three dialogues-第3章

按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！


it？

　　　　　。　That　is　no　difficult　matter。　You　know　the　least　pain
cannot　exist　unperceived；　whatever；　therefore；　degree　of　heat　is
a　pain　exists　only　in　the　mind。　But；　as　for　all　other　degrees　of
heat；　nothing　obliges　us　to　think　the　same　of　them。

　　　　　。　I　think　you　granted　before　that　no　unperceiving
being　was　capable　of　pleasure；　any　more　than　of　pain。

　　　　　。　I　did。　｛178｝

　　　　　。　And　is　not　warmth；　or　a　more　gentle　degree　of　heat
than　what　causes　uneasiness；　a　pleasure？

　　　　　。　What　then？

　　　　　。　Consequently；　it　cannot　exist　without　the　mind　in　an
unperceiving　substance；　or　body。

　　　　　。　So　it　seems。

　　　　　。　Since；　therefore；　as　well　those　degrees　of　heat　that
are　not　painful；　as　those　that　are；　can　exist　only　in　a　thinking
substance；　may　we　not　conclude　that　external　bodies　are
absolutely　incapable　of　any　degree　of　heat　whatsoever？

　　　　　。　On　second　thoughts；　I　do　not　think　it　so　evident　that
warmth　is　a　pleasure　as　that　a　great　degree　of　heat　is　a　pain。

　　　　　。　　do　not　pretend　that　warmth　is　as　great　a
pleasure　as　heat　is　a　pain。　But；　if　you　grant　it　to　be　even　a
small　pleasure；　it　serves　to　make　good　my　conclusion。

　　　　　。　I　could　rather　call　it　an　。　It　seems　to　be
nothing　more　than　a　privation　of　both　pain　and　pleasure。　And　that
such　a　quality　or　state　as　this　may　agree　to　an　unthinking
substance；　I　hope　you　will　not　deny。

　　　　　。　If　you　are　resolved　to　maintain　that　warmth；　or　a
gentle　degree　of　heat；　is　no　pleasure；　I　know　not　how　to　convince
you　otherwise　than　by　appealing　to　your　own　sense。　But　what　think
you　of　cold？

　　　　　。　The　same　that　I　do　of　heat。　An　intense　degree　of　cold
is　a　pain；　for　to　feel　a　very　great　cold；　is　to　perceive　a　great
uneasiness：　it　cannot　therefore　exist　without　the　mind；　but　a
lesser　degree　of　cold　may；　as　well　as　a　lesser　degree　of　heat。

　　　　　。　Those　bodies；　therefore；　upon　whose　application　to
our　own；　we　perceive　a　moderate　degree　of　heat；　must　be　concluded
to　have　a　moderate　degree　of　heat　or　warmth　in　them；　and　those；
upon　whose　application　we　feel　a　like　degree　of　cold；　must　be
thought　to　have　cold　in　them。

　　　　　。　They　must。

　　　　　。　Can　any　doctrine　be　true　that　necessarily　leads　a
man　into　an　absurdity？

　　　　　。　Without　doubt　it　cannot。

　　　　　。　Is　it　not　an　absurdity　to　think　that　the　same　thing
should　be　at　the　same　time　both　cold　and　warm？

　　　　　。　It　is。

　　　　　。　Suppose　now　one　of　your　hands　hot；　and　the　other
cold；　and　that　they　are　both　at　once　put　into　the　same　vessel　of
｛179｝　water；　in　an　intermediate　state；　will　not　the　water　seem
cold　to　one　hand；　and　warm　to　the　other？

　　　　　。　It　will。

　　　　　。　Ought　we　not　therefore；　by　your　principles；　to
conclude　it　is　really　both　cold　and　warm　at　the　same　time；　that
is；　according　to　your　own　concession；　to　believe　an　absurdity？

　　　　　。　I　confess　it　seems　so。

　　　　　。　Consequently；　the　principles　themselves　are　false；
since　you　have　granted　that　no　true　principle　leads　to　an
absurdity。

　　　　　。　But；　after　all；　can　anything　be　more　absurd　than　to
say；　？

　　　　　。　To　make　the　point　still　clearer；　tell　me　whether；　in
two　cases　exactly　alike；　we　ought　not　to　make　the　same　judgment？

　　　　　。。　We　ought。

　　　　　。　When　a　pin　pricks　your　finger；　doth　it　not　rend　and
divide　the　fibres　of　your　flesh？

　　　　　。　It　doth。

　　　　　。　And　when　a　coal　burns　your　finger；　doth　it　any　more？

　　　　　。　It　doth　not。

　　　　　。　Since；　therefore；　you　neither　judge　the　sensation
itself　occasioned　by　the　pin；　nor　anything　like　it　to　be　in　the
pin；　you　should　not；　conformably　to　what　you　have　now　granted；
judge　the　sensation　occasioned　by　the　fire；　or　anything　like　it；
to　be　in　the　fire。

　　　　　。　Well；　since　it　must　be　so；　I　am　content　to　yield　this
point；　and　acknowledge　that　heat　and　cold　are　only　sensations
existing　in　our　minds。　But　there　still　remain　qualities　enough　to
secure　the　reality　of　external　things。

