three dialogues-第22章

按键盘上方向键 ← 或 → 可快速上下翻页，按键盘上的 Enter 键可回到本书目录页，按键盘上方向键 ↑ 可回到本页顶部！
————未阅读完？加入书签已便下次继续阅读！


incomplete；　otherwise　than　upon　your　supposition　　that　Matter
｛245｝　is　an　essential　part　of　all　corporeal　things。　We　both；
therefore；　agree　in　this；　that　we　perceive　only　sensible　forms：
but　herein　we　differ　　you　will　have　them　to　be　empty
appearances；　I；　real　beings。　In　short；　you　do　not　trust　your
senses；　I　do。

　　　　　。　You　say　you　believe　your　senses；　and　seem　to　applaud
yourself　that　in　this　you　agree　with　the　vulgar。　According　to
you；　therefore；　the　true　nature　of　a　thing　is　discovered　by　the
senses。　If　so；　whence　comes　that　disagreement？　Why　is　not　the
same　figure；　and　other　sensible　qualities；　perceived　all　manner
of　ways？　and　why　should　we　use　a　microscope　the　better　to
discover　the　true　nature　of　a　body；　if　it　were　discoverable　to
the　naked　eye？

　　　　　。　Strictly　speaking；　Hylas；　we　do　not　see　the　same
object　that　we　feel；　neither　is　the　same　object　perceived　by　the
microscope　which　was　by　the　naked　eye。　But；　in　case　every
variation　was　thought　sufficient　to　constitute　a　new　kind　of
individual；　the　endless　number　of　confusion　of　names　would　render
language　impracticable。　Therefore；　to　avoid　this；　as　well　as
other　inconveniences　which　are　obvious　upon　a　little　thought；　men
combine　together　several　ideas；　apprehended　by　divers　senses；　or
by　the　same　sense　at　different　times；　or　in　different
circumstances；　but　observed；　however；　to　have　some　connexion　in
nature；　either　with　respect　to　co…existence　or　succession；　all
which　they　refer　to　one　name；　and　consider　as　one　thing。　Hence　it
follows　that　when　I　examine；　by　my　other　senses；　a　thing　I　have
seen；　it　is　not　in　order　to　understand　better　the　same　object
which　I　had　perceived　by　sight；　the　object　of　one　sense　not　being
perceived　by　the　other　senses。　And；　when　I　look　through　a
microscope；　it　is　not　that　I　may　perceive　more　clearly　what　I
perceived　already　with　my　bare　eyes；　the　object　perceived　by　the
glass　being　quite　different　from　the　former。　But；　in　both　cases；
my　aim　is　only　to　know　what　ideas　are　connected　together；　and　the
more　a　man　knows　of　the　connexion　of　ideas；　the　more　he　is　said
to　know　of　the　nature　of　things。　What；　therefore；　if　our　ideas
are　variable；　what　if　our　senses　are　not　in　all　circumstances
affected　with　the　same　appearances。　It　will　not　thence　follow
they　are　not　to　be　trusted；　or　that　they　are　inconsistent　either
with　themselves　or　anything　else：　except　it　be　with　your
preconceived　notion　of　（I　know　not　what）　one　single；　unchanged；
unperceivable；　real　Nature；　marked　by　each　name。　Which　prejudice
seems　to　have　taken　its　rise　from　not　rightly　｛246｝　understanding
the　common　language　of　men；　speaking　of　several　distinct　ideas　as
united　into　one　thing　by　the　mind。　And；　indeed；　there　is　cause　to
suspect　several　erroneous　conceits　of　the　philosophers　are　owing
to　the　same　original：　while　they　began　to　build　their　schemes　not
so　much　on　notions　as　on　words；　which　were　framed　by　the　vulgar；
merely　for　conveniency　and　dispatch　in　the　common　actions　of
life；　without　any　regard　to　speculation。

