on sophistical refutations-第8章

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definite　subject　before　them。　Also　the　putting　of　several　questions；



even　though　the　position　against　which　one　is　arguing　be　quite



definite；　and　the　claim　that　he　shall　say　only　what　he　thinks；



create　abundant　opportunity　for　drawing　him　into　paradox　or　fallacy；



and　also；　whether　to　any　of　these　questions　he　replies　'Yes'　or



replies　'No'；　of　leading　him　on　to　statements　against　which　one　is



well　off　for　a　line　of　attack。　Nowadays；　however；　men　are　less　able　to



play　foul　by　these　means　than　they　were　formerly：　for　people　rejoin



with　the　question；　'What　has　that　to　do　with　the　original　subject？'　It



is；　too；　an　elementary　rule　for　eliciting　some　fallacy　or　paradox　that



one　should　never　put　a　controversial　question　straight　away；　but　say



that　one　puts　it　from　the　wish　for　information：　for　the　process　of



inquiry　thus　invited　gives　room　for　an　attack。



　　A　rule　specially　appropriate　for　showing　up　a　fallacy　is　the



sophistic　rule；　that　one　should　draw　the　answerer　on　to　the　kind　of



statements　against　which　one　is　well　supplied　with　arguments：　this　can



be　done　both　properly　and　improperly；　as　was　said　before。'　Again；　to



draw　a　paradoxical　statement；　look　and　see　to　what　school　of



philosophers　the　person　arguing　with　you　belongs；　and　then　question



him　as　to　some　point　wherein　their　doctrine　is　paradoxical　to　most



people：　for　with　every　school　there　is　some　point　of　that　kind。　It



is　an　elementary　rule　in　these　matters　to　have　a　collection　of　the



special　'theses'　of　the　various　schools　among　your　propositions。　The



solution　recommended　as　appropriate　here；　too；　is　to　point　out　that



the　paradox　does　not　come　about　because　of　the　argument：　whereas



this　is　what　his　opponent　always　really　wants。



　　Moreover；　argue　from　men's　wishes　and　their　professed　opinions。



For　people　do　not　wish　the　same　things　as　they　say　they　wish：　they　say



what　will　look　best；　whereas　they　wish　what　appears　to　be　to　their



interest：　e。g。　they　say　that　a　man　ought　to　die　nobly　rather　than　to



live　in　pleasure；　and　to　live　in　honest　poverty　rather　than　in



dishonourable　riches；　but　they　wish　the　opposite。　Accordingly；　a　man



who　speaks　according　to　his　wishes　must　be　led　into　stating　the



professed　opinions　of　people；　while　he　who　speaks　according　to　these



must　be　led　into　admitting　those　that　people　keep　hidden　away：　for



in　either　case　they　are　bound　to　introduce　a　paradox；　for　they　will



speak　contrary　either　to　men's　professed　or　to　their　hidden　opinions。



　　The　widest　range　of　common…place　argument　for　leading　men　into



paradoxical　statement　is　that　which　depends　on　the　standards　of　Nature



and　of　the　Law：　it　is　so　that　both　Callicles　is　drawn　as　arguing　in



the　Gorgias；　and　that　all　the　men　of　old　supposed　the　result　to　come



about：　for　nature　（they　said）　and　law　are　opposites；　and　justice　is



a　fine　thing　by　a　legal　standard；　but　not　by　that　of　nature。



Accordingly；　they　said；　the　man　whose　statement　agrees　with　the



standard　of　nature　you　should　meet　by　the　standard　of　the　law；　but　the



man　who　agrees　with　the　law　by　leading　him　to　the　facts　of　nature：　for



in　both　ways　paradoxical　statements　may　be　committed。　In　their　view



the　standard　of　nature　was　the　truth；　while　that　of　the　law　was　the



opinion　held　by　the　majority。　So　that　it　is　clear　that　they；　too；　used



to　try　either　to　refute　the　answerer　or　to　make　him　make　paradoxical



statements；　just　as　the　men　of　to…day　do　as　well。



　　Some　questions　are　such　that　in　both　forms　the　answer　is



paradoxical；　e。g。　'Ought　one　to　obey　the　wise　or　one's　father？'　and



'Ought　one　to　do　what　is　expedient　or　what　is　just？'　and　'Is　it



preferable　to　suffer　injustice　or　to　do　an　injury？'　You　should　lead



people；　then；　into　views　opposite　to　the　majority　and　to　the



philosophers；　if　any　one　speaks　as　do　the　expert　reasoners；　lead　him



into　opposition　to　the　majority；　while　if　he　speaks　as　do　the



