protagoras-第7章

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to　say　the　same　of　Paralus　and　Xanthippus　themselves；　for　they　are



young　and　there　is　still　hope　of　them。



　　Protagoras　ended；　and　in　my　ear







　　　　So　charming　left　his　voice；　that　I　the　while



　　　　Thought　him　still　speaking；　still　stood　fixed　to　hear。







At　length；　when　the　truth　dawned　upon　me；　that　he　had　really　finished；



not　without　difficulty　I　began　to　collect　myself；　and　looking　at



Hippocrates；　I　said　to　him：　O　son　of　Apollodorus；　how　deeply



grateful　I　am　to　you　for　having　brought　me　hither；　I　would　not　have



missed　the　speech　of　Protagoras　for　a　great　deal。　For　I　used　to



imagine　that　no　human　care　could　make　men　good；　but　I　know　better　now。



Yet　I　have　still　one　very　small　difficulty　which　I　am　sure　that



Protagoras　will　easily　explain；　as　he　has　already　explained　so　much。



If　a　man　were　to　go　and　consult　Pericles　or　any　of　our　great



speakers　about　these　matters；　he　might　perhaps　hear　as　fine　a



discourse；　but　then　when　one　has　a　question　to　ask　of　any　of　them；



like　books；　they　can　neither　answer　nor　ask；　and　if　any　one　challenges



the　least　particular　of　their　speech；　they　go　ringing　on　in　a　long



harangue；　like　brazen　pots；　which　when　they　are　struck　continue　to



sound　unless　some　one　puts　his　hand　upon　them；　whereas　our　friend



Protagoras　can　not　only　make　a　good　speech；　as　he　has　already　shown；



but　when　he　is　asked　a　question　he　can　answer　briefly；　and　when　he



asks　he　will　wait　and　hear　the　answer；　and　this　is　a　very　rare　gift。



Now　I；　Protagoras；　want　to　ask　of　you　a　little　question；　which　if



you　will　only　answer；　I　shall　be　quite　satisfied。　You　were　saying　that



virtue　can　be　taught；…that　I　will　take　upon　your　authority；　and



there　is　no　one　to　whom　I　am　more　ready　to　trust。　But　I　marvel　at



one　thing　about　which　I　should　like　to　have　my　mind　set　at　rest。　You



were　speaking　of　Zeus　sending　justice　and　reverence　to　men；　and



several　times　while　you　were　speaking；　justice；　and　temperance；　and



holiness；　and　all　these　qualities；　were　described　by　you　as　if



together　they　made　up　virtue。　Now　I　want　you　to　tell　me　truly



whether　virtue　is　one　whole；　of　which　justice　and　temperance　and



holiness　are　parts；　or　whether　all　these　are　only　the　names　of　one　and



the　same　thing：　that　is　the　doubt　which　still　lingers　in　my　mind。



　　There　is　no　difficulty；　Socrates；　in　answering　that　the　qualities　of



which　you　are　speaking　are　the　parts　of　virtue　which　is　one。



　　And　are　they　parts；　I　said；　in　the　same　sense　in　which　mouth；



nose；　and　eyes；　and　ears；　are　the　parts　of　a　face；　or　are　they　like



the　parts　of　gold；　which　differ　from　the　whole　and　from　one　another



only　in　being　larger　or　smaller？



　　I　should　say　that　they　differed；　Socrates；　in　the　first　way；　they



are　related　to　one　another　as　the　parts　of　a　face　are　related　to　the



whole　face。



　　And　do　men　have　some　one　part　and　some　another　part　of　virtue？　Of　if



a　man　has　one　part；　must　he　also　have　all　the　others？



　　By　no　means；　he　said；　for　many　a　man　is　brave　and　not　just；　or



just　and　not　wise。



　　You　would　not　deny；　then；　that　courage　and　wisdom　are　also　parts



of　virtue？



　　Most　undoubtedly　they　are；　he　answered；　and　wisdom　is　the　noblest　of



the　parts。



　　And　they　are　all　different　from　one　another？　I　said。



　　Yes。



　　And　has　each　of　them　a　distinct　function　like　the　parts　of　the



face；…the　eye；　for　example；　is　not　like　the　ear；　and　has　not　the



same　functions；　and　the　other　parts　are　none　of　them　like　one　another；



either　in　their　functions；　or　in　any　other　way？　I　want　to　know　whether



the　comparison　holds　concerning　the　parts　of　virtue。　Do　they　also



differ　from　one　another　in　themselves　and　in　their　functions？　For　that



is　clearly　what　the　simile　would　imply。



　　Yes；　Socrates；　you　are　right　in　supposing　that　they　differ。



　　Then；　I　said；　no　other　part　of　virtue　is　like　knowledge；　or　like



