on sophistical refutations-第3章

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not　merely　synonymous　but　the　same　name…and　to　confute　it　from　the



propositions　granted；　necessarily；　without　including　in　the



reckoning　the　original　point　to　be　proved；　in　the　same　respect　and



relation　and　manner　and　time　in　which　it　was　asserted。　A　'false



assertion'　about　anything　has　to　be　defined　in　the　same　way。　Some



people；　however；　omit　some　one　of　the　said　conditions　and　give　a



merely　apparent　refutation；　showing　（e。g。）　that　the　same　thing　is　both



double　and　not　double：　for　two　is　double　of　one；　but　not　double　of



three。　Or；　it　may　be；　they　show　that　it　is　both　double　and　not



double　of　the　same　thing；　but　not　that　it　is　so　in　the　same　respect：



for　it　is　double　in　length　but　not　double　in　breadth。　Or；　it　may　be；



they　show　it　to　be　both　double　and　not　double　of　the　same　thing　and　in



the　same　respect　and　manner；　but　not　that　it　is　so　at　the　same　time：



and　therefore　their　refutation　is　merely　apparent。　One　might；　with



some　violence；　bring　this　fallacy　into　the　group　of　fallacies



dependent　on　language　as　well。



　　Those　that　depend　on　the　assumption　of　the　original　point　to　be



proved；　occur　in　the　same　way；　and　in　as　many　ways；　as　it　is



possible　to　beg　the　original　point；　they　appear　to　refute　because



men　lack　the　power　to　keep　their　eyes　at　once　upon　what　is　the　same



and　what　is　different。



　　The　refutation　which　depends　upon　the　consequent　arises　because



people　suppose　that　the　relation　of　consequence　is　convertible。　For



whenever；　suppose　A　is；　B　necessarily　is；　they　then　suppose　also



that　if　B　is；　A　necessarily　is。　This　is　also　the　source　of　the



deceptions　that　attend　opinions　based　on　sense…perception。　For



people　often　suppose　bile　to　be　honey　because　honey　is　attended　by　a



yellow　colour：　also；　since　after　rain　the　ground　is　wet　in



consequence；　we　suppose　that　if　the　ground　is　wet；　it　has　been



raining；　whereas　that　does　not　necessarily　follow。　In　rhetoric



proofs　from　signs　are　based　on　consequences。　For　when　rhetoricians



wish　to　show　that　a　man　is　an　adulterer；　they　take　hold　of　some



consequence　of　an　adulterous　life；　viz。　that　the　man　is　smartly



dressed；　or　that　he　is　observed　to　wander　about　at　night。　There　are；



however；　many　people　of　whom　these　things　are　true；　while　the　charge



in　question　is　untrue。　It　happens　like　this　also　in　real　reasoning；



e。g。　Melissus'　argument；　that　the　universe　is　eternal；　assumes　that



the　universe　has　not　come　to　be　（for　from　what　is　not　nothing　could



possibly　come　to　be）　and　that　what　has　come　to　be　has　done　so　from　a



first　beginning。　If；　therefore；　the　universe　has　not　come　to　be；　it



has　no　first　beginning；　and　is　therefore　eternal。　But　this　does　not



necessarily　follow：　for　even　if　what　has　come　to　be　always　has　a　first



beginning；　it　does　not　also　follow　that　what　has　a　first　beginning　has



come　to　be；　any　more　than　it　follows　that　if　a　man　in　a　fever　be



hot；　a　man　who　is　hot　must　be　in　a　fever。



　　The　refutation　which　depends　upon　treating　as　cause　what　is　not　a



cause；　occurs　whenever　what　is　not　a　cause　is　inserted　in　the



argument；　as　though　the　refutation　depended　upon　it。　This　kind　of



thing　happens　in　arguments　that　reason　ad　impossible：　for　in　these



we　are　bound　to　demolish　one　of　the　premisses。　If；　then；　the　false



cause　be　reckoned　in　among　the　questions　that　are　necessary　to



establish　the　resulting　impossibility；　it　will　often　be　thought　that



the　refutation　depends　upon　it；　e。g。　in　the　proof　that　the　'soul'



