protagoras-第13章

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you　would　rather；　do　you　answer；　and　give　me　the　opportunity　of



resuming　and　completing　our　unfinished　argument。



　　I　made　these　and　some　similar　observations；　but　Protagoras　would　not



distinctly　say　which　he　would　do。　Thereupon　Alcibiades　turned　to



Callias；　and　said：…Do　you　think；　Callias；　that　Protagoras　is　fair　in



refusing　to　say　whether　he　will　or　will　not　answer？　for　I　certainly



think　that　he　is　unfair；　he　ought　either　to　proceed　with　the　argument；



or　distinctly　refuse　to　proceed；　that　we　may　know　his　intention；　and



then　Socrates　will　be　able　to　discourse　with　some　one　else；　and　the



rest　of　the　company　will　be　free　to　talk　with　one　another。



　　I　think　that　Protagoras　was　really　made　ashamed　by　these　words　of



Alcibiades　and　when　the　prayers　of　Callias　and　the　company　were



superadded；　he　was　at　last　induced　to　argue；　and　said　that　I　might　ask



and　he　would　answer。



　　So　I　said：　Do　not　imagine；　Protagoras；　that　I　have　any　other



interest　in　asking　questions　of　you　but　that　of　clearing　up　my　own



difficulties。　For　I　think　that　Homer　was　very　right　in　saying　that







　　　　　　When　two　go　together；　one　sees　before　the　other；







for　all　men　who　have　a　companion　are　readier　in　deed；　word；　or



thought；　but　if　a　man







　　　　　　　　　　Sees　a　thing　when　he　is　alone；







he　goes　about　straightway　seeking　until　he　finds　some　one　to　whom　he



may　show　his　discoveries；　and　who　may　confirm　him　in　them。　And　I　would



rather　hold　discourse　with　you　than　with　any　one；　because　I　think　that



no　man　has　a　better　understanding　of　most　things　which　a　good　man



may　be　expected　to　understand；　and　in　particular　of　virtue。　For　who　is



there；　but　you？…who　not　only　claim　to　be　a　good　man　and　a　gentleman；



for　many　are　this；　and　yet　have　not　the　power　of　making　others　good



whereas　you　are　not　only　good　yourself；　but　also　the　cause　of　goodness



in　others。　Moreover　such　confidence　have　you　in　yourself；　that



although　other　Sophists　conceal　their　profession；　you　proclaim　in



the　face　of　Hellas　that　you　are　a　Sophist　or　teacher　of　virtue　and



education；　and　are　the　first　who　demanded　pay　in　return。　How　then



can　I　do　otherwise　than　invite　you　to　the　examination　of　these



subjects；　and　ask　questions　and　consult　with　you？　I　must；　indeed。



And　I　should　like　once　more　to　have　my　memory　refreshed　by　you　about



the　questions　which　I　was　asking　you　at　first；　and　also　to　have　your



help　in　considering　them。　If　I　am　not　mistaken　the　question　was



this：　Are　wisdom　and　temperance　and　courage　and　justice　and　holiness



five　names　of　the　same　thing？　or　has　each　of　the　names　a　separate



underlying　essence　and　corresponding　thing　having　a　peculiar　function；



no　one　of　them　being　like　any　other　of　them？　And　you　replied　that



the　five　names　were　not　the　names　of　the　same　thing；　but　that　each



of　them　had　a　separate　object；　and　that　all　these　objects　were　parts



of　virtue；　not　in　the　same　way　that　the　parts　of　gold　are　like　each



other　and　the　whole　of　which　they　are　parts；　but　as　the　parts　of　the



face　are　unlike　the　whole　of　which　they　are　parts　and　one　another；　and



have　each　of　them　a　distinct　function。　I　should　like　to　know　whether



this　is　still　your　opinion；　or　if　not；　I　will　ask　you　to　define　your



meaning；　and　I　shall　not　take　you　to　task　if　you　now　make　a



different　statement。　For　I　dare　say　that　you　may　have　said　what　you



did　only　in　order　to　make　trial　of　me。



　　I　answer；　Socrates；　he　said；　that　all　these　qualities　are　parts　of



virtue；　and　that　four　out　of　the　five　are　to　some　extent　similar；



and　that　the　fifth　of　them；　which　is　courage；　is　very　different　from



the　other　four；　as　I　prove　in　this　way：　You　may　observe　that　many



men　are　utterly　unrighteous；　unholy；　intemperate；　ignorant；　who　are



nevertheless　remarkable　for　their　courage。



　　Stop；　I　said；　I　should　like　to　think　about　that。　When　you　speak　of



