three dialogues-第4章

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thought　the　subject　of　sound。

　　　　　。　What　reason　is　there　for　that；　Hylas？

　　　　　。　Because；　when　any　motion　is　raised　in　the　air；　we
perceive　a　sound　greater　or　lesser；　according　to　the　air's
motion；　but　without　some　motion　in　the　air；　we　never　hear　any
sound　at　all。

　　　　　。　And　granting　that　we　never　hear　a　sound　but　when
some　motion　is　produced　in　the　air；　yet　I　do　not　see　how　you　can
infer　from　thence；　that　the　sound　itself　is　in　the　air。

　　　　　。　It　is　this　very　motion　in　the　external　air　that
produces　in　the　mind　the　sensation　of　。　For；　striking　on
the　drum　of　the　ear；　it　causeth　a　vibration；　which　by　the
auditory　nerves　being　communicated　to　the　brain；　the　soul　is
thereupon　affected　with　the　sensation　called　。

　　　　　。　What！　is　sound　then　a　sensation？

　　　　　。　I　tell　you；　as　perceived　by　us；　it　is　a　particular
sensation　in　the　mind。

　　　　　。　And　can　any　sensation　exist　without　the　mind？

　　　　　。　No；　certainly。

　　　　　。　How　then　can　sound；　being　a　sensation；　exist　in　the
air；　if　by　the　　you　mean　a　senseless　substance　existing
without　the　mind？

　　　　　。　You　must　distinguish；　Philonous；　between　sound　as　it
is　｛182｝　perceived　by　us；　and　as　it　is　in　itself；　or　（which　is
the　same　thing）　between　the　sound　we　immediately　perceive；　and
that　which　exists　without　us。　The　former；　indeed；　is　a　particular
kind　of　sensation；　but　the　latter　is　merely　a　vibrative　or
undulatory　motion　the　air。

　　　　　。　I　thought　I　had　already　obviated　that　distinction；
by　answer　I　gave　when　you　were　applying　it　in　a　like　case　before。
But；　to　say　no　more　of　that；　are　you　sure　then　that　sound　is
really　nothing　but　motion？

　　　　　。　I　am。

　　　　　。　Whatever　therefore　agrees　to　real　sound；　may　with
truth　be　attributed　to　motion？

　　　　　。　It　may。

　　　　　。　It　is　then　good　sense　to　speak　of　　as　of　a
thing　that　is　；　；　；　。

　　　　　。　　see　you　are　resolved　not　to　understand　me。　Is　it
not　evident　those　accidents　or　modes　belong　only　to　sensible
sound；　or　　the　common　acceptation　of　the　word；　but　not
to　　in　the　real　and　philosophic　sense；　which；　as　I　just
now　told　you；　is　nothing　but　a　certain　motion　of　the　air？

　　　　　。　It　seems　then　there　are　two　sorts　of　sound　　the
one　vulgar；　or　that　which　is　heard；　the　other　philosophical　and
real？

　　　　　。　Even　so。

　　　　　。　And　the　latter　consists　in　motion？

　　　　　。　I　told　you　so　before。

　　　　　。　Tell　me；　Hylas；　to　which　of　the　senses；　think　you；
the　idea　of　motion　belongs？　to　the　hearing？

　　　　　。　No；　certainly；　but　to　the　sight　and　touch。

　　　　　。　It　should　follow　then；　that；　according　to　you；　real
sounds　may　possibly　be　；　but　never　。

　　　　　。　Look　you；　Philonous；　you　may；　if　you　please；　make　a
jest　of　my　opinion；　but　that　will　not　alter　the　truth　of　things。
I　own；　indeed；　the　inferences　you　draw　me　into　sound　something
oddly；　but　common　language；　you　know；　is　framed　by；　and　for　the
use　of　the　vulgar：　we　must　not　therefore　wonder　if　expressions
adapted　to　exact　philosophic　notions　seem　uncouth　and　out　of　the
way。

　　　　　。　Is　it　come　to　that？　I　assure　you；　I　imagine　myself
to　have　gained　no　small　point；　since　you　make　so　light　of
departing　from　common　phrases　and　opinions；　it　being　a　main　part
of　our　inquiry；　to　examine　whose　notions　are　widest　of　the　｛183｝
common　road；　and　most　repugnant　to　the　general　sense　of　the
world。　But；　can　you　think　it　no　more　than　a　philosophical
paradox；　to　say　that　；　and　that　the
idea　of　them　is　obtained　by　some　other　sense？　And　is　there
nothing　in　this　contrary　to　nature　and　the　truth　of　things？

　　　　　。　To　deal　ingenuously；　I　do　not　like　it。　And；　after　the
concessions　already　made；　I　had　as　well　grant　that　sounds　too
have　no　real　being　without　the　mind。

