three dialogues-第11章

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idea。　And　it　is　most　evident　that　。

　　　　　。　You　are　therefore；　by　your　principles；　forced　to
deny　the　　of　sensible　things；　since　you　made　it　to
consist　in　an　absolute　existence　exterior　to　the　mind。　That　is　to
say；　you　are　a　downright　sceptic。　So　I　have　gained　my　point；
which　was　to　shew　your　principles　led　to　Scepticism。　｛207｝

　　　　　。　For　the　present　I　am；　if　not　entirely　convinced；　at
least　silenced。

　　　　　。　I　would　fain　know　what　more　you　would　require　in
order　to　a　perfect　conviction。　Have　you　not　had　the　liberty　of
explaining　yourself　all　manner　of　ways？　Were　any　little　slips　in
discourse　laid　hold　and　insisted　on？　Or　were　you　not　allowed　to
retract　or　reinforce　anything　you　had　offered；　as　best　served
your　purpose？　Hath　not　everything　you　could　say　been　heard　and
examined　with　all　the　fairness　imaginable？　In　a　word　have　you　not
in　every　point　been　convinced　out　of　your　own　mouth？　And；　if　you
can　at　present　discover　any　flaw　in　any　of　your　former
concessions；　or　think　of　any　remaining　subterfuge；　any　new
distinction；　colour；　or　comment　whatsoever；　why　do　you　not
produce　it？

　　　　　。　A　little　patience；　Philonous。　I　am　at　present　so
amazed　to　see　myself　ensnared；　and　as　it　were　imprisoned　in　the
labyrinths　you　have　drawn　me　into；　that　on　the　sudden　it　cannot
be　expected　I　should　find　my　way　out。　You　must　give　me　time　to
look　about　me　and　recollect　myself。

　　　　　。　Hark；　is　not　this　the　college　bell？

　　　　　。　It　rings　for　prayers。

　　　　　。　We　will　go　in　then；　if　you　please；　and　meet　here
again　tomorrow　morning。　In　the　meantime；　you　may　employ　your
thoughts　on　this　morning's　discourse；　and　try　if　you　can　find　any
fallacy　in　it；　or　invent　any　new　means　to　extricate　yourself。

　　　　　。　Agreed。　｛208｝


　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　THE　SECOND　DIALOGUE


　　　　　。　I　beg　your　pardon；　Philonous；　for　not　meeting　you
sooner。　All　this　morning　my　head　was　so　filled　with　our　late
conversation　that　I　had　not　leisure　to　think　of　the　time　of　the
day；　or　indeed　of　anything　else。

　　　　　。　I　am　glad　you　were　so　intent　upon　it；　in　hopes
if　there　were　any　mistakes　in　your　concessions；　or　fallacies　in
my　reasonings　from　them；　you　will　now　discover　them　to　me。

　　　　　。　I　assure　you　I　have　done　nothing　ever　since　I　saw　you
but　search　after　mistakes　and　fallacies；　and；　with　that　view；
have　minutely　examined　the　whole　series　of　yesterday's　discourse：
but　all　in　vain；　for　the　notions　it　led　me　into；　upon　review；
appear　still　more　clear　and　evident；　and；　the　more　I　consider
them；　the　more　irresistibly　do　they　force　my　assent。

　　　　　。　And　is　not　this；　think　you；　a　sign　that　they　are
genuine；　that　they　proceed　from　nature；　and　are　conformable　to
right　reason？　Truth　and　beauty　are　in　this　alike；　that　the
strictest　survey　sets　them　both　off　to　advantage；　while　the　false
lustre　of　error　and　disguise　cannot　endure　being　reviewed；　or　too
nearly　inspected。

　　　　　。　I　own　there　is　a　great　deal　in　what　you　say。　Nor　can
any　one　be　more　entirely　satisfied　of　the　truth　of　those　odd
consequences；　so　long　as　I　have　in　view　the　reasonings　that　lead
to　them。　But；　when　these　are　out　of　my　thoughts；　there　seems；　on
the　other　hand；　something　so　satisfactory；　so　natural　and
intelligible；　in　the　modern　way　of　explaining　things　that；　I
profess；　I　know　not　how　to　reject　it。

　　　　　。　I　know　not　what　way　you　mean。

　　　　　。　I　mean　the　way　of　accounting　for　our　sensations　or
ideas。

　　　　　。　How　is　that？

　　　　　。　It　is　supposed　the　soul　makes　her　residence　in　some
part　of　the　brain；　from　which　the　nerves　take　their　rise；　and　are
thence　extended　to　all　parts　of　the　body；　and　that　outward
objects；　by　the　different　impressions　they　make　on　the　organs　of
sense；　communicate　certain　vibrative　motions　to　the　nerves；　and
these　being　filled　with　spirits　propagate　them　to　the　brain　｛209｝
or　seat　of　the　soul；　which；　according　to　the　various　impressions
or　traces　thereby　made　in　the　brain；　is　variously　affected　with
ideas。

