on sophistical refutations-第4章

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accident　of　anything；　there　is　no　refutation。　For　supposing；　when　A



and　B　are；　C　must　necessarily　be；　and　C　is　white；　there　is　no



necessity　for　it　to　be　white　on　account　of　the　syllogism。　So；　if　the



triangle　has　its　angles　equal　to　two　right…angles；　and　it　happens　to



be　a　figure；　or　the　simplest　element　or　starting　point；　it　is　not



because　it　is　a　figure　or　a　starting　point　or　simplest　element　that　it



has　this　character。　For　the　demonstration　proves　the　point　about　it



not　qua　figure　or　qua　simplest　element；　but　qua　triangle。　Likewise



also　in　other　cases。　If；　then；　refutation　is　a　proof；　an　argument



which　argued　per　accidens　could　not　be　a　refutation。　It　is；　however；



just　in　this　that　the　experts　and　men　of　science　generally　suffer



refutation　at　the　hand　of　the　unscientific：　for　the　latter　meet　the



scientists　with　reasonings　constituted　per　accidens；　and　the



scientists　for　lack　of　the　power　to　draw　distinctions　either　say　'Yes'



to　their　questions；　or　else　people　suppose　them　to　have　said　'Yes'；



although　they　have　not。



　　Those　that　depend　upon　whether　something　is　said　in　a　certain



respect　only　or　said　absolutely；　are　clear　cases　of　ignoratio



elenchi　because　the　affirmation　and　the　denial　are　not　concerned



with　the　same　point。　For　of　'white　in　a　certain　respect'　the



negation　is　'not　white　in　a　certain　respect'；　while　of　'white



absolutely'　it　is　'not　white；　absolutely'。　If；　then；　a　man　treats



the　admission　that　a　thing　is　'white　in　a　certain　respect'　as　though



it　were　said　to　be　white　absolutely；　he　does　not　effect　a



refutation；　but　merely　appears　to　do　so　owing　to　ignorance　of　what



refutation　is。



　　The　clearest　cases　of　all；　however；　are　those　that　were　previously



described'　as　depending　upon　the　definition　of　a　'refutation'：　and



this　is　also　why　they　were　called　by　that　name。　For　the　appearance



of　a　refutation　is　produced　because　of　the　omission　in　the　definition；



and　if　we　divide　fallacies　in　the　above　manner；　we　ought　to　set



'Defective　definition'　as　a　common　mark　upon　them　all。



　　Those　that　depend　upon　the　assumption　of　the　original　point　and　upon



stating　as　the　cause　what　is　not　the　cause；　are　clearly　shown　to　be



cases　of　ignoratio　elenchi　through　the　definition　thereof。　For　the



conclusion　ought　to　come　about　'because　these　things　are　so'；　and　this



does　not　happen　where　the　premisses　are　not　causes　of　it：　and　again　it



should　come　about　without　taking　into　account　the　original　point；



and　this　is　not　the　case　with　those　arguments　which　depend　upon



begging　the　original　point。



　　Those　that　depend　upon　the　assumption　of　the　original　point　and　upon



stating　as　the　cause　what　is　not　the　cause；　are　clearly　shown　to　be



cases　of　ignoratio　elenchi　through　the　definition　thereof。　For　the



conclusion　ought　to　come　about　'because　these　things　are　so'；　and　this



does　not　happen　where　the　premisses　are　not　causes　of　it：　and　again　it



should　come　about　without　taking　into　account　the　original　point；



and　this　is　not　the　case　with　those　arguments　which　depend　upon



begging　the　original　point。



　　　　Those　that　depend　upon　the　consequent　are　a　branch　of　Accident：



for　the　consequent　is　an　accident；　only　it　differs　from　the　accident



in　this；　that　you　may　secure　an　admission　of　the　accident　in　the



case　of　one　thing　only　（e。g。　the　identity　of　a　yellow　thing　and



honey　and　of　a　white　thing　and　swan）；　whereas　the　consequent　always



involves　more　than　one　thing：　for　we　claim　that　things　that　are　the



same　as　one　and　the　same　thing　are　also　the　same　as　one　another；　and



this　is　the　ground　of　a　refutation　dependent　on　the　consequent。　It　is；



however；　not　always　true；　e。g。　suppose　that　and　B　are　the　same　as　C



per　accidens；　for　both　'snow'　and　the　'swan'　are　the　same　as　something



white'。　Or　again；　as　in　Melissus'　argument；　a　man　assumes　that　to



'have　been　generated'　and　to　'have　a　beginning'　are　the　same　thing；　or



