three dialogues-第26章

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mention　that　the　apprehension　of　a　distant　Deity　naturally
disposes　men　to　a　negligence　in　their　moral　actions；　which　they
would　be　more　cautious　of；　in　case　they　thought　Him　immediately
present；　and　acting　on　their　minds；　without　the　interposition　of
Matter；　or　unthinking　second　causes。　　Then　in　：
what　difficulties　concerning　entity　in　abstract；　substantial
forms；　hylarchic　principles；　plastic　natures；　substance　and
accident；　principle　of　individuation；　possibility　of　Matter's
thinking；　origin　of　ideas；　the　manner　how　two　independent
substances　so　widely　different　as　；　should
mutually　operate　on　each　other？　what　difficulties；　I　say；　and
endless　disquisitions；　concerning　these　and　innumerable　other　the
like　points；　do　we　escape；　by　supposing　only　Spirits　and　ideas？　…
…　Even　the　　themselves；　if　we　take　away　the　absolute
existence　of　extended　things；　become　much　more　clear　and　easy；
the　most　shocking　paradoxes　and　intricate　speculations　in　those
sciences　depending　on　the。　infinite　divisibility　of　finite
extension；　which　depends　on　that　supposition　　But　what　need　is
there　to　insist　on　the　particular　sciences？　Is　not　that
opposition　to　all　science　whatsoever；　that　frenzy　of　the　ancient
and　modern　Sceptics；　built　on　the　same　foundation？　Or　can　you
produce　so　much　as　one　argument　against　the　reality　of　corporeal
things；　or　in　behalf　of　that　avowed　utter　ignorance　of　their
natures；　which　doth　not　suppose　their　reality　to　consist　in　an
external　absolute　existence？　Upon　this　supposition；　indeed；　the
objections　from　the　change　of　colours　in　a　pigeon's　neck；　or　the
appearance　of　the　broken　oar　in　the　water；　must　be　allowed　to
have　weight。　But　these　and　the　like　objections　vanish；　if　we　do
not　maintain　the　being　of　absolute　external　originals；　but　place
the　reality　of　things　in　ideas；。　fleeting　indeed；　and　changeable；
　however；　not　changed　at　random；　but　according　to　the　fixed
order　of　nature。　For；　herein　consists　that　constancy　and　truth　of
things　which　secures　all　the　concerns　of　life；　and　distinguishes
that　which　is　real　from　the　　the　fancy。
｛259｝

　　　　　。　I　agree　to　all　you　have　now　said。；　and　must　own　that
nothing　can　incline　me　to　embrace　your　opinion　more　than　the
advantages　I　see　it　is　attended　with。　I　am　by　nature　lazy；　and
this　would　be　a　mighty　abridgment　in　knowledge。　What　doubts；　what
hypotheses；　what　labyrinths　of　amusement；　what　fields　of
disputation；　what　an　ocean　of　false　learning；　may　be　avoided　by
that　single　notion　of　！

　　　　　。　After　all；　is　there　anything　farther　remaining　to　be
done？　You　may　remember　you　promised　to　embrace　that　opinion　which
upon　examination　should　appear　most　agreeable　to　Common　Sense　and
remote　from　Scepticism。　This；　by　your　own　confession；　is　that
which　denies　Matter；　or　the　　existence　of　corporeal
things。　Nor　is　this　all；　the　same　notion　has　been　proved　several
ways；　viewed　in　different　lights；　pursued　in　its　consequences；
and　all　objections　against　it　cleared。　Can　there　be　a　greater
evidence　of　its　truth？　or　is　it　possible　it　should　have　all　the
marks　of　a　true　opinion　and　yet　be　false？

　　　　　。　I　own　myself　entirely　satisfied　for　the　present　in
all　respects。　But；　what　security　can　I　have　that　I　shall　still
continue　the　same　full　assent　to　your　opinion；　and　that　no
unthought…of　objection　or　difficulty　will　occur　hereafter？

　　　　　。　Pray；　Hylas；　do　you　in　other　cases；　when　a　point　is
once　evidently　proved；　withhold　your　consent　on　account　of
objections　or　difficulties　it　may　be　liable　to？　Are　the
difficulties　that　attend　the　doctrine　of　incommensurable
quantities；　of　the　angle　of　contact；　of　the　asymptotes　to　curves；
or　the　like；　sufficient　to　make　you　hold　out　against　mathematical
demonstration？　Or　will　you　disbelieve　the　Providence　of　God；
because　there　may　be　some　particular　things　which　you　know　not
how　to　reconcile　with　it？　If　there　are　difficulties　；　there　are　at　the　same　time　direct　and　evident
proofs　of　it。　But　for　the　existence　of　Matter　there　is　not　one
proof；　and　far　more　numerous　and　insurmountable　objections　lie
against　it。　But　where　are　those　mighty　difficulties　you　insist
on？　Alas！　you　know　not　where　or　what　they　are；　something　which
may　possibly　occur　hereafter。　If　this　be　a　sufficient　pretence
for　withholding　your　full　assent；　you　should　never　yield　it　to
any　proposition；　how　free　soever　from　exceptions；　how　clearly　and
solidly　soever　demonstrated。