　　　　　。　And　call　you　this　an　explication　of　the　manner
whereby　we　are　affected　with　ideas？

　　　　　。　Why　not；　Philonous？　Have　you　anything　to　object
against　it？

　　　　　。　I　would　first　know　whether　I　rightly　understand　your
hypothesis。　You　make　certain　traces　in　the　brain　to　be　the　causes
or　occasions　of　our　ideas。　Pray　tell　me　whether　by　the　
you　mean　any　sensible　thing。

　　　　　。　What　else　think　you　I　could　mean？

　　　　　。　Sensible　things　are　all　immediately　perceivable；　and
those　things　which　are　immediately　perceivable　are　ideas；　and
these　exist　only　in　the　mind。　Thus　much　you　have；　if　I　mistake
not；　long　since　agreed　to。

　　　　　。　I　do　not　deny　it。

　　　　　。　The　brain　therefore　you　speak　of；　being　a　sensible
thing；　exists　only　in　the　mind。　Now；　I　would　fain　know　whether
you　think　it　reasonable　to　suppose　that　one　idea　or　thing
existing　in　the　mind　occasions　all　other　ideas。　And；　if　you　think
so；　pray　how　do　you　account　for　the　origin　of　that　primary　idea
or　brain　itself？

　　　　　。　I　do　not　explain　the　origin　of　our　ideas　by　that
brain　which　is　perceivable　to　sense　　this　being　itself　only　a
combination　of　sensible　ideas　　but　by　another　which　I　imagine。

　　　　　。　But　are　not　things　imagined　as　truly　
as　things　perceived？

　　　　　。　I　must　confess　they　are。

　　　　　。　It　comes；　therefore；　to　the　same　thing；　and　you　have
been　all　this　while　accounting　for　ideas　by　certain　motions　or
impressions　of　the　brain；　that　is；　by　some　alterations　in　an
idea；　whether　sensible　or　imaginable　it　matters　not。

　　　　　。　I　begin　to　suspect　my　hypothesis。

　　　　　。　Besides　spirits；　all　that　we　know　or　conceive　are
our　own　ideas。　When；　therefore；　you　say　all　ideas　are　occasioned
by　impressions　in　the　brain；　do　you　conceive　this　brain　or　no？　If
you　do；　then　you　talk　of　ideas　imprinted　in　an　idea　causing　that
same　idea；　which　is　absurd。　If　you　do　not　conceive　it；　you　talk
unintelligibly；　instead　of　forming　a　reasonable　hypothesis。　｛210｝

　　　　　。　I　now　clearly　see　it　was　a　mere　dream。　There　is
nothing　in　it。

　　　　　。　You　need　not　be　much　concerned　at　it；　for　after　all；
this　way　of　explaining　things；　as　you　called　it；　could　never　have
satisfied　any　reasonable　man。　What　connexion　is　there　between　a
motion　in　the　nerves；　and　the　sensations　of　sound　or　colour　in
the　mind？　Or　how　is　it　possible　these　should　be　the　effect　of
that？

　　　　　。　But　I　could　never　think　it　had　so　little　in　it　as　now
it　seems　to　have。

　　　　　。　Well　then；　are　you　at　length　satisfied　that　no
sensible　things　have　a　real　existence；　and　that　you　are　in　truth
an　arrant　sceptic？

　　　　　。　It　is　too　plain　to　be　denied。

　　　　　。　Look！　are　not　the　fields　covered　with　a　delightful
verdure？　Is　there　not　something　in　the　woods　and　groves；　in　the
rivers　and　clear　springs；　that　soothes；　that　delights；　that
transports　the　soul？　At　the　prospect　of　the　wide　and　deep　ocean；
or　some　huge　mountain　whose　top　is　lost　in　the　clouds；　or　of　an
old　gloomy　forest；　are　not　our　minds　filled　with　a　pleasing
horror？　Even　in　rocks　and　deserts　is　there　not　an　agreeable
wildness？　How　sincere　a　pleasure　is　it　to　behold　the　natural
beauties　of　the　earth！　To　preserve　and　renew　our；　relish　for
them；　is　not　the　veil　of　night　alternately　drawn　over　her　face；
and　doth　she　not　change　her　dress　with　the　seasons？　How　aptly　are
the　elements　disposed！　What　variety　and　use　＇in　the　meanest
productions　of　nature＇！＇4＇　What　delicacy；　what　beauty；　what
contrivance；　in　animal　and　vegetable　bodies　I　How　exquisitely　are
all　things　suited；　as　well　to　their　particular　ends；　as　to
constitute　opposite　parts　of　the　whole　I　And；　while　they　mutually
aid　and　support；　do　they　not　also　set　off　and　illustrate　each
other？　Raise　now　your　thoughts　from　this　ball　of　earth　to　all
those　glorious　luminaries　that　adorn　the　high　arch　of　heaven。　The
motion　and　situation　of　the　planets；　are　they　not　admirable　for
use　and　order？　Were　those　（miscalled　）　globes　once　known
to　stray；　in　their　repeated　journeys　thr