three dialogues-第16章

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by　；　or　by　its　。　This　indeed　is　surprising；
and　the　more　so　because　it　is　altogether　voluntary　＇and　of　your
own　head＇；＇6＇　you　not　being　led　to　it　by　any　one　reason；　for　I
challenge　you　to　shew　me　that　thing　in　nature　which　needs　Matter
to　explain　or　account　for　it。

　　　　　。　　of　things　cannot　be　maintained　without
supposing　the　existence　of　Matter。　And　is　not　this；　think　you；　a
good　reason　why　I　should　be　earnest　in　its　defence？

　　　　　。　The　reality　of　things！　What　things？　sensible　or
intelligible？

　　　　　。　Sensible　things。

　　　　　。　My　glove　for　example？

　　　　　。　That；　or　any　other　thing　perceived　by　the　senses。

　　　　　。　But　to　fix　on　some　particular　thing。　Is　it　not　a
sufficient　evidence　to　me　of　the　existence　of　this　；　that
I　see　it；　and　feel　it；　and　wear　it？　Or；　if　this　will　not　do；　how
is　it　possible　I　should　be　assured　of　the　reality　of　this　thing；
which　I　actually　see　in　this　place；　by　supposing　that　some
unknown　thing；　which　I　never　did　or　can　see；　exists　after　an
unknown　manner；　in　an　unknown　place；　or　in　no　place　at　all？　How
can　the　supposed　reality　of　that　which　is　intangible　be　a　proof
that　anything　tangible　really　exists？　Or；　of　that　which　is
invisible；　that　any　visible　thing；　or；　in　general　of　anything
which　is　imperceptible；　that　a　perceptible　exists？　Do　but　explain
this　and　I　shall　think　nothing　too　hard　for　you。

　　　　　。　Upon　the　whole；　I　am　content　to　own　the　existence　of
matter　is　highly　improbable；　but　the　direct　and　absolute
impossibility　of　it　does　not　appear　to　me。

　　　　　。　But　granting　Matter　to　be　possible；　yet；　upon　that
account　merely；　it　can　have　no　more　claim　to　existence　than　a
golden　mountain；　or　a　centaur。

　　　　　。　I　acknowledge　it；　but　still　you　do　not　deny　it　is
possible；　and　that　which　is　possible；　for　aught　you　know；　may
actually　exist。

　　　　　。　I　deny　it　to　be　possible；　and　have；　if　I　mistake
not；　｛225｝　evidently　proved；　from　your　own　concessions；　that　it
is　not。　In　the　common　sense　of　the　word　；　is　there　any
more　implied　than　an　extended；　solid；　figured；　moveable
substance；　existing　without　the　mind？　And　have　not　you
acknowledged；　over　and　over；　that　you　have　seen　evident　reason
for　denying　the　possibility　of　such　a　substance？

　　　　　。　True；　but　that　is　only　one　sense　of　the　term
。

　　　　　。　But　is　it　not　the　only　proper　genuine　received
sense？　And；　if　Matter；　in　such　a　sense；　be　proved　impossible；　may
it　not　be　thought　with　good　grounds　absolutely　impossible？　Else
how　could　anything　be　proved　impossible？　Or；　indeed；　how　could
there　be　any　proof　at　all　one　way　or　other；　to　a　man　who　takes
the　liberty　to　unsettle　and　change　the　common　signification　of
words？

　　　　　。　I　thought　philosophers　might　be　allowed　to　speak　more
accurately　than　the　vulgar；　and　were　not　always　confined　to　the
common　acceptation　of　a　term。

　　　　　。　But　this　now　mentioned　is　the　common　received　sense
among　philosophers　themselves。　But；　not　to　insist　on　that；　have
you　not　been　allowed　to　take　Matter　in　what　sense　you　pleased？
And　have　you　not　used　this　privilege　in　the　utmost　extent；
sometimes　entirely　changing；　at　others　leaving　out；　or　putting
into　the　definition　of　it　whatever；　for　the　present；　best　served
your　design；　contrary　to　all　the　known　rules　of　reason　and　logic？
And　hath　not　this　shifting；　unfair　method　of　yours　spun　out　our
dispute　to　an　unnecessary　length；　Matter　having　been　particularly
examined；　and　by　your　own　confession　refuted　in　each　of　those
senses？　And　can　any　more　be　required　to　prove　the　absolute
impossibility　of　a　thing；　than　the　proving　it　impossible　in　every
particular　sense　that　either　you　or　any　one　else　understands　it
in？

　　　　　。　But　I　am　not　so　thoroughly　satisfied　that　you　have
proved　the　impossibility　of　Matter；　in　the　last　most　obscure
abstracted　and　indefinite　sense。

　　　　　。。　When　is　a　thing　shewn　to　be　impossible？

　　　　　。　When　a　repugnancy　is　demonstrated　between　the　ideas
comprehended　in　its　definition。

　　　　　。　But　where　there　are　no　ideas；　there　no　repugnancy
can　be　demonstrated　between　ideas？

