three dialogues-第13章

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or　do　that　by　tedious　roundabout　methods　which　might　have　been
performed　in　a　much　more　easy　and　compendious　way；　what　shall　we
think　of　that　hypothesis　which　supposes　the　whole　world　made　in
vain？

　　　　　。　But　what　say　you？　Are　not　you　too　of　opinion　that　we
see　all　things　in　God？　If　I　mistake　not；　what　you　advance　comes
near　it。

　　　　　。　＇Few　men　think；　yet　all　have　opinions。　Hence　men's
opinions　are　superficial　and　confused。　It　is　nothing　strange　that
tenets　which　in　themselves　are　ever　so　different；　should
nevertheless　be　confounded　with　each　other；　by　those　who　do　not
consider　them　attentively。　I　shall　not　therefore　be　surprised　if
some　men　imagine　that　I　run　into　the　enthusiasm　of　Malebranche；
though　in　truth　I　am　very　remote　from　it。　He　builds　on　the　most
abstract　general　ideas；　which　I　entirely　disclaim。　He　asserts　an
absolute　external　world；　which　I　deny。　He　maintains　that　we　are
deceived　by　our　senses；　and；　know　not　the　real　natures　or　the
true　forms　and　figures　of　extended　beings；　of　all　which　I　hold
the　direct　contrary。　So　that　upon　the　whole　there　are　no
Principles　more　fundamentally　opposite　than　his　and　mine。　It　must
be　owned　that＇＇5＇　I　entirely　agree　with　what　the　holy　Scripture
saith；　〃That　in　God　we　live　and　move　and　have　our　being。〃　But
that　we　see　things　in　His　essence；　after　the　manner　above　set
forth；　I　am　far　from　believing。　Take　here　in　brief　my　meaning：　
It　is　evident　that　the　things　I　perceive　are　my　own　ideas；　and
that　no　idea　can　exist　unless　it　be　in　a　mind：　nor　is　it　less
plain　that　these　ideas　or　things　by　me　perceived；　either
themselves　or　their　archetypes；　exist　independently　of　my　mind；
since　I　know　myself　not　to　be　their　author；　it　being　out　of　my
power　to　determine　at　pleasure　what　particular　ideas　I　shall　be
affected　with　upon　opening　my　eyes　or　ears：　they　must　therefore
exist　in　some　other　Mind；　whose　｛215｝　Will　it　is　they　should　be
exhibited　to　me。　The　things；　I　say；　immediately　perceived　are
ideas　or　sensations；　call　them　which　you　will。　But　how　can　any
idea　or　sensation　exist　in；　or　be　produced　by；　anything　but　a
mind　or　spirit？　This　indeed　is　inconceivable。　And　to　assert　that
which　is　inconceivable　is　to　talk　nonsense：　is　it　not？

　　　　　。　Without　doubt。

　　　　　。　But；　on　the　other　hand；　it　is　very　conceivable　that
they　should　exist　in　and　be　produced　by　a　spirit；　since　this　is
no　more　than　I　daily　experience　in　myself；　inasmuch　as　I　perceive
numberless　ideas；　and；　by　an　act　of　my　will；　can　form　a　great
variety　of　them；　and　raise　them　up　in　my　imagination：　though；　it
must　be　confessed；　these　creatures　of　the　fancy　are　not
altogether　so　distinct；　so　strong；　vivid；　and　permanent；　as　those
perceived　by　my　senses　　which　latter　are　called　。
From　all　which　I　conclude；　。
；　from　the　variety；　order；　and　manner　of　these；　I　conclude
；　；　；　。　　it　well；　I　do　not　say；　I　see　things　by
perceiving　that　which　represents　them　in　the　intelligible
Substance　of　God。　This　I　do　not　understand；　but　I　say；　the　things
by　me　perceived　are　known　by　the　understanding；　and　produced　by
the　will　of　an　infinite　Spirit。　And　is　not　all　this　most　plain
and　evident？　Is　there　any　more　in　it　than　what　a　little
observation　in　our　own　minds；　and　that　which　passeth　in　them；　not
only　enables　us　to　conceive；　but　also　obliges　us　to　acknowledge。

　　　　　。　I　think　I　understand　you　very　clearly；　and　own　the
proof　you　give　of　a　Deity　seems　no　less　evident　than　it　is
surprising。　But；　allowing　that　God　is　the　supreme　and　universal
Cause　of　an　things；　yet；　may　there　not　be　still　a　Third　Nature
besides　Spirits　and　Ideas？　May　we　not　admit　a　subordinate　and
limited　cause　of　our　ideas？　In　a　word；　may　there　not　for　all　that
be　？

