on sophistical refutations-第7章

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the　cause：　also　（2）　there　are　those　misreasonings　which　do　not　conform



to　the　line　of　inquiry　proper　to　the　particular　subject；　but　are



generally　thought　to　conform　to　the　art　in　question。　For　false



diagrams　of　geometrical　figures　are　not　contentious　（for　the　resulting



fallacies　conform　to　the　subject　of　the　art）…any　more　than　is　any



false　diagram　that　may　be　offered　in　proof　of　a　truth…e。g。



Hippocrates'　figure　or　the　squaring　of　the　circle　by　means　of　the



lunules。　But　Bryson's　method　of　squaring　the　circle；　even　if　the



circle　is　thereby　squared；　is　still　sophistical　because　it　does　not



conform　to　the　subject　in　hand。　So；　then；　any　merely　apparent



reasoning　about　these　things　is　a　contentious　argument；　and　any



reasoning　that　merely　appears　to　conform　to　the　subject　in　hand；



even　though　it　be　genuine　reasoning；　is　a　contentious　argument：　for　it



is　merely　apparent　in　its　conformity　to　the　subject…matter；　so　that　it



is　deceptive　and　plays　foul。　For　just　as　a　foul　in　a　race　is　a



definite　type　of　fault；　and　is　a　kind　of　foul　fighting；　so　the　art



of　contentious　reasoning　is　foul　fighting　in　disputation：　for　in　the



former　case　those　who　are　resolved　to　win　at　all　costs　snatch　at



everything；　and　so　in　the　latter　case　do　contentious　reasoners。　Those；



then；　who　do　this　in　order　to　win　the　mere　victory　are　generally



considered　to　be　contentious　and　quarrelsome　persons；　while　those



who　do　it　to　win　a　reputation　with　a　view　to　making　money　are



sophistical。　For　the　art　of　sophistry　is；　as　we　said；'　a　kind　of　art



of　money…making　from　a　merely　apparent　wisdom；　and　this　is　why　they



aim　at　a　merely　apparent　demonstration：　and　quarrelsome　persons　and



sophists　both　employ　the　same　arguments；　but　not　with　the　same



motives：　and　the　same　argument　will　be　sophistical　and　contentious；



but　not　in　the　same　respect；　rather；　it　will　be　contentious　in　so



far　as　its　aim　is　an　apparent　victory；　while　in　so　far　as　its　aim　is



an　apparent　wisdom；　it　will　be　sophistical：　for　the　art　of　sophistry



is　a　certain　appearance　of　wisdom　without　the　reality。　The　contentious



argument　stands　in　somewhat　the　same　relation　to　the　dialectical　as



the　drawer　of　false　diagrams　to　the　geometrician；　for　it　beguiles　by



misreasoning　from　the　same　principles　as　dialectic　uses；　just　as　the



drawer　of　a　false　diagram　beguiles　the　geometrician。　But　whereas　the



latter　is　not　a　contentious　reasoner；　because　he　bases　his　false



diagram　on　the　principles　and　conclusions　that　fall　under　the　art　of



geometry；　the　argument　which　is　subordinate　to　the　principles　of



dialectic　will　yet　clearly　be　contentious　as　regards　other　subjects。



Thus；　e。g。　though　the　squaring　of　the　circle　by　means　of　the　lunules



is　not　contentious；　Bryson's　solution　is　contentious：　and　the　former



argument　cannot　be　adapted　to　any　subject　except　geometry；　because



it　proceeds　from　principles　that　are　peculiar　to　geometry；　whereas　the



latter　can　be　adapted　as　an　argument　against　all　the　number　of



people　who　do　not　know　what　is　or　is　not　possible　in　each　particular



context：　for　it　will　apply　to　them　all。　Or　there　is　the　method　whereby



Antiphon　squared　the　circle。　Or　again；　an　argument　which　denied　that



it　was　better　to　take　a　walk　after　dinner；　because　of　Zeno's　argument；



would　not　be　a　proper　argument　for　a　doctor；　because　Zeno's　argument



is　of　general　application。　If；　then；　the　relation　of　the　contentious



argument　to　the　dialectical　were　exactly　like　that　of　the　drawer　of



false　diagrams　to　the　geometrician；　a　contentious　argument　upon　the



aforesaid　subjects　could　not　have　existed。　But；　as　it　is；　the



dialectical　argument　is　not　concerned　with　any　definite　kind　of　being；



nor　does　it　show　anything；　nor　is　it　even　an　argument　such　as　we



find　in　the　general　philosophy　of　being。　For　all　beings　are　not



contained　in　any　one　kind；　nor；　if　they　were；　could　they　possibly　fall