majority；　then　into　opposition　to　the　reasoners。　For　some　say　that



of　necessity　the　happy　man　is　just；　whereas　it　is　paradoxical　to　the



many　that　a　king　should　be　happy。　To　lead　a　man　into　paradoxes　of　this



sort　is　the　same　as　to　lead　him　into　the　opposition　of　the　standards



of　nature　and　law：　for　the　law　represents　the　opinion　of　the　majority；



whereas　philosophers　speak　according　to　the　standard　of　nature　and　the



truth。







　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　13







　　Paradoxes；　then；　you　should　seek　to　elicit　by　means　of　these



common…place　rules。　Now　as　for　making　any　one　babble；　we　have



already　said　what　we　mean　by　'to　babble'。　This　is　the　object　in　view



in　all　arguments　of　the　following　kind：　If　it　is　all　the　same　to　state



a　term　and　to　state　its　definition；　the　'double'　and　'double　of



half'　are　the　same：　if　then　'double'　be　the　'double　of　half'；　it



will　be　the　'double　of　half　of　half'。　And　if；　instead　of　'double'；



'double　of　half'　be　again　put；　then　the　same　expression　will　be



repeated　three　times；　'double　of　half　of　half　of　half'。　Also　'desire



is　of　the　pleasant；　isn't　it？'　desire　is　conation　for　the　pleasant：



accordingly；　'desire'　is　'conation　for　the　pleasant　for　the　pleasant'。



　　All　arguments　of　this　kind　occur　in　dealing　（1）　with　any　relative



terms　which　not　only　have　relative　genera；　but　are　also　themselves



relative；　and　are　rendered　in　relation　to　one　and　the　same　thing；　as



e。g。　conation　is　conation　for　something；　and　desire　is　desire　of



something；　and　double　is　double　of　something；　i。e。　double　of　half：



also　in　dealing　（2）　with　any　terms　which；　though　they　be　not



relative　terms　at　all；　yet　have　their　substance；　viz。　the　things　of



which　they　are　the　states　or　affections　or　what　not；　indicated　as　well



in　their　definition；　they　being　predicated　of　these　things。　Thus



e。g。　'odd'　is　a　'number　containing　a　middle'：　but　there　is　an　'odd



number'：　therefore　there　is　a　'number…containing…a…middle　number'。



Also；　if　snubness　be　a　concavity　of　the　nose；　and　there　be　a　snub



nose；　there　is　therefore　a　'concave…nose　nose'。



　　People　sometimes　appear　to　produce　this　result；　without　really



producing　it；　because　they　do　not　add　the　question　whether　the



expression　'double'；　just　by　itself；　has　any　meaning　or　no；　and　if　so；



whether　it　has　the　same　meaning；　or　a　different　one；　but　they　draw



their　conclusion　straight　away。　Still　it　seems；　inasmuch　as　the　word



is　the　same；　to　have　the　same　meaning　as　well。







　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　14







　　We　have　said　before　what　kind　of　thing　'solecism'　is。'　It　is



possible　both　to　commit　it；　and　to　seem　to　do　so　without　doing　so；　and



to　do　so　without　seeming　to　do　so。　Suppose；　as　Protagoras　used　to



say　that　menis　（'wrath'）　and　pelex　（'helmet'）　are　masculine：



according　to　him　a　man　who　calls　wrath　a　'destructress'　（oulomenen）



commits　a　solecism；　though　he　does　not　seem　to　do　so　to　other



people；　where　he　who　calls　it　a　'destructor'　（oulomenon）　commits　no



solecism　though　he　seems　to　do　so。　It　is　clear；　then；　that　any　one



could　produce　this　effect　by　art　as　well：　and　for　this　reason　many



arguments　seem　to　lead　to　solecism　which　do　not　really　do　so；　as



happens　in　the　case　of　refutations。



　　Almost　all　apparent　solecisms　depend　upon　the　word　'this'　（tode）；



and　upon　occasions　when　the　inflection　denotes　neither　a　masculine　nor



a　feminine　object　but　a　neuter。　For　'he'　（outos）　signifies　a



masculine；　and　'she'　（aute）　feminine；　but　'this'　（touto）；　though



meant　to　signify　a　neuter；　often　also　signifies　one　or　other　of　the



former：　e。g。　'What　is　this？'　'It　is　Calliope'；　'it　is　a　log'；　'it　is



Coriscus'。　Now　in　the　masculine　and　feminine　the　inflections　are　all



different；　whereas　in　the　neuter　some　are　and　some　are　not。　Often；



then；　when　'this'　（touto）　has　been　granted；　people　reason　as　if　'him'



（touton）　had　been　said：　and　likewise　also　they　substitute　one



inflection　for