brave　men；　do　you　mean　the　confident；　or　another　sort　of　nature？



　　Yes；　he　said；　I　mean　the　impetuous；　ready　to　go　at　that　which　others



are　afraid　to　approach。



　　In　the　next　place；　you　would　affirm　virtue　to　be　a　good　thing；　of



which　good　thing　you　assert　yourself　to　be　a　teacher。



　　Yes；　he　said；　I　should　say　the　best　of　all　things；　if　I　am　in　my



right　mind。



　　And　is　it　partly　good　and　partly　bad；　I　said；　or　wholly　good？



　　Wholly　good；　and　in　the　highest　degree。



　　Tell　me　then；　who　are　they　who　have　confidence　when　diving　into　a



well？



　　I　should　say；　the　divers。



　　And　the　reason　of　this　is　that　they　have　knowledge？



　　Yes；　that　is　the　reason。



　　And　who　have　confidence　when　fighting　on　horseback…the　skilled



horseman　or　the　unskilled？



　　The　skilled。



　　And　who　when　fighting　with　light　shields…the　peltasts　or　the



nonpeltasts？



　　The　peltasts。　And　that　is　true　of　all　other　things；　he　said；　if　that



is　your　point：　those　who　have　knowledge　are　more　confident　than



those　who　have　no　knowledge；　and　they　are　more　confident　after　they



have　learned　than　before。



　　And　have　you　not　seen　persons　utterly　ignorant；　I　said；　of　these



things；　and　yet　confident　about　them？



　　Yes；　he　said；　I　have　seen　such　persons　far　too　confident。



　　And　are　not　these　confident　persons　also　courageous？



　　In　that　case；　he　replied；　courage　would　be　a　base　thing；　for　the　men



of　whom　we　are　speaking　are　surely　madmen。



　　Then　who　are　the　courageous？　Are　they　not　the　confident？



　　Yes；　he　said；　to　that　statement　I　adhere。



　　And　those；　I　said；　who　are　thus　confident　without　knowledge　are



really　not　courageous；　but　mad；　and　in　that　case　the　wisest　are　also



the　most　confident；　and　being　the　most　confident　are　also　the　bravest；



and　upon　that　view　again　wisdom　will　be　courage。



　　Nay；　Socrates；　he　replied；　you　are　mistaken　in　your　remembrance　of



what　was　said　by　me。　When　you　asked　me；　I　certainly　did　say　that　the



courageous　are　the　confident；　but　I　was　never　asked　whether　the



confident　are　the　courageous；　if　you　had　asked　me；　I　should　have



answered　〃Not　all　of　them〃：　and　what　I　did　answer　you　have　not



proved　to　be　false；　although　you　proceeded　to　show　that　those　who　have



knowledge　are　more　courageous　than　they　were　before　they　had



knowledge；　and　more　courageous　than　others　who　have　no　knowledge；



and　were　then　led　on　to　think　that　courage　is　the　same　as　wisdom。



But　in　this　way　of　arguing　you　might　come　to　imagine　that　strength



is　wisdom。　You　might　begin　by　asking　whether　the　strong　are　able；



and　I　should　say　〃Yes〃；　and　then　whether　those　who　know　how　to　wrestle



are　not　more　able　to　wrestle　than　those　who　do　not　know　how　to



wrestle；　and　more　able　after　than　before　they　had　learned；　and　I



should　assent。　And　when　I　had　admitted　this；　you　might　use　my



admissions　in　such　a　way　as　to　prove　that　upon　my　view　wisdom　is



strength；　whereas　in　that　case　I　should　not　have　admitted；　any　more



than　in　the　other；　that　the　able　are　strong；　although　I　have



admitted　that　the　strong　are　able。　For　there　is　a　difference　between



ability　and　strength；　the　former　is　given　by　knowledge　as　well　as　by



madness　or　rage；　but　strength　comes　from　nature　and　a　healthy　state　of



the　body。　And　in　like　manner　I　say　of　confidence　and　courage；　that



they　are　not　the　same；　and　I　argue　that　the　courageous　are



confident；　but　not　all　the　confident　courageous。　For　confidence　may　be



given　to　men　by　art；　and　also；　like　ability；　by　madness　and　rage；



but　courage　comes　to　them　from　nature　and　the　healthy　state　of　the



soul。



　　I　said：　You　would　admit；　Protagoras；　that　some　men　live　well　and



others　ill？



　　He　assented。



　　And　do　you　think　that　a　man　lives　well　who　lives　in　pain　and　grief？



　　He　does　not。



　　But　if　he　lives　pleasantly　to　the　end　of　his　life；　will　he　not　in



that　case　have　lived　well？



　　He　will。



　　Then　to　live　pleasantly　is　a　good；　and　to　live　unpleasantly　an　evil？



　　Yes；