　from　　and　；　from　this　or　that　particular
magnitude　or　figure。　So　likewise　as　to　motion；　　and　
are　altogether　relative　to　the　succession　of　ideas　in　our　own
minds。　But；　it　doth　not　follow；　because　those　modifications　of
motion　exist　not　without　the　mind；　that　therefore　absolute　motion
abstracted　from　them　doth　not。

　　　　　。　Pray　what　is　it　that　distinguishes　one　motion；　or
one　part　of　extension；　from　another？　Is　it　not　something
sensible；　as　some　degree　of　swiftness　or　slowness；　some　certain
magnitude　or　figure　peculiar　to　each？

　　　　　。　I　think　so。

　　　　　。　These　qualities；　therefore；　stripped　of　all　sensible
properties；　are　without　all　specific　and　numerical　differences；
as　the　schools　call　them。

　　　　　。　They　are。

　　　　　。　That　is　to　say；　they　are　extension　in　general；　and
motion　in　general。

　　　　　。　Let　it　be　so。

　　　　　。　But　it　is　a　universally　received　maxim　that
。　How　then　can　motion　in
general；　or　extension　in　general；　exist　in　any　corporeal
substance？　｛193｝

　　　　　。　I　will　take　time　to　solve　your　difficulty。

　　　　　。　But　I　think　the　point　may　be　speedily　decided。
Without　doubt　you　can　tell　whether　you　are　able　to　frame　this　or
that　idea。　Now　I　am　content　to　put　our　dispute　on　this　issue。　If
you　can　frame　in　your　thoughts　a　distinct　　of
motion　or　extension；　divested　of　all　those　sensible　modes；　as
swift　and　slow；　great　and　small；　round　and　square；　and　the　like；
which　are　acknowledged　to　exist　only　in　the　mind；　I　will　then
yield　the　point　you　contend　for。　But　if　you　cannot；　it　will　be
unreasonable　on　your　side　to　insist　any　longer　upon　what　you　have
no　notion　of。

　　　　　。　To　confess　ingenuously；　I　cannot。

　　　　　。　Can　you　even　separate　the　ideas　of　extension　and
motion　from　the　ideas　of　all　those　qualities　which　they　who　make
the　distinction　term　？

　　　　　。　What！　is　it　not　an　easy　matter　to　consider　extension
and　motion　by　themselves；　abstracted　from　all　other　sensible
qualities？　Pray　how　do　the　mathematicians　treat　of　them？

　　　　　。　I　acknowledge；　Hylas；　it　is　not　difficult　to　form
general　propositions　and　reasonings　about　those　qualities；
without　mentioning　any　other；　and；　in　this　sense；　to　consider　or
treat　of　them　abstractedly。　But；　how　doth　it　follow　that；　because
I　can　pronounce　the　word　　by　itself；　I　can　form　the　idea
of　it　in　my　mind　exclusive　of　body？　or；　because　theorems　may　be
made　of　extension　and　figures；　without　any　mention　of　　or
；　or　any　other　sensible　mode　or　quality；　that　therefore　it
is　possible　such　an　abstract　idea　of　extension；　without　any
particular　size　or　figure；　or　sensible　quality；＇3　＇　＇should　be
distinctly　formed；　and　apprehended　by　the　mind？　Mathematicians
treat　of　quantity；　without　regarding　what　other　sensible。
qualities　it　is　attended　with；　as　being　altogether　indifferent　to
their　demonstrations。　But；　when　laying　aside　the　words；　they
contemplate　the　bare　ideas；　I　believe　you　will　find；　they　are　not
the　pure　abstracted　ideas　of　extension。

　　　　　。　But　what　say　you　to　？　May　not
abstracted　ideas　be　framed　by　that　faculty？

　　　　　。　Since　I　cannot　frame　abstract　ideas　at　all；　it　is
plain　I　cannot　frame　them　by　the　help　of　；　｛194｝
whatsoever　faculty　you　understand　by　those　words。　Besides；　not　to
inquire　into　the　nature　of　pure　intellect　and　its　spiritual
objects；　as　；　；　；　or　the　like；　thus　much
seems　manifest　　that　sensible　things　are　only　to　be　perceived
by　sense；　or　represented　by　the　imagination。　Figures；　therefore；
and　extension；　being　originally　perceived　by　sense；　do　not　belong
to　pure　intellect：　but；　for　your　farther　satisfaction；　try　if　you
can　frame　the　idea　of　any　figure；　abstracted　from　all
particularities　of　size；　or　even　from　other　sensible　qualities。