　　　　　。　How　often　must　I　inculcate　the　same　thing？　You　allow
the　things　immediately　perceived　by　sense　to　exist　nowhere
without　the　mind；　but　there　is　nothing　perceived　by　sense　which
is　not　perceived　immediately：　therefore　there　is　nothing　sensible
that　exists　without　the　mind。　The　Matter；　therefore；　which　you
still　insist　on　is　something　intelligible；　I　suppose；　something
that　may　be　discovered　by　reason；　and　not　by　sense。

　　　　　。　You　are　in　the　right。　｛216｝

　　　　　。　Pray　let　me　know　what　reasoning　your　belief　of
Matter　is　grounded　on；　and　what　this　Matter　is；　in　your　present
sense　of　it。

　　　　　。　I　find　myself　affected　with　various　ideas；　whereof　I
know　I　am　not　the　cause；　neither　are　they　the　cause　of
themselves；　or　of　one　another；　or　capable　of　subsisting　by
themselves；　as　being　altogether　inactive；　fleeting；　dependent
beings。　They　have　therefore　　cause　distinct　from　me　and
them：　of　which　I　pretend　to　know　no　more　than　that　it　is　。　And　this　thing；　whatever　it　be；　I　call
Matter。

　　　　　。　Tell　me；　Hylas；　hath　every　one　a　liberty　to　change
the　current　proper　signification　attached　to　a　common　name　in　any
language？　For　example；　suppose　a　traveller　should　tell　you　that
in　a　certain　country　men　pass　unhurt　through　the　fire；　and；　upon
explaining　himself；　you　found　he　meant　by　the　word　fire　that
which　others　call　。　Or；　if　he　should　assert　that　there　are
trees　that　walk　upon　two　legs；　meaning　men　by　the　term　。
Would　you　think　this　reasonable？

　　　　　。　No；　I　should　think　it　very　absurd。　Common　custom　is
the　standard　of　propriety　in　language。　And　for　any　man　to　affect
speaking　improperly　is　to　pervert　the　use　of　speech；　and　can
never　serve　to　a　better　purpose　than　to　protract　and　multiply
disputes；　where　there　is　no　difference　in　opinion。

　　　　　。　And　doth　not　；　in　the　common　current
acceptation　of　the　word；　signify　an　extended；　solid；　moveable；
unthinking；　inactive　Substance？

　　　　　。　It　doth。

　　　　　。　And；　hath　it　not　been　made　evident　that　no　
substance　can　possibly　exist？　And；　though　it　should　be　allowed　to
exist；　yet　how　can　that　which　is　　be　a　；　or　that
which　is　　be　a　？　You　may；　indeed；
if　you　please；　annex　to　the　word　　a　contrary　meaning　to
what　is　vulgarly　received；　and　tell　me　you　understand　by　it；　an
unextended；　thinking；　active　being；　which　is　the　cause　of　our
ideas。　But　what　else　is　this　than　to　play　with　words；　and　run
into　that　very　fault　you　just　now　condemned　with　so　much　reason？
I　do　by　no　means　find　fault　with　your　reasoning；　in　that　you
collect　a　cause　from　the　：　　I　deny　that　
cause　deducible　by　reason　can　properly　be　termed　Matter。

　　　　　。　There　is　indeed　something　in　what　you　say。　But　I　am
｛217｝　afraid　you　do　not　thoroughly　comprehend　my　meaning。　I　would
by　no　means　be　thought　to　deny　that　God；　or　an　infinite　Spirit；
is　the　Supreme　Cause　of　all　things。　All　I　contend　for　is；　that；
subordinate　to　the　Supreme　Agent；　there　is　a　cause　of　a　limited
and　inferior　nature；　which　　in　the　production　of　our
ideas；　not　by　any　act　of　will；　or　spiritual　efficiency；　but　by
that　kind　of　action　which　belongs　to　Matter；　viz。　。

　　　　　。　I　find　you　are　at　every　turn　relapsing　into　your　old
exploded　conceit；　of　a　moveable；　and　consequently　an　extended；
substance；　existing　without　the　mind。　What！　Have　you　already
forgotten　you　were　convinced；　or　are　you　willing　I　should　repeat
what　has　been　said　on　that　head？　In　truth　this　is　not　fair
dealing　in　you；　still　to　suppose　the　being　of　that　which　you　have
so　often　acknowledged　to　have　no　being。　But；　not　to　insist
farther　on　what　has　been　so　largely　handled；　I　ask　whether　all
your　ideas　are　not　perfectly　passive　and　inert；　including　nothing
of　action　in　them。

　　　　　。　They　are。

　　　　　。　And　are　sensible　qualities　anything　else　but　ideas？

　　　　　。　How　often　have　I　acknowledged　that　they　are　not。

　　　　　。　But　is　not　　a　sensible　quality？

　　　　　。　It　is。

　　　　　。　Consequently　it　is　no　action？

　　　　　。　I　agree　with　you。　And　indeed　it　is　very　plain　that
when　I　stir　my　finger；　it　remains　passi