　　　　　。　You　have　satisfied　me；　Philonous。

　　　　　。　But；　to　arm　you　against　all　future　objections；　do
but　consider：　That　which　bears　equally　hard　on　two　contradictory
｛260｝　opinions　can　be　proof　against　neither。　Whenever；　therefore；
any　difficulty　occurs；　try　if　you　can　find　a　solution　for　it　on
the　hypothesis　of　the　。　Be　not　deceived　by　words；
but　sound　your　own　thoughts。　And　in　case　you　cannot　conceive　it
easier　by　the　help　of　；　it　is　plain　it　can　be　no
objection　against　。　Had　you　proceeded　all　along　by
this　rule；　you　would　probably　have　spared　yourself　abundance　of
trouble　in　objecting；　since　of　all　your　difficulties　I　challenge
you　to　shew　one　that　is　explained　by　Matter：　nay；　which　is　not
more　unintelligible　with　than　without　that　supposition；　and
consequently　makes　rather　　for　it。　You　should
consider；　in　each　particular；　whether　the　difficulty　arises　from
the　…。　If　it　doth　not；　you　might　as
well　argue　from　the　infinite　divisibility　of　extension　against
the　Divine　prescience；　as　from　such　a　difficulty　against
。　And　yet；　upon　recollection；　I　believe　you　will
find　this　to　have　been　often；　if　not　always；　the　case。　You　should
likewise　take　heed　not　to　argue　on　a　。　One　is
apt　to　say　　The　unknown　substances　ought　to　be　esteemed　real
things；　rather　than　the　ideas　in　our　minds：　and　who　can　tell　but
the　unthinking　external　substance　may　concur；　as　a　cause　or
instrument；　in　the　productions　of　our　ideas？　But　is　not　this
proceeding　on　a　supposition　that　there　are　such　external
substances？　And　to　suppose　this；　is　it　not　begging　the　question？
But；　above　all　things；　you　should　beware　of　imposing　on　yourself
by　that　vulgar　sophism　which　is　called　。　You
talked　often　as　if　you　thought　I　maintained　the　non…existence　of
Sensible　Things。　Whereas　in　truth　no　one　can　be　more　thoroughly
assured　of　their　existence　than　I　am。　And　it　is　you　who　doubt；　I
should　have　said；　positively　deny　it。　Everything　that　is　seen；
felt；　heard；　or　any　way　perceived　by　the　senses；　is；　on　the
principles　I　embrace；　a　real　being；　but　not　on　yours。　Remember；
the　Matter　you　contend　for　is　an　Unknown　Somewhat　（if　indeed　it
may　be　termed　）；　which　is　quite　stripped　of　all
sensible　qualities；　and　can　neither　be　perceived　by　sense；　nor
apprehended　by　the　mind。　Remember　I　say；　that　it　is　not　any
object　which　is　hard　or　soft；　hot　or　cold；　blue　or　white；　round
or　square；　&c。　For　all　these　things　I　affirm　do　exist。　Though
indeed　I　deny　they　have　an　existence　distinct　from　being
perceived；　or　that　they　exist　out　of　all　minds　whatsoever。　Think
on　these　points；　let　them　be　attentively　considered　and　still
kept　in　view。　Otherwise　you　will　not　comprehend　the　state　of　the
question；　without　which　your　objections　｛261｝　will　always　be　wide
of　the　mark；　and；　instead　of　mine；　may　possibly　be　directed　（as
more　than　once　they　have　been）　against　your　own　notions。

　　　　　。　I　must　needs　own；　Philonous；　nothing　seems　to　have
kept　me　from　agreeing　with　you　more　than　this　same　。　In　denying　Matter；。　at　first；　glimpse　I　am　tempted　to
imagine　you　deny　the　things　we　see　and　feel：　but；　upon　reflexion；
find　there　is　no　ground　for　it。　What　think　you；　therefore；　of
retaining　the　name　；　and　applying　it　to　？　This　may　be　done　without　any　change　in　your　sentiments：
and；　believe　me；　it　would　be　a　means　of　reconciling　them　to　some
persons　who　may　be　more　shocked　at　an　innovation　in　words　than　in
opinion。

　　　　　。　With　all　my　heart：　retain　the　word