　　　　　。　And　I　hope　you　will　make　no　difficulty　to
acknowledge　the　same　of　。

　　　　　。　Pardon　me：　the　case　of　colours　is　very　different。　Can
anything　be　plainer　than　that　we　see　them　on　the　objects？

　　　　　。　The　objects　you　speak　of　are；　I　suppose；　corporeal
Substances　existing　without　the　mind？

　　　　　。　They　are。

　　　　　。　And　have　true　and　real　colours　inhering　in　them？

　　　　　。　Each　visible　object　hath　that　colour　which　we　see　in
it。

　　　　　。　How！　is　there　anything　visible　but　what　we　perceive
by　sight？

　　　　　。　There　is　not。

　　　　　。　And；　do　we　perceive　anything　by　sense　which　we　do
not　perceive　immediately？

　　　　　。　How　often　must　I　be　obliged　to　repeat　the　same　thing？
I　tell　you；　we　do　not。

　　　　　。　Have　patience；　good　Hylas；　and　tell　me　once　more；
whether　there　is　anything　immediately　perceived　by　the　senses；
except　sensible　qualities。　I　know　you　asserted　there　was　not；　but
I　would　now　be　informed；　whether　you　still　persist　in　the　same
opinion。

　　　　　。　I　do。

　　　　　。　Pray；　is　your　corporeal　substance　either　a　sensible
quality；　or　made　up　of　sensible　qualities？

　　　　　。　What　a　question　that　is！　who　ever　thought　it　was？

　　　　　。　My　reason　for　asking　was；　because　in　saying；　；　you　make
visible　objects　to　be　corporeal　substances；　which　implies　either
that　corporeal　substances　are　sensible　qualities；　or　else　that
there　is　something　besides　sensible　qualities　perceived　by　sight：
but；　as　this　point　was　formerly　agreed　between　us；　and　is　still
maintained　by　you；　it　is　a　clear　consequence；　that　your
　is　nothing　distinct　from　。　｛184｝

　　　　　。　You　may　draw　as　many　absurd　consequences　as　you
please；　and　endeavour　to　perplex　the　plainest　things；　but　you
shall　never　persuade　me　out　of　my　senses。　I　clearly　understand　my
own　meaning。

　　　　　。　I　wish　you　would　make　me　understand　it　too。　But；
since　you　are　unwilling　to　have　your　notion　of　corporeal
substance　examined；　I　shall　urge　that　point　no　farther。　Only　be
pleased　to　let　me　know；　whether　the　same　colours　which　we　see
exist　in　external　bodies；　or　some　other。

　　　　　。　The　very　same。

　　　　　。　What！　are　then　the　beautiful　red　and　purple　we　see
on　yonder　clouds　really　in　them？　Or　do　you　imagine　they　have　in
themselves　any　other　form　than　that　of　a　dark　mist　or　vapour？

　　　　　。　I　must　own；　Philonous；　those　colours　are　not　really
in　the　clouds　as　they　seem　to　be　at　this　distance。　They　are　only
apparent　colours。

　　　　　。　　call　you　them？　how　shall　we　distinguish
these　apparent　colours　from　real？

　　　　　。　Very　easily。　Those　are　to　be　thought　apparent　which；
appearing　only　at　a　distance；　vanish　upon　a　nearer　approach。

　　　　　。　And　those；　I　suppose；　are　to　be　thought　real　which
are　discovered　by　the　most　near　and　exact　survey。

　　　　　。　Right。

　　　　　。　Is　the　nearest　and　exactest　survey　made　by　the　help
of　a　microscope；　or　by　the　naked　eye？

　　　　　。　By　a　microscope；　doubtless。

　　　　　。　But　a　microscope　often　discovers　colours　in　an
object　different　from　those　perceived　by　the　unassisted　sight。
And；　in　case　we　had　microscopes　magnifying　to　any　assigned
degree；　it　is　certain　that　no　object　whatsoever；　viewed　through
them；　would　appear　in　the　same　colour　which　it　exhibits　to　the
naked　eye。

　　　　　。　And　what　will　you　conclude　from　all　this？　You　cannot
argue　that　there　are　really　and　naturally　no　colours　on　objects：
because　by　artificial　managements　they　may　be　altered；　or　made　to
vanish。

　　　　　。　I　think　it　may　evidently　be　concluded　from　your　own
concessions；　that　all　the　colours　we　see　with　our　naked　eyes　are
only　apparent　as　those　on　the　clouds；　since　they　vanish　upon　a
more　close　and　accurate　inspection　which　is　afforded　us　by　a
microscope。　Then'　as　to　what　you　say　by　way　of　prevention：　｛185｝
I　ask　you　whether　the　real　and　natural　state　of　an　object　is
better　discovered　by　a　very　sharp　and　piercing　sight；　or　by　one
which　is　less　sharp？

　　　　　。　By　the　former　without　doubt。

　　　　　。　Is　it　not　plain　from　　that　microscop