　　　　　。　Let　me　think　a　little　　I　do　not　find　that　I　can。

　　　　　。　And　can　you　think　it　possible　that　should　really
exist　in　nature　which　implies　a　repugnancy　in　its　conception？

　　　　　。　By　no　means。

　　　　　。　Since　therefore　it　is　impossible　even　for　the　mind
to　disunite　the　ideas　of　extension　and　motion　from　all　other
sensible　qualities；　doth　it　not　follow；　that　where　the　one　exist
there　necessarily　the　other　exist　likewise？

　　　　　。　It　should　seem　so。

　　　　　。　Consequently；　the　very　same　arguments　which　you
admitted　as　conclusive　against　the　Secondary　Qualities　are；
without　any　farther　application　of　force；　against　the　Primary
too。　Besides；　if　you　will　trust　your　senses；　is　it　not　plain　all
sensible　qualities　coexist；　or　to　them　appear　as　being　in　the
same　place？　Do　they　ever　represent　a　motion；　or　figure；　as　being
divested　of　all　other　visible　and　tangible　qualities？

　　　　　。　You　need　say　no　more　on　this　head。　I　am　free　to　own；
if　there　be　no　secret　error　or　oversight　in　our　proceedings
hitherto；　that　all　sensible　qualities　are　alike　to　be　denied
existence　without　the　mind。　But；　my　fear　is　that　I　have　been　too
liberal　in　my　former　concessions；　or　overlooked　some　fallacy　or
other。　In　short；　I　did　not　take　time　to　think。

　　　　　。　For　that　matter；　Hylas；　you　may　take　what　time　you
please　in　reviewing　the　progress　of　our　inquiry。　You　are　at
liberty　to　recover　any　slips　you　might　have　made；　or　offer
whatever　you　have　omitted　which　makes　for　your　first　opinion。

　　　　　。　One　great　oversight　I　take　to　be　this　　that　I　did
not　sufficiently　distinguish　the　　from　the　。
Now；　though　this　latter　may　not　exist　without　the　mind；　yet　it
will　not　thence　follow　that　the　former　cannot。

　　　　　。　What　object　do　you　mean？　the　object　of　the　senses？

　　　　　。　The　same。

　　　　　。　It　is　then　immediately　perceived？　｛195｝

　　　　　。　Right。

　　　　　。　Make　me　to　understand　the　difference　between　what　is
immediately　perceived　and　a　sensation。

　　　　　。　The　sensation　I　take　to　be　an　act　of　the　mind
perceiving；　besides　which；　there　is　something　perceived；　and　this
I　call　the　。　For　example；　there　is　red　and　yellow　on　that
tulip。　But　then　the　act　of　perceiving　those　colours　is　in　me
only；　and　not　in　the　tulip。

　　　　　。　What　tulip　do　you　speak　of？　Is　it　that　which　you
see？

　　　　　。　The　same。

　　　　　。　And　what　do　you　see　beside　colour；　figure；　and
extension？

　　　　　。　Nothing。

　　　　　。　What　you　would　say　then　is　that　the　red　and　yellow
are　coexistent　with　the　extension；　is　it　not？

　　　　　。　That　is　not　all；　I　would　say　they　have　a　real
existence　without　the　mind；　in　some　unthinking　substance。

　　　　　。　That　the　colours　are　really　in　the　tulip　which　I　see
is　manifest。　Neither　can　it　be　denied　that　this　tulip　may　exist
independent　of　your　mind　or　mine；　but；　that　any　immediate　object
of　the　senses；　　that　is；　any　idea；　or　combination　of　ideas　
should　exist　in　an　unthinking　substance；　or　exterior　to　
minds；　is　in　itself　an　evident　contradiction。　Nor　can　I　imagine
how　this　follows　from　what　you　said　just　now；　to　wit；　that　the
red　and　yellow　were　on　the　tulip　；　since　you　do　not
pretend　to　　that　unthinking　substance。

　　　　　。　You　have　an　artful　way；　Philonous；　of　diverting　our
inquiry　from　the　subject。

　　　　　。　I　see　you　have　no　mind　to　be　pressed　that　way。　To
return　then　to　your　distinction　between　　and　；
if　I　take　you　right；　you　distinguish　in　every　perception　two
things；　the　one　an　action　of　the　mind；　the　other　not。

　　　　　。　True。

　　　　　。　And　this　action　cannot　exist　in；　or　belong　to；　any
unthinking　thing；　but；　whatever　beside　is　implied　in　a　perception
may？　｛196｝

　　　　　。　That　is　my　meaning。

　　　　　。　So　that　if　there　was　a　perception　without　any　act　of
the　mind；　it　we