under　the　same　principles。　Accordingly；　no　art　that　is　a　method　of



showing　the　nature　of　anything　proceeds　by　asking　questions：　for　it



does　not　permit　a　man　to　grant　whichever　he　likes　of　the　two



alternatives　in　the　question：　for　they　will　not　both　of　them　yield　a



proof。　Dialectic；　on　the　other　hand；　does　proceed　by　questioning；



whereas　if　it　were　concerned　to　show　things；　it　would　have　refrained



from　putting　questions；　even　if　not　about　everything；　at　least　about



the　first　principles　and　the　special　principles　that　apply　to　the



particular　subject　in　hand。　For　suppose　the　answerer　not　to　grant



these；　it　would　then　no　longer　have　had　any　grounds　from　which　to



argue　any　longer　against　the　objection。　Dialectic　is　at　the　same



time　a　mode　of　examination　as　well。　For　neither　is　the　art　of



examination　an　accomplishment　of　the　same　kind　as　geometry；　but　one



which　a　man　may　possess；　even　though　he　has　not　knowledge。　For　it　is



possible　even　for　one　without　knowledge　to　hold　an　examination　of



one　who　is　without　knowledge；　if　also　the　latter　grants　him　points



taken　not　from　thing　that　he　knows　or　from　the　special　principles　of



the　subject　under　discussion　but　from　all　that　range　of　consequences



attaching　to　the　subject　which　a　man　may　indeed　know　without　knowing



the　theory　of　the　subject；　but　which　if　he　do　not　know；　he　is　bound　to



be　ignorant　of　the　theory。　So　then　clearly　the　art　of　examining　does



not　consist　in　knowledge　of　any　definite　subject。　For　this　reason；



too；　it　deals　with　everything：　for　every　'theory'　of　anything



employs　also　certain　common　principles。　Hence　everybody；　including



even　amateurs；　makes　use　in　a　way　of　dialectic　and　the　practice　of



examining：　for　all　undertake　to　some　extent　a　rough　trial　of　those　who



profess　to　know　things。　What　serves　them　here　is　the　general



principles：　for　they　know　these　of　themselves　just　as　well　as　the



scientist；　even　if　in　what　they　say　they　seem　to　the　latter　to　go



wildly　astray　from　them。　All；　then；　are　engaged　in　refutation；　for



they　take　a　hand　as　amateurs　in　the　same　task　with　which　dialectic



is　concerned　professionally；　and　he　is　a　dialectician　who　examines



by　the　help　of　a　theory　of　reasoning。　Now　there　are　many　identical



principles　which　are　true　of　everything；　though　they　are　not　such　as



to　constitute　a　particular　nature；　i。e。　a　particular　kind　of　being；



but　are　like　negative　terms；　while　other　principles　are　not　of　this



kind　but　are　special　to　particular　subjects；　accordingly　it　is



possible　from　these　general　principles　to　hold　an　examination　on



everything；　and　that　there　should　be　a　definite　art　of　so　doing；



and；　moreover；　an　art　which　is　not　of　the　same　kind　as　those　which



demonstrate。　This　is　why　the　contentious　reasoner　does　not　stand　in



the　same　condition　in　all　respects　as　the　drawer　of　a　false　diagram：



for　the　contentious　reasoner　will　not　be　given　to　misreasoning　from



any　definite　class　of　principles；　but　will　deal　with　every　class。



　　These；　then；　are　the　types　of　sophistical　refutations：　and　that　it



belongs　to　the　dialectician　to　study　these；　and　to　be　able　to　effect



them；　is　not　difficult　to　see：　for　the　investigation　of　premisses



comprises　the　whole　of　this　study。







　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　12







　　So　much；　then；　for　apparent　refutations。　As　for　showing　that　the



answerer　is　committing　some　fallacy；　and　drawing　his　argument　into



paradox…for　this　was　the　second　item　of　the　sophist's　programme…in　the



first　place；　then；　this　is　best　brought　about　by　a　certain　manner　of



questioning　and　through　the　question。　For　to　put　the　question



without　framing　it　with　reference　to　any　definite　subject　is　a　good



bait　for　these　purposes：　for　people　are　more　inclined　to　make　mistakes



when　they　talk　at　large；　and　they　talk　at　large　when　they　have　no



definite　subject　before　them。　Also　the　putting　of　several　questions；



even　though　the　position　against　which　on