three dialogues-第23章

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should　say　it　was　not　the　　house。　　would　we　not；　for　all
this；　perfectly　agree　in　our　thoughts　of　the　house；　considered　in
itself？　And　would　not　all　the　difference　consist　in　a　sound？　If
you　should　say；　We　differed　in　our　notions；　for　that　you　super…
added　to　your　idea　of　the　house　the　simple　abstracted　idea　of
identity；　whereas　I　did　not；　I　would　tell　you；　I　know　not　what
you　mean　by　；　and　should　desire
you　to　look　into　your　own　thoughts；　and　be　sure　you　understood
yourself。　　Why　so　silent；　Hylas？　Are　you　not　yet　satisfied　men
may　dispute　about　identity　and　diversity；　without　any　real
difference　in　their　thoughts　and　opinions；　abstracted　from　names？
Take　this　farther　reflexion　with　you：　that　whether　Matter　be
allowed　to　exist　or　no；　the　case　is　exactly　the　same　as　to　the
point　in　hand。　For　the　Materialists　themselves　acknowledge　what
we　immediately　perceive　by　our　senses　to　be　our　own　ideas。　Your
difficulty；　therefore；　that　no　two　see　the　same　thing；　makes
equally　against　the　Materialists　and　me。

　　　　　。　＇Ay；　Philonous；＇＇10＇　But　they　suppose　an　external
archetype；　to　which　referring　their　several　ideas　they　may　truly
be　said　to　perceive　the　same　thing。

　　　　　。　And　（not　to　mention　your　having　discarded　those
archetypes）　so　may　you　suppose　an　external　archetype　on　my
principles；　　；　；　：　though
indeed　it　must　be'　supposed　to　exist　in　that　Mind　which
comprehends　all　things；　but　then；　this　serves　all　the　ends　of
；　as　well　as　if　it　existed　out　of　a　mind。　And　I　am　sure
you　yourself　will　not　say　it　is　less　intelligible。

　　　　　。　You　have　indeed　clearly　satisfied　me　　either　that
there　is　no　difficulty　at　bottom　in　this　point；　or；　if　there　be；
that　it　makes　equally　against　both　opinions。

　　　　　。　But　that　which　makes　equally　against　two
contradictory　opinions　can　be　a　proof　against　neither。

　　　　　。　I　acknowledge　it。　But；　after　all；　Philonous；　when　I
consider　｛249｝　the　substance　of　what　you　advance　against
；　it　amounts　to　no　more　than　this：　We　are　sure　that
we　really　see；　hear；　feel；　in　a　word；　that　we　are　affected　with
sensible　impressions。

　　　　　。　And　how　are　　concerned　any　farther？　I　see　this
cherry；　I　feel　it；　I　taste　it：　and　I　am　sure　　cannot　be
seen；　or　felt；　or。　tasted：　it　is　therefore　red。　Take　away　the
sensations　of　softness；　moisture；　redness；　tartness；　and　you　take
away　the　cherry；　since　it　is　not　a　being　distinct　from
sensations。　A　cherry；　I　say；　is　nothing　but　a　congeries　of
sensible　impressions；　or　ideas　perceived　by　various　senses：　which
ideas　are　united　into　one　thing　（or　have　one　name　given　them）　by
the　mind；　because　they　are　observed　to　attend　each　other。　Thus；
when　the　palate　is　affected　with　such　a　particular　taste；　the
sight　is　affected　with　a　red　colour；　the　touch　with　roundness；
softness；　&c。　Hence；　when　I　see；　and　feel；　and　taste；　in　such
sundry　certain　manners；　I　am　sure　the　cherry　exists；　or　is　real；
its　reality　being　in　my　opinion　nothing　abstracted　from　those
sensations。　But　if　by　the　word　　you；　mean　an　unknown
nature；　distinct　from　all　those　sensible　qualities；　and　by　its
　something　distinct　from　its　being　perceived；　then；
indeed；　I　own；　neither　you　nor　I；　nor　any　one　else；　can　be　sure
it　exists。

　　　　　。　But；　what　would　you　say；　Philonous；　if　I　should　bring
the　very　same　reasons　against　the　existence　of　sensible　things
；　which　you　have　offered　against　their　existing　？

　　　　　。　When　I　see　your　reasons；　you　shall　hear　what　I　have
to　say　；to　them。

　　　　　。　Is　the　mind　extended　or　unextended？

　　　　　。　Unextended；　without　doubt。

　　　　　。　Do　you　say　the　things　you　perceive　are　in　your　mind？

　　　　　。　They　are。

　　　　　。　Again；　have　I　not　heard　you　speak　of　sensible
impressions？

　　　　　。　I　believe　you　may。

　　　　　。　Explain　to　me　now；　0　Philonous！　how　it　is　possible
there　should　be　room　for　all　those　trees　and　houses　to　exist　in
your　mind。　Can　extended　things　be　contained　in　that　which　is
unextended？　Or；　are　we　to　imagine　impressions　made　on　a　thing
void　of　all　solidity？　You　cannot　say　objects　are　in　your　mind；　as
books　in　your　study：　or　that　things　are　imprinted　on　it；　as　the
figure　of　a　seal　upon　wax。　In　what　sense；　therefore；　are　we　to
understand　those　expressions？　Explain　me　this　if　you　can：　and　I
shall　then　be　able　to　answer　all　those　queries　you　formerly　put
to　me　about　my　。