to　'become　equal'　and　to　'assume　the　same　magnitude'。　For　because　what



has　been　generated　has　a　beginning；　he　claims　also　that　what　has　a



beginning　has　been　generated；　and　argues　as　though　both　what　has



been　generated　and　what　is　finite　were　the　same　because　each　has　a



beginning。　Likewise　also　in　the　case　of　things　that　are　made　equal



he　assumes　that　if　things　that　assume　one　and　the　same　magnitude



become　equal；　then　also　things　that　become　equal　assume　one　magnitude：



i。e。　he　assumes　the　consequent。　Inasmuch；　then；　as　a　refutation



depending　on　accident　consists　in　ignorance　of　what　a　refutation　is；



clearly　so　also　does　a　refutation　depending　on　the　consequent。　We



shall　have　further　to　examine　this　in　another　way　as　well。



　　Those　fallacies　that　depend　upon　the　making　of　several　questions



into　one　consist　in　our　failure　to　dissect　the　definition　of



'proposition'。　For　a　proposition　is　a　single　statement　about　a



single　thing。　For　the　same　definition　applies　to　'one　single　thing



only'　and　to　the　'thing'；　simply；　e。g。　to　'man'　and　to　'one　single　man



only'　and　likewise　also　in　other　cases。　If；　then；　a　'single



proposition'　be　one　which　claims　a　single　thing　of　a　single　thing；　a



'proposition'；　simply；　will　also　be　the　putting　of　a　question　of



that　kind。　Now　since　a　proof　starts　from　propositions　and　refutation



is　a　proof；　refutation；　too；　will　start　from　propositions。　If；　then；　a



proposition　is　a　single　statement　about　a　single　thing；　it　is



obvious　that　this　fallacy　too　consists　in　ignorance　of　what　a



refutation　is：　for　in　it　what　is　not　a　proposition　appears　to　be



one。　If；　then；　the　answerer　has　returned　an　answer　as　though　to　a



single　question；　there　will　be　a　refutation；　while　if　he　has



returned　one　not　really　but　apparently；　there　will　be　an　apparent



refutation　of　his　thesis。　All　the　types　of　fallacy；　then；　fall　under



ignorance　of　what　a　refutation　is；　some　of　them　because　the



contradiction；　which　is　the　distinctive　mark　of　a　refutation；　is



merely　apparent；　and　the　rest　failing　to　conform　to　the　definition



of　a　proof。







　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　7







　　The　deception　comes　about　in　the　case　of　arguments　that　depend　on



ambiguity　of　words　and　of　phrases　because　we　are　unable　to　divide



the　ambiguous　term　（for　some　terms　it　is　not　easy　to　divide；　e。g。



'unity'；　'being'；　and　'sameness'）；　while　in　those　that　depend　on



combination　and　division；　it　is　because　we　suppose　that　it　makes　no



difference　whether　the　phrase　be　combined　or　divided；　as　is　indeed　the



case　with　most　phrases。　Likewise　also　with　those　that　depend　on



accent：　for　the　lowering　or　raising　of　the　voice　upon　a　phrase　is



thought　not　to　alter　its　meaning…with　any　phrase；　or　not　with　many。



With　those　that　depend　on　the　of　expression　it　is　because　of　the



likeness　of　expression。　For　it　is　hard　to　distinguish　what　kind　of



things　are　signified　by　the　same　and　what　by　different　kinds　of



expression：　for　a　man　who　can　do　this　is　practically　next　door　to



the　understanding　of　the　truth。　A　special　reason　why　a　man　is　liable



to　be　hurried　into　assent　to　the　fallacy　is　that　we　suppose　every



predicate　of　everything　to　be　an　individual　thing；　and　we　understand



it　as　being　one　with　the　thing：　and　we　therefore　treat　it　as　a



substance：　for　it　is　to　that　which　is　one　with　a　thing　or　substance；



as　also　to　substance　itself；　that　'individually'　and　'being'　are



deemed　to　belong　in　the　fullest　sense。　For　this　reason；　too；　this　type



of　fallacy　is　to　be　ranked　among　those　that　depend　on　language；　in　the



first　place；　because　the　deception　is　effected　the　more　readily　when



we　are　inquiring　into　a　problem　in　company　with　others　than　when　we　do



so　by　ourselves　（for　an　inquiry　with　another　person　is　carried　on　by



means　of　speech；　whereas　an　inquiry　by　oneself　is　carried　on　quite



as　much　by　means　of　the　object　itself）；　secondly　a　man　is　liable　to　be