justice；　or　like　courage；　or　like　temperance；　or　like　holiness？



　　No；　he　answered。



　　Well　then；　I　said；　suppose　that　you　and　I　enquire　into　their



natures。　And　first；　you　would　agree　with　me　that　justice　is　of　the



nature　of　a　thing；　would　you　not？　That　is　my　opinion：　would　it　not



be　yours　also？



　　Mine　also；　he　said。



　　And　suppose　that　some　one　were　to　ask　us；　saying；　〃O　Protagoras；　and



you；　Socrates；　what　about　this　thing　which　you　were　calling　justice；



is　it　just　or　unjust？〃…and　I　were　to　answer；　just：　would　you　vote　with



me　or　against　me？



　　With　you；　he　said。



　　Thereupon　I　should　answer　to　him　who　asked　me；　that　justice　is　of



the　nature　of　the　just：　would　not　you？



　　Yes；　he　said。



　　And　suppose　that　he　went　on　to　say：　〃Well　now；　is　there　also　such



a　thing　as　holiness？　〃we　should　answer；　〃Yes；〃　if　I　am　not　mistaken？



　　Yes；　he　said。



　　Which　you　would　also　acknowledge　to　be　a　thing…should　we　not　say　so？



　　He　assented。



　　〃And　is　this　a　sort　of　thing　which　is　of　the　nature　of　the　holy；



or　of　the　nature　of　the　unholy？〃　I　should　be　angry　at　his　putting　such



a　question；　and　should　say；　〃Peace；　man；　nothing　can　be　holy　if



holiness　is　not　holy。〃　What　would　you　say？　Would　you　not　answer　in　the



same　way？



　　Certainly；　he　said。



　　And　then　after　this　suppose　that　he　came　and　asked　us；　〃What　were



you　saying　just　now？　Perhaps　I　may　not　have　heard　you　rightly；　but　you



seemed　to　me　to　be　saying　that　the　parts　of　virtue　were　not　the　same



as　one　another。〃　I　should　reply；　〃You　certainly　heard　that　said；　but



not；　as　you　imagine；　by　me；　for　I　only　asked　the　question；



Protagoras　gave　the　answer。〃　And　suppose　that　he　turned　to　you　and



said；　〃Is　this　true；　Protagoras？　and　do　you　maintain　that　one　part



of　virtue　is　unlike　another；　and　is　this　your　position？〃…how　would　you



answer　him？



　　I　could　not　help　acknowledging　the　truth　of　what　he　said；　Socrates。



　　Well　then；　Protagoras；　we　will　assume　this；　and　now　supposing　that



he　proceeded　to　say　further；　〃Then　holiness　is　not　of　the　nature　of



justice；　nor　justice　of　the　nature　of　holiness；　but　of　the　nature　of



unholiness；　and　holiness　is　of　the　nature　of　the　not　just；　and



therefore　of　the　unjust；　and　the　unjust　is　the　unholy〃：　how　shall　we



answer　him？　I　should　certainly　answer　him　on　my　own　behalf　that



justice　is　holy；　and　that　holiness　is　just；　and　I　would　say　in　like



manner　on　your　behalf　also；　if　you　would　allow　me；　that　justice　is



either　the　same　with　holiness；　or　very　nearly　the　same；　and　above



all　I　would　assert　that　justice　is　like　holiness　and　holiness　is



like　justice；　and　I　wish　that　you　would　tell　me　whether　I　may　be



permitted　to　give　this　answer　on　your　behalf；　and　whether　you　would



agree　with　me。



　　He　replied；　I　cannot　simply　agree；　Socrates；　to　the　proposition　that



justice　is　holy　and　that　holiness　is　just；　for　there　appears　to　me



to　be　a　difference　between　them。　But　what　matter？　if　you　please　I



please；　and　let　us　assume；　if　you　will　I；　that　justice　is　holy；　and



that　holiness　is　just。



　　Pardon　me；　I　replied；　I　do　not　want　this　〃if　you　wish〃　or　〃if　you



will〃　sort　of　conclusion　to　be　proven；　but　I　want　you　and　me　to　be



proven：　I　mean　to　say　that　the　conclusion　will　be　best　proven　if　there



be　no　〃if。〃



　　Well；　he　said；　I　admit　that　justice　bears　a　resemblance　to　holiness；



for　there　is　always　some　point　of　view　in　which　everything　is　like



every　other　thing；　white　is　in　a　certain　way　like　black；　and　hard　is



like　soft；　and　the　most　extreme　opposites　have　some　qualities　in



common；　even　the　parts　of　the　face　which；　as　we　were　saying　before；



are　distinct　and　have　different　functions；　are　still　in　a　certain



point　of　view　similar；　and　one　of　them　is　like　another　of　them。　And



you　may　prove　that　they　are　like　one　another　on　the　same　principle



that　all　things　are　like　one　another；　and　yet　things　which　are　like　in



some　particular　ought　not　to　be　called　alike；　nor　things　which　a