　　　　　。　I　agree　with　you。

　　　　　。　Now；　in　that　which　you　call　the　obscure　indefinite
sense　of　the　word　；　it　is　plain；　by　your　own　confession；
there　｛226｝　was　included　no　idea　at　all；　no　sense　except　an
unknown　sense；　which　is　the　same　thing　as　none。　You　are　not；
therefore；　to　expect　I　should　prove　a　repugnancy　between　ideas；
where　there　are　no　ideas；　or　the　impossibility　of　Matter　taken　in
an　　sense；　that　is；　no　sense　at　all。　My　business　was
only　to　shew　you　meant　；　and　this　you　were　brought　to
own。　So　that；　in　all　your　various　senses；　you　have　been　shewed
either　to　mean　nothing　at　all；　or；　if　anything；　an　absurdity。　And
if　this　be　not　sufficient　to　prove　the　impossibility　of　a　thing；
I　desire　you　will　let　me　know　what　is。

　　　　　。　I　acknowledge　you　have　proved　that　Matter　is
impossible；　nor　do　I　see　what　more　can　be　said　in　defence　of　it。
But；　at　the　same　time　that　I　give　up　this；　I　suspect　all　my　other
notions。　For　surely　none　could　be　more　seemingly　evident　than
this　once　was：　and　yet　it　now　seems　as　false　and　absurd　as　ever
it　did　true　before。　But　I　think　we　have　discussed　the　point
sufficiently　for　the　present。　The　remaining　part　of　the　day　I
would　willingly　spend　in　running　over　in　my　thoughts　the　several
heads　of　this　morning's　conversation；　and　tomorrow　shall　be　glad
to　meet　you　here　again　about　the　same　time。

　　　　　。　　will　not　fail　to　attend　you。　｛227｝

　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　THE　THIRD　DIALOGUE

　　　　　　Tell　me；　Hylas；＇7＇　what　are　the　fruits　of
yesterday's　meditation？　Has　it　confirmed　you　in　the　same　mind　you
were　in　at　parting？　or　have　you　since　seen　cause　to　change　your
opinion？

　　　　　。　Truly　my　opinion　is　that　all　our　opinions　are　alike
vain　and　uncertain。　What　we　approve　to…day；　we　condemn　to…morrow。
We　keep　a　stir　about　knowledge；　and　spend　our　lives　in　the
pursuit　of　it；　when；　alas　I　we　know　nothing　all　the　while：　nor　do
I　think　it　possible　for　us　ever　to　know　anything　in　this　life。
Our　faculties　are　too　narrow　and　too　few。　Nature　certainly　never
intended　us　for　speculation。

　　　　　。　What！　Say　you　we　can　know　nothing；　Hylas？

　　　　　。　There　is　not　that　single　thing　in　the　world　whereof
we　can　know　the　real　nature；　or　what　it　is　in　itself。

　　　　　。　Will　you　tell　me　I　do　not　really　know　what　fire　or
water　is？

　　　　　。　You　may　indeed　know　that　fire　appears　hot；　and　water
fluid；　but　this　is　no　more　than　knowing　what　sensations　are
produced　in　your　own　mind；　upon　the　application　of　fire　and　water
to　your　organs　of　sense。　Their　internal　constitution；　their　true
and　real　nature；　you　are　utterly　in　the　dark　as　to　。

　　　　　。　Do　I　not　know　this　to　be　a　real　stone　that　I　stand
on；　and　that　which　I　see　before　my　eyes　to　be　a　real　tree？

　　　　　。　？　No；　it　is　impossible　you　or　any　man　alive
should　know　it。　All　you　know　is；　that　you　have　such　a　certain
idea　or　appearance　in　your　own　mind。　But　what　is　this　to　the　real
tree　or　stone？　I　tell　you　that　colour；　figure；　and　hardness；
which　you　perceive；　are　not　the　real　natures　of　those　things；　or
in　the　least　like　them。　The　same　may　be　said　of　all　other　real
things；　or　corporeal　substances；　which　compose　the　world。　They
have　none　of　them　anything　of　themselves；　like　those　sensible
qualities　by　us　perceived。　We　should　not　therefore　pretend　to
affirm　or　know　anything　of　them；　as　they　are　in　their　own　nature。

　　　　　。　But　surely；　Hylas；　I　can　distinguish　gold；　for
example；　｛228｝　from　iron：　and　how　could　this　be；　if　I　knew　not
what　either　truly　was？

　　　　　。　Believe　me；　Philonous；　you　can　only　distinguish
between　your　own　ideas。　That　yellowness；　that　weight；　and　other
sensible　qualities；　think　you　they　are　really　in　the　gold？　They
are　only　relative　to　the　senses；　and　have　no　absolute　existence
in　nature。　And　in　pretending　to　distinguish　the　species　of　real
things；　by　the　appearances　in　your　mind；　you　may　perhaps　act　as
wisely　as　he　that　should