　　　　　。　Methinks　I　apprehend　your　meaning。

　　　　　。　It　is　your　opinion　the　ideas　we　perceive　by　our
senses　are　not　real　things；　but　images　or　copies　of　them。　Our
knowledge；　therefore；　is　no　farther　real　than　as　our　ideas　are
the　true　　of　those　。　But；　as　these
supposed　originals　are　in　themselves　unknown；　it　is　impossible　to
know　how　far　our　ideas　resemble　them；　or　whether　they　resemble
them　at　all。　We　cannot；　therefore；　be　sure　we　have　any　real
knowledge。　Farther；　as　our　ideas　are　perpetually　varied；　without
any　change　in　the　supposed　real　things；　it　necessarily　follows
they　cannot　all　be　true　copies　of　them：　or；　if　some　are　and
others　are　not；　it　is　impossible　to　distinguish　the　former　from
the　latter。　And　this　plunges　us　yet　deeper　in　uncertainty。　Again；
when　we　consider　the　point；　we　cannot　conceive　how　any　idea；　or
anything　like　an　idea；　should　have　an　absolute　existence　out　of　a
mind：　nor　consequently；　according　to　you；　how　there　should　be　any
real　thing　in　nature。　The　result　of　；all　which　is　that　we　are
thrown　into　the　most　hopeless　and　abandoned　scepticism。　Now；　give
me　leave　to　ask　you；　First；　Whether　your　referring　ideas　to
certain　absolutely　existing　unperceived　substances；　as　their
originals；　be　not　the　source　of　all　this　scepticism？　Secondly；
whether　you　are　informed；　either　by　sense　or　reason；　of　the
existence　of　those　unknown　originals？　And；　in　case　you　are　not；
whether　it　be　not　absurd　to　suppose　them？　Thirdly；　Whether；　upon
inquiry；　you　find　there　is　anything　distinctly　conceived　or　meant
by　the　？　Lastly；　Whether；　the　premises　considered；　it　be　not
the　wisest　way　to　follow　nature；　trust　your　senses；　and；　laying
aside　all　anxious　thought　about　unknown　natures　or　substances；
admit　with　the　vulgar　those　for　real　things　which　are　perceived
by　the　senses？

　　　　　。　For　the　present；　I　have　no　inclination　to　the
answering　part。　I　would　much　rather　see　how　you　can　get　over　what
follows。　Pray　are　not　the　objects　perceived　by　the　｛247｝　
of　one；　likewise　perceivable　to　others　present？　If　there　were　a
hundred　more　here；　they　would　all　see　the　garden；　the　trees；　and
flowers；　as　I　see　them。　But　they　are　not　in　the　same　manner
affected　with　the　ideas　I　frame　in　my　。　Does　not
this　make　a　difference　between　the　former　sort　of　objects　and　the
latter？

　　　　　。　I　grant　it　does。　Nor　have　I　ever　denied　a　difference
between　the　objects　of　sense　and　those　of　imagination。　But　what
would　you　infer　from　thence？　You　cannot　say　that　sensible　objects
exist　unperceived；　because　they　are　perceived　by　many。

　　　　　。　I　own　I　can　make　nothing　of　that　objection：　but　it
hath　led　me　into　another。　Is　it　not　your　opinion　that　by　our
senses　we　perceive　only　the　ideas　existing　in　our　minds？

　　　　　。　It　is。

　　　　　。　But　the　　idea　which　is　in　my　mind　cannot　be　in
yours；　or　in　any　other　mind。　Doth　it　not　therefore　follow；　from
your　principles；　that　no　two　can　see　the　same　thing？　And　is　not
this　highly；　absurd？

　　　　　。　If　the　term　　be　taken　in　the　vulgar
acceptation；　it　is　certain　（and　not　at　all　repugnant　to　the
principles　I　maintain）　that　different　persons　may　perceive　the
same　thing；　or　the　same　thing　or　idea　exist　in　different　minds。
Words　are　of　arbitrary　imposition；　and；　since　men　are　used　to
apply　the　word　　where　no　distinction　or　variety　is
perceived；　and　I　do　not　pretend　to　alter　their　perceptions；　it
follows　that；　as　men　have　said　before；　；　so　they　may；　upon　like　occasions；　still　continue　to　use
the　same　phrase；　without　any　deviation　either　from　propriety　of
language；　or　the　truth　of　things。　But；　if　the　term　　be　used
in　the　acceptation　of　philosophers；　who　pretend　to　an　abstracted
notion　of　identity；　then；　according　to　their　sundry　definitions
of　this　notion　（for　it　is　not　yet　agreed　wherein　that　philosophic
identity　consists）；　it　may　or　may　not　be　possible　for　divers
persons　to　perceive　the　same　thing。　But　whether　philosophers
shall　think　fit　to　　a　thing　the　　no；　is；　I
conceive；　of　small　importance。　Let　us　suppose　several　men
together；　all　endued　with　the　same　faculties；　and　consequently
affected　in　like　sort　by　their　senses；　and　who　had　yet　never
known　the　use　of　language；　they　would；　without　question；　agree　in
their　perceptions。　Though　perhaps；　when　they　came　to　the　use　of
speech；　some　regarding　the　uniformness　of　what　was　perceived；
might　call　it　the　　thing：　others；　especially　｛248｝
regarding　the　diversity　of　persons　who　perceived；　might　choose
the　denomination　of　　things。　But　who　sees　not　that　all
the　dispute　is　about　a　word？　to　wit；　whether。　what　is　perceived
by　different　persons　may　yet　have　the　term　　applied　to　it？
Or；　suppose　a　house；　whose　walls　or　outward　shell　remaining
unaltered；　the　chambers　are　all　pulled　down；　and　new　ones　built
in　their　place；　and　that　you　should　call　this　the　；　and　I
should　say　it　was　not　the　　house。　　would　we　not；　for　all
this；　perfectly　agree　in　our　thoughts　of　the　h