　　　　　。　But　what　will　you　say；　Hylas；　if　it　shall　appear
that　the　case　is　the　same　with　regard　to　all　other　sensible
qualities；　and　that　they　can　no　more　be　supposed　to　exist　without
the　mind；　than　heat　and　cold？

　　　　　。　Then　indeed　you　will　have　done　something　to　the
purpose；　but　that　is　what　I　despair　of　seeing　proved。

　　　　　。　Let　us　examine　them　in　order。　What　think　you　of
；　do　they　exist　without　the　mind；　or　no？

　　　　　。　Can　any　man　in　his　senses　doubt　whether　sugar　is
sweet；　or　wormwood　bitter？

　　　　　。　Inform　me；　Hylas。　Is　a　sweet　taste　a　particular　kind
of　pleasure　or　pleasant　sensation；　or　is　it　not？　｛180｝

　　　　　。　It　is。

　　　　　。　And　is　not　bitterness　some　kind　of　uneasiness　or
pain？

　　　　　。　I　grant　it。

　　　　　。　If　therefore　sugar　and　wormwood　are　unthinking
corporeal　substances　existing　without　the　mind；　how　can　sweetness
and　bitterness；　that　is；　Pleasure　and　pain；　agree　to　them？

　　　　　。　Hold；　Philonous；　I　now　see　what　it　was　delude　time。
You　asked　whether　heat　and　cold；　sweetness　at　were　not　particular
sorts　of　pleasure　and　pain；　to　which　simply；　that　they　were。
Whereas　I　should　have　thus　distinguished：　those　qualities；　as
perceived　by　us；　are　pleasures　or　pair　existing　in　the　external
objects。　We　must　not　therefore　conclude　absolutely；　that　there　is
no　heat　in　the　fire；　or　sweetness　in　the　sugar；　but　only　that
heat　or　sweetness；　as　perceived　by　us；　are　not　in　the　fire　or
sugar。　What　say　you　to　this？

　　　　　。　I　say　it　is　nothing　to　the　purpose。　Our　discourse
proceeded　altogether　concerning　sensible　things；　which　you
defined　to　be；　。　Whatever　other　qualities；　therefore；　you　speak　of　as
distinct　from　these；　I　know　nothing　of　them；　neither　do　they　at
all　belong　to　the　point　in　dispute。　You　may；　indeed；　pretend　to
have　discovered　certain　qualities　which　you　do　not　perceive；　and
assert　those　insensible　qualities　exist　in　fire　and　sugar。　But
what　use　can　be　made　of　this　to　your　present　purpose；　I　am　at　a
loss　to　conceive。　Tell　me　then　once　more；　do　you　acknowledge　that
heat　and　cold；　sweetness　and　bitterness　（meaning　those　qualities
which　are　perceived　by　the　senses）；　do　not　exist　without　the
mind？

　　　　　。　I　see　it　is　to　no　purpose　to　hold　out；　so　I　give　up
the　cause　as　to　those　mentioned　qualities。　Though　I　profess　it
sounds　oddly；　to　say　that　sugar　is　not　sweet。

　　　　　。　But；　for　your　farther　satisfaction；　take　this　along
with　you：　that　which　at　other　times　seems　sweet；　shall；　to　a
distempered　palate；　appear　bitter。　And；　nothing　can　be　plainer
than　that　divers　persons　perceive　different　tastes　in　the　same
food；　since　that　which　one　man　delights　in；　another　abhors。　And
how　could　this　be；　if　the　taste　was　something　really　inherent　in
the　food？

　　　　　。　I　acknowledge　I　know　not　how。

　　　　　。　In　the　next　place；　　are　to　be　considered。
And；　with　regard　to　these；　I　would　fain　know　whether　what　hath
｛181｝　been　said　of　tastes　doth　not　exactly　agree　to　them？　Are
they　not　so　many　pleasing　or　displeasing　sensations？

　　　　　。　They　are。

　　　　　。　Can　you　then　conceive　it　possible　that　they　should
exist　in　an　unperceiving　thing？

　　　　　。　I　cannot。

　　　　　。　Or；　can　you　imagine　that　filth　and　ordure　affect
those　brute　animals　that　feed　on　them　out　of　choice；　with　the
same　smells　which　we　perceive　in　them？

　　　　　。　By　no　means。

　　　　　。　May　we　not　therefore　conclude　of　smells；　as　of　the
other　forementioned　qualities；　that　they　cannot　exist　in　any　but
a　perceiving　substance　or　mind？

　　　　　。　I　think　so。

　　　　　。　Then　as　to　；　what　must　we　think　of　them：　are
they　accidents　really　inherent　in　external　bodies；　or　not？

　　　　　。　That　they　inhere　not　in　the　sonorous　bodies　is　plain
from　hence：　because　a　bell　struck　in　the　exhausted　receiver　of　an
air…pump　sends　forth　no　sound。　The　air；　therefore；　must　be
thought　the　subject　of　sound。

　　　　　。　What　reason　is　there　for　that；　Hylas？