and　'life'　are　not　the　same：　for　if　coming…to…be　be　contrary　to



perishing；　then　a　particular　form　of　perishing　will　have　a



particular　form　of　coming…to…be　as　its　contrary：　now　death　is　a



particular　form　of　perishing　and　is　contrary　to　life：　life；　therefore；



is　a　coming　to…be；　and　to　live　is　to　come…to…be。　But　this　is



impossible：　accordingly；　the　'soul'　and　'life'　are　not　the　same。　Now



this　is　not　proved：　for　the　impossibility　results　all　the　same；　even



if　one　does　not　say　that　life　is　the　same　as　the　soul；　but　merely　says



that　life　is　contrary　to　death；　which　is　a　form　of　perishing；　and　that



perishing　has　'coming…to…be'　as　its　contrary。　Arguments　of　that



kind；　then；　though　not　inconclusive　absolutely；　are　inconclusive　in



relation　to　the　proposed　conclusion。　Also　even　the　questioners



themselves　often　fail　quite　as　much　to　see　a　point　of　that　kind。



　　Such；　then；　are　the　arguments　that　depend　upon　the　consequent　and



upon　false　cause。　Those　that　depend　upon　the　making　of　two　questions



into　one　occur　whenever　the　plurality　is　undetected　and　a　single



answer　is　returned　as　if　to　a　single　question。　Now；　in　some　cases；



it　is　easy　to　see　that　there　is　more　than　one；　and　that　an　answer　is



not　to　be　given；　e。g。　'Does　the　earth　consist　of　sea；　or　the　sky？'　But



in　some　cases　it　is　less　easy；　and　then　people　treat　the　question　as



one；　and　either　confess　their　defeat　by　failing　to　answer　the



question；　or　are　exposed　to　an　apparent　refutation。　Thus　'Is　A　and



is　B　a　man？'　'Yes。'　'Then　if　any　one　hits　A　and　B；　he　will　strike　a



man'　（singular）；'not　men'　（plural）。　Or　again；　where　part　is　good　and



part　bad；　'is　the　whole　good　or　bad？'　For　whichever　he　says；　it　is



possible　that　he　might　be　thought　to　expose　himself　to　an　apparent



refutation　or　to　make　an　apparently　false　statement：　for　to　say　that



something　is　good　which　is　not　good；　or　not　good　which　is　good；　is



to　make　a　false　statement。　Sometimes；　however；　additional　premisses



may　actually　give　rise　to　a　genuine　refutation；　e。g。　suppose　a　man



were　to　grant　that　the　descriptions　'white'　and　'naked'　and　'blind'



apply　to　one　thing　and　to　a　number　of　things　in　a　like　sense。　For　if



'blind'　describes　a　thing　that　cannot　see　though　nature　designed　it　to



see；　it　will　also　describe　things　that　cannot　see　though　nature



designed　them　to　do　so。　Whenever；　then；　one　thing　can　see　while



another　cannot；　they　will　either　both　be　able　to　see　or　else　both　be



blind；　which　is　impossible。







　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　　6







　　The　right　way；　then；　is　either　to　divide　apparent　proofs　and



refutations　as　above；　or　else　to　refer　them　all　to　ignorance　of　what



'refutation'　is；　and　make　that　our　starting…point：　for　it　is



possible　to　analyse　all　the　aforesaid　modes　of　fallacy　into　breaches



of　the　definition　of　a　refutation。　In　the　first　place；　we　may　see　if



they　are　inconclusive：　for　the　conclusion　ought　to　result　from　the



premisses　laid　down；　so　as　to　compel　us　necessarily　to　state　it　and



not　merely　to　seem　to　compel　us。　Next　we　should　also　take　the



definition　bit　by　bit；　and　try　the　fallacy　thereby。　For　of　the



fallacies　that　consist　in　language；　some　depend　upon　a　double　meaning；



e。g。　ambiguity　of　words　and　of　phrases；　and　the　fallacy　of　like　verbal



forms　（for　we　habitually　speak　of　everything　as　though　it　were　a



particular　substance）…while　fallacies　of　combination　and　division



and　accent　arise　because　the　phrase　in　question　or　the　term　as　altered



is　not　the　same　as　was　intended。　Even　this；　however；　should　be　the



same；　just　as　the　thing　signified　should　be　as　well；　if　a　refutation



or　proof　is　to　be　effected；　e。g。　if　the　point　concerns　a　doublet；　then



you　should　draw　the　conclusion　of　a　'doublet'；　not　of　a　'cloak'。　For



the　former　conclusion　also　would　be　true；　but　it　has　not　been



proved；　we　need　a　further　question　to　show　that　'doublet'　means　the



same　thing；　in　order　to　satisfy　any　one　who　asks　why　you　think　your



point　proved。



　　Fallacies　that　depend　on　Accident　are　clear　cases　of　ignoratio



elenchi　when　once　'proof'　has　been　defined。　For　the　same　definition



ought　to　hold　good　of　'refutation'　too；　except　that　a　mention　of



'the　contradictory'　is　here　added：　for　a　refutation　is　a　proof　of



the　contradictory。　If；　then；　there　is　no　proof　as　regards　an



accident　of　anything；　there　is　no　refutation。　For　sup