　　　　　。　Look　you；　Hylas；　when　I　speak　of　objects　as　existing
in　the　mind；　or　imprinted　on　the　senses；　I　would　not　be
understood　in　the　gross　literal　sense；　as　when　bodies　are　said　to
exist　in　a　place；　or　a　seal　to　make　an　impression　upon　wax。　My
meaning　is　only　that　the　mind　comprehends　or　perceives　them；　and
that　it　is　affected　from　without；　or　by　some　being　distinct　from
itself。　This　is　my　explication　of　your　difficulty；　and　how　it　can
serve　to　make　your　tenet　of　an　unperceiving　material　
intelligible；　I　would　fain　know。

　　　　　。　Nay；　if　that　be　all；　I　confess　I　do　not　see　what　use
can　be　made　of　it。　But　are　you　not　guilty　of　some　abuse　of
language　in　this？

　　　　　。　None　at　all。　It　is　no　more　than　common　custom；　which
you　know　is　the　rule　of　language；　hath　authorised：　nothing　being
more　usual；　than　for　philosophers　to　speak　of　the　immediate
objects　of　the　understanding　as　things　existing　in　the　mind。　'Nor
is　there　anything　in　this　but　what　is　conformable　to　the　general
analogy　of　language；　most　part　of　the　mental　operations　being
signified　by　words　borrowed　from　sensible　things；　as　is　plain　in
the　terms　；　reflect；　；　&。；　which；　being
applied　to　the　mind；　must　not　be　taken　in　their　gross；　original
sense。

　　　　　。　You　have；　I　own；　satisfied　me　in　this　point。　But
there　still　remains　one　great　difficulty；　which　I　know　not　how
you　will　get　over。　And；　indeed；　it　is　of　such　importance　that　if
you　could　solve　all　others；　without　being　able　to　find　a　solution
for　this；　you　must　never　expect　to　make　me　a　proselyte　to　your
principles。

　　　　　。　Let　me　know　this　mighty　difficulty。

　　　　　。　The　Scripture　account　of　the　creation　is　what　appears
to　me　utterly　irreconcilable　with　your　notions。　Moses　tells　us　of
a　creation：　a　creation　of　what？　of　ideas？　No；　certainly；　but　of
things；　of　real　things；　solid　corporeal　substances。　Bring　your
principles　to　agree　with　this；　and　I　shall　perhaps　agree　with
you。

　　　　　。　Moses　mentions　the　sun；　moon；　and　stars；　earth　and
sea；　plants　and　animals。　That　all　these　do　really　exist；　and　were
in　the　beginning　created　by　God；　I　make　no　question。　｛251｝　If　by
　you　mean　fictions　and　fancies　of　the　mind；　then　these　are
no　ideas。　If　by　　you　mean　immediate　objects　of　the
understanding；　or　sensible　things；　which　cannot　exist
unperceived；　or　out　of　a　mind；　then　these　things　are　ideas。　But
whether　you　do　or　do　not　call　them　；　　matters　little。
The　difference　is　only　about　a　name。　And；　whether　that　name　be
retained　or　rejected；　the　sense；　the　truth；　and　reality　of　things
continues　the　same。　In　common　talk；　the　objects　of　our　senses　are
not　termed　；　but　。　Call　them　so　still：　provided
you　do　not　attribute　to　them　any　absolute　external　existence；　and
I　shall　never　quarrel　with　you　for　a　word。　The　creation；
therefore；　I　allow　to　have　been　a　creation　of　things；　of　
things。　Neither　is　this　in　the　least　inconsistent　with　my
principles；　as　is　evident　from　what　I　have　now　said；　and　would
have　been　evident　to　you　without　this；　if　you　had　not　forgotten
what　had　been　so　often　said　before。　But　as　for　solid　corporeal
substances；　I　desire　you　to　show　where　Moses　makes　any　mention　of
them；　and；　if　they　should　be　mentioned　by　him；　or　any　other
inspired　writer；　it　would　still　be　incumbent　on　you　to　shew　those
words　were　not　taken　in　the　vulgar　acceptation；　for　things
falling　under　our　senses；　but　in　the　philosophic　acceptation；　for
Matter；　or　；　。
When　you　have　proved　these　